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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
FROM STABILITY TO INSURGENCY: THE ROOT AND PROXIMATE CAUSES  
 
OF THE SEPTEMBER 2002 CIVIL WAR IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE 
 
by  
 
Bertin K. Kouadio 
 
Florida International University, 2009 
 
Miami, Florida 
 
Professor John F. Clark, Major Professor 
 
This dissertation was an analysis of the root and proximate causes of the 
September 2002 civil war in Côte d’Ivoire.  The central question of this study was: Why 
did Côte d’Ivoire, which was relatively stable under President Houphouët-Boigny, 
suddenly begin to experience political violence in the 1990s and an explosion in 2002? 
Côte d’Ivoire was an interesting case because it was stable for a long period of time, 
apparently making it an infertile ground for conflict. It was also interesting for 
comparative purposes because of the fact that several states in West Africa (for instance, 
Benin, Togo, and Ghana) have experienced military coups but not have civil wars. 
Finally, this case was an opportunity to revisit the debate on the causes of civil wars in 
the African context. Chapter one has outlined the entire dissertation project and 
contextualized the analysis that follows in the subsequent chapters. Chapter two has 
reviewed the literature on civil wars in general, identified the different types of civil wars, 
and the type the Ivoiran war is. Chapter three has examined the domestic and 
international political economy as a source of the civil violence in Côte d’Ivoire. Chapter 
iv 
 
 
 
four has examined the role of ethnicity and region as identities of the war, while chapter 
five has analyzed the role of the foreign relations in the civil war, as well as the regional 
political context. Chapter six has distinguished between the root and proximate causes of 
the Ivoirian civil war, made judgments about the relative weight of the various causes, 
and the extent to which the weight of the causes can be measured.  
The study found that the “Ivoirité” was the most important trigger of the civil war 
in Côte d’Ivoire. The overall conclusion of my dissertation was that the September 2002 
crisis in that country was a political crisis which occured in the context of a political 
reform. It first started with succession problems in 1993 followed by the controversial 
elections in 1995 and 2000. Later, this electoral politics spread beyond electoral issues, 
namely citizenship matters.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation is an analysis of the root and proximate causes of the September 
2002 civil war in Côte d’Ivoire (also called Ivory Coast). It consists of six chapters and 
covers the period from 7 August 1960 (date of Côte d’Ivoire’s independence from 
France) to 19 September 2002 (date of the beginning of the civil war). This study does 
not consider developments outside of this time period unless they are relevant in 
understanding the start of the Ivoirian civil war. 
The chapter one outlines the entire dissertation project and contextualizes the 
analysis that is to follow. It is divided into three sections. The first section outlines the 
relatively long period of stability under President Houphouët-Boigny (1960-1993). The 
second section discusses the major events that led to the civil war after Houphouët-
Boigny died in December 1993. The third section gives a brief overview of the remaining 
five chapters.  
I should begin by stating that a countless number of interesting things may be said 
about civil wars, but this dissertation has a specific and narrow agenda. I am interested in 
understanding the root and proximate causes of the current civil war in Côte d’Ivoire. In 
other words, this dissertation seeks to understand how one of Africa’s most stable and 
prosperous states has fallen victim to war.  Since the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire was so 
unexpected, it should have something interesting to tell us about civil wars in general and 
African civil wars since the end of the Cold War in particular. 
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Côte d’Ivoire is an interesting case because it was stable for a long period of time, 
apparently making it an infertile ground for conflict. Until 1990, this small West African 
state was dominated by a single-party system led by President Felix Houphouët-Boigny. 
A combination of internal and external factors forced the late president and the 
Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), to adopt multiparty democracy in 1990. 
Thereafter, the country experienced political tumult and then civil war. Côte d’Ivoire is 
also an interesting case for comparative purposes due the fact that several states in West 
Africa (for instance, Benin, Togo, and Ghana) have experienced military coups but not 
have civil wars. This begs the central question of this study: Why did Côte d’Ivoire, 
which was relatively stable under President Houphouët-Boigny, suddenly begin to 
experience political violence in the 1990s and an explosion in 2002?  
In order to answer this question I have organized this dissertation around the 
following contexts: First, I examined the domestic or national political context in which 
Côte d’Ivoire evolved since it became independent from France in 1960. Second, I 
discussed the regional context using Côte d’Ivoire’s regional foreign policies towards its 
neighbors and other African states, identifying the major interactions (economic, 
political, and diplomatic) Côte d’Ivoire has had since its independence in 1960. Third, I 
explored the international context (namely the past and current relationships with France, 
as well as other non-African states, the world market, and the International Monetary 
Fund and World Bank), to measure which factors can be regarded as contributing factors 
to the crisis. The following five sub-questions and hypotheses were also developed in 
order to make a full assessment of how all the foregoing arguments measure up in the 
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hope that their answers would ultimately reach an understanding why the civil war came 
to Côte d’Ivoire.  
First, what kind of relationships existed between the former colonizing country 
(France) and Côte d’Ivoire before and after 1990? I begin by noting that France’support 
of Côte d’Ivoire was automatic under President Houphouët-Boigny, but this was not the 
case following the founding president’s death. It should be noted that France and Côte 
d’Ivoire had signed multiple treaties (including political, diplomatic, economic, and 
military) during the early years of independence. Because of this France protected this 
country from both internal and external aggression. A change in this patron-client 
relationship may help explain the situation in Côte d’Ivoire. 
Second, what kind of relationships existed between the various ethnic groups in 
Côte d’Ivoire under the single-party regime, and after the installation of multiparty 
democracy in 1990? That is, how was the unity of the country maintained under President 
Houphouët-Boigny? What changed after his death, and why? The study notes that under 
the first regime ethnic differences were managed, a model of ethnic tolerance was 
promoted using mass media, administrative, ideological, and promoting positive 
communication and interaction among members of different ethnic and, also religious 
groups. This was neglected in the subsequent regimes, including one military (1999- 
2000). Instead, a variety of influences promoted division and rivalry between ethnic and, 
especially religious groups. Such divisions initially began with electoral politics and then 
spread beyond electoral issues, namely the creation of the Ivoirité concept. 
Third, to what extent were the neighboring states (Mali, Burkina Faso, and 
Liberia) guilty of collaborating with the rebellious friends or foes of the first regime? If 
3 
 
 
 
so, and the interference was significant, what went wrong with these relationships? That 
is, why did they begin to intervene during the 1990s and 2000s when they have not done 
so before? The study hypothesizes that these neighboring states may have stimulated the 
rebellion for various reasons including cultural (origins, culture, and religion) or 
economic (migrant worker communities).  
Fourth, what types of leadership quality or vision did the different leaders have 
for Côte d’Ivoire’s economic and political development? The study hypothesizes that the 
new leaders who followed President Houphouët-Boigny may have lacked charisma or 
some other qualities of leadership that made them ineffective at holding the country 
together. 
Fifth, what types of economic interactions did Côte d’Ivoire have then and now 
on the local, regional, and world market? What factors contributed to the economic 
decline or economic boom in this country? What happened to the price and local income 
from Côte d’Ivoire’s cocoa and coffee? The study hypothesizes that changes in the world 
economy and Côte d’Ivoire’s role in it may explain the change. Furthermore, the study 
questions whether the structural adjustment programs imposed by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in the 1980s and 1990s might have contributed to 
significant increase in poverty-for reasons now well-documented, including huge national 
debt, lack of money for infrastructure programs in education, health, and jobs, resulting 
in an increase in general misery of average and poor people resulting in higher general 
dissatisfaction or frustration.  
My dissertation begins with the core assumption that the civil war in Côte 
d’Ivoire cannot be explained (that is, revealed to have one over-riding cause, or a network 
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of intersecting causes whose influence can be quantified), but it can be understood (that 
is, one can identify the main contributing causes, and make some judgments about which 
are most influential, one can distinguish between necessary conditions, contributing 
conditions, and efficient usually posed as “proximate” causes. The overall conclusion 
will present all the arguments, weigh them and determine which causes seem particularly 
compelling and relevant to this case.  
1. The Long Period of Stability  
  The period 1960-1980 was marked by significant economic progress that led 
analysts such as Amin (1970), Hecht (1983), and Nyong’oro (1978 and 1987), to describe 
Côte d’Ivoire as an exception in Sub-Saharan Africa. According to these scholars, Côte 
d’Ivoire, not only was regarded as the leading country in Francophone Africa, but also a 
symbol and model of political and economic success on the continent, and the developing 
world. Chabal (1993) and Rothchild et al. (1996) have also argued that President 
Houphouët-Boigny was the main architect of that relative success and stability. He was 
able to hold the various ethnic and religious communities together, while promoting 
economic prosperity. As a result, this country was attributed some flattering labels 
including: “oasis of prosperity and stability”, “economic miracle”, “ lung of West 
Africa”, “heavy weight”, “economic locomotive of West Africa”, “African elephant”, or 
“success story” among others (Bakary 2003). 
Côte d’Ivoire was a key player on the world stage both politically and 
economically under President Houphouët-Boigny. Nyong’oro (1978 and 1987), for 
example, writes that economically, he created an African capitalist model for his country 
that generated a huge success in the first two decades of independence, as well as massive 
5 
 
 
 
West African immigrant communities into Côte d’Ivoire. A large number of people of 
Lebanese descent, French, and North Africans settled in Côte d’Ivoire also. Two 
hagiobiographies by Siriex (1975 and 1986) were dedicated to the Ivoirian leader. The 
first was Houphouët-Boigny: L’homme de la Paix (Houphouët-Boigny: The Man of 
Peace), and the second was Houphouët-Boigny ou la Sagesse Africaine (Houphouët-
Boigny or The African Wisedom).  
The late president was very active both inside and outside his country. At the 
continental level, Houphouët-Boigny played a major diplomatic role assisting in the 
resolution of many crises including: the Biafra war of 1967-1970 in Nigeria, the Angola 
and Mozambique wars of the 1970s and 1980s, the civil war in Liberia in the 1990s, and 
more. Furthermore, he granted asylum to many deposed ex-African leaders, and he 
remained the main leader of the famous La Françafrique (Franco-African Community) 
on the continent until his death in December 1993. Because of his political longevity and 
the respect he received by his peers, Houphouët-Boigny was considered the father, and 
source of wisdom and consultation for many young generations of African leaders 
including: Charles Taylor of Liberia, Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso, Jerry Rwalings of 
Ghana, and Samora Machel of Mozambique, to mention just a few. Finally, he was 
personally involved in the dismantling of the Apartheid regime in South Africa. 
Unfortunately, he did not see other important developments after Nelson Mandela 
became president in that country. 
Despite all of this, his legacy continues to divide Ivoirian communities. During 
my doctoral research in Abidjan in 2003 and 2004, I realized that any explanations of the 
past largely reflected party loyalty, personal experiences, and ethnic affiliations. Those 
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who have benefited from his personal rule and the one-party state or belonged to his 
ethnic group were more sympathetic to him, when in reality his reign was also tarnished 
by unfortunate events which discussed in this dissertation also. In order to understand 
what is plaguing Côte d’Ivoire it is important to provide some background by 
highlighting the country’s geography, ethnography, as well as history of settlement and 
spatial occupation.  
Côte d’Ivoire has a total area of 322,460 square kilometers. It borders the 
Republics of Liberia and Guinea-Conakry (west), Mali (north-west), Burkina Faso 
(north), Ghana (east), and the Atlantic Ocean (south). It has two main vegetation belts 
that cut the country almost in half. The southern portion is covered by the tropical 
rainforest, and savanna in the north. Côte d’Ivoire enjoys a warm climate, tropical along 
the coast, semiarid in far north, three seasons-warm and dry (November to March), hot 
and dry (March to May), hot and wet (June to October). Though, the climate is now 
changing due to new local and global forces (Kouadio and Gottlieb 1997).  
This country consists of five major ethnic groups (Mande, Kru, Akan, Gur, and 
the coastal people). The five ethnic groups consist of sixty-six dialects. The regional 
distribution of these ethnic groups is as follows: Akan speaking people (42%), including 
the Baule, Anyi, and Abron, are largely located in the central region and along the eastern 
coast (and in neighboring countries, especially Ghana). The Mande people include two 
sub-groups: the northern Mande (17%), consisting of the Dyula, Bamana, and Malinke, 
and southern Mande made up of the Wan, Beng, Mwan, Guro, Dan, Gban, and Tura, who 
account for 10%. Originally from Liberia, Guinea, and Mali, most of them are located in 
the center-west region of the country. In the west are Kru speakers (11%) consisting of 
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the Guere, Wobe, Kodia, Grebo, Oubi, Neyo, Bakwe, Bete, and Niaboua, who came from 
Liberia, the Gambia, and Guinea. In the north (along the borders with Mali and Burkina 
Faso) is the Gur or Voltaic group (18%), comprising primarily of the Senufo, Kulango, 
Lobi, and other small groups (Gouin, Site, Degha, Samogho, and Gonja). The coastal 
peoples consisting of Abe, Abidji, Abure, Mbato, Avikam, Nzima, Ebrie, Jackjack, 
Eotiole, Adjukru, and Alladian, are named for their location next to the coastal lagoon 
and the Atlantic Ocean. The 1998 data structure the main language groups of Côte 
d’Ivoire as follows: 23 percent Baule; 18 percent Bete; 15 percent Senufo; 11 percent 
Malinke; and 33 percent other (Kouadio and Gottlieb 1997, see also Konate 2004, 
Loucou 1984, and Kouadio 2007).  
Also, there are significant numbers of immigrants from the Middleast and North 
Africa, Asia, and Europe. From other Sub-Saharan African countries these included 
primarily people from Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Benin, Togo, Senegal, Mali, Guinea, 
Ghana, Niger, and Liberia. Meanwhile, the civil wars in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, famine in Ethiopia in the 1980s, and elsewhere on the 
continent caused immigration from these troubled countries into Côte d’Ivoire (Kouadio 
2007). Table 1 and table 2 below respectively show the major ethnic groups and 
distribution, and languages within each group. Also, a linguistic map of Côte d’Ivoire is 
provided in Appendix A (p. 213).  
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Table 1 : Major Ethnic Groups  
 
 
ETHNIC GROUP 
 
PERCENTAGE 
 
LOCATION 
Akan 42.1% Central Region and the 
Eastern Coast 
Voltaic or Gur 17.6% North 
Northern Mande 16.5% Northwest 
Southern Mande 10% Southterwest 
Kru 11% West 
Lagoon or Coastal 
People 
2.8% Southern Atlantic Coast 
Other 130,000 Lebanese 14,000 French +Other Across the country 
 
Source: Adapted from CIA Factbook (1998)-Côte d'Ivoire  
 
 
Table 2: Major Languages  
 
ETHNIC GROUP LANGUAGE 
Akan Baule, Anyi, and Abron 
Northern Mande Dyula, Bambara, and Malinké 
Southern Mande Wan, Beng, Mwan, Guro, Dan, Gban, and Tura 
Kru Guere, Wobe, Kodia, Grebo, Oubi, Neyo, Bakwe, Dida, Bete, 
and Niaboua 
Voltaic or Gur Senufo, Kulango, Lobi, Gouin, Site, Degha, Samogho, Gonja 
Lagoon or Coastal 
People 
Abe, Abidji, Abure, Mbato, Avikam, Nzima, Ebrie, Jackjack, 
Eotiole, Adjukru, and Alladian 
 
 
Source: Bertin Kouadio and Alma Gottlieb (1997) 
 
Côte d’Ivoire has three major religions including: practitioners of traditional 
African religions or animism (25-40 percent), Muslim (35-40 percent), and Christian (20-
30 percent). The majority of foreigners (migrant workers from the Sahel region) are 
Muslim (70%), and Christian (20%). These figures, however, are approximations, as 
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there is much syncretism in religious practice, and mutual tolerance that seems to be 
fading away due to the recent political developments in the country since December 
1993.  
In fact, animist groups are fairly heterogeneous with assorted ancestors, gods, and 
spirits of the earth, forest, and sky being identified, sometimes alongside a high god. As 
for the major world religions, many Ivoirians add the Christian or Muslim god and 
associated religious practices to their old customs and pantheons, rather than converting 
fully. But, religious differences had never been a source of conflict in Côte d’Ivoire 
before. Committed converts to Christianity or Islam tend to be clustered in the cities 
rather than the rural areas. Various forms of Christianity, from Roman Catholicism to the 
independent churches of William Wade Harris, and Albert Atcho, have gained a 
significant following among the Akan and Lagoon people, while Islam finds followers 
among Mande-and Gur-speaking people (Kouadio and Gottlieb 1997). As for the 
immigrants, they normally retain their original beliefs and practices, although some are 
affected by their new environment and may opt to join a new religious tradition. Despite 
this heterogeneity of the Ivoirian population these groups were able to live side by side 
for nearly four decades without major clashes (Kouadio 2007).  Table 3 below shows the 
various religious faiths and their distribution by percentage, as well as the regions where 
they are mostly practiced. 
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Table 3: Major Religions 
 
 
RELIGION 
 
PERCENTAGE 
 
LOCATION 
Muslim 35-40% Mostly north, but also other regions 
Indigenous 25-40% Widespread across the country 
Christian 20-30% Mostly south, also other regions 
Foreigners 
(Muslim) 
70% North, urban centers, also other regions 
Foreigners 
(Christian) 
20% Mostly south, also other regions 
 
Source: Adapted from CIA Fact book (2001)-Côte d'Ivoire  
 
Politically, Côte d’Ivoire has been run by ethnic Baule, Bete and Dyula leaders, 
though French influence remains significant. Felix Houphouët-Boigny, a Baule from 
Yamoussoukro (center), was its first president, and he remained in this position until his 
death on 7 December 1993 at the age of eighty-eight. Baulin (1980 and 1982), Amondji 
(1984 and 1986), Siriex (1986), Tiemoko (2000), Jackson and Rosberg (1982), and 
Cohen (1974) have extensively written about the life of President Houphouët-Boigny and 
the history of Côte d’Ivoire. There is a large consensus among these scholars that the life 
of the president and the history of his country were so intertwined that it appears almost 
impossible to separate the two. In fact, Jacques Baulin, a former advisor to the president, 
called him “Monsieur Côte d’Ivoire.” In other words, one could not talk of Côte d’Ivoire 
without referring to Houphouët-Boigny and vice-versa. This also gave an indication of 
the tight control the president enjoyed over his country and people. But, where did the 
president derive all this power, and how did he manage to maintain unity, to remain well-
connected to his people?  
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Houphouët-Boigny’s initial rise to power started during the colonial era when he 
first served as an African physician (médécin Africain) in various regions of the country 
(Aboisso in the southeast, and Guiglo in the west). Then he became the head of his family 
and traditional chief of the Akwe people (his native tribe) after his maternal uncle 
Kouassi Ngoh died. Some years earlier, he had studied medicine in the prestigious 
colonial school of William Ponty at Gorée, Senegal (Houphouët-Boigny 1994: 55).  
It was French colonial Governor Lapalude of Côte d’Ivoire who invited the young 
physician to take over the position of his deceased uncle, a loyal chief and servant to the 
French colonial administration.  Houphouët-Boigny then resigned from his position to 
lead his family and his native tribe, also serve the interests of the colonial administration. 
He was set to become a wealthy man, and to have an illustrious, bright, and long political 
career. First, he inherited a huge amount of wealth from his family, and the colonial 
administration, which he later used during his political struggle against his political 
opponents. He also claimed all the cocoa, coffee, and tobacco plantations, as well as 
assets from his deceased brother Augustin Dia, and his uncle Kouassi Ngoh. Quickly, the 
former African physician became a wealthy man, and a big African planter (Houphouët-
Boigny 1994: 75). 
During his tenure as president, Houphouët-Boigny was a fine politician who was 
capable of combining intelligence, risk taking, confidence and hope, by navigating 
sharply between traditional and modern ways of governance. Admirers such as Coulibaly 
(1975) and Zan (1986) among others have referred to him as the most prominent 
politician of his time in Sub-Saharan Africa. They described him as clever, opportunistic, 
and very energetic, and his political career filled with important achievements. Moreover, 
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Houphouêt-Boigny was identified with the anti-colonial movement through the 
Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), a regional association of which the 
Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) he created was a local chapter (Amondji 1984: 
9-10 and Appiah 1993).  
In his part, Crowder (1978: 225) writes that French colonial rule in West Africa 
ended in the early 1940s. That during the decolonization process (1944-1960) 
Houphouët-Boigny was backed by France, and had the guaranteed support of the 
traditional chiefs against radical politicians. This author adds that his education and other 
responsibilities had earned him a good deal of respect, which I explained below.  
In 1930, he married his first wife, a royal Agni descendent with a Senegalese 
father. The Agni people live in the southeast region (see map in Appendix A, p.217) and 
are highly respected by other groups. They have a kinship system that goes hundreds 
years back. Thus, Houphouët-Boigny acquired kinship ties with another Akan group, and 
also the foreign African community (Houphouët-Boigny 1994: 62).  
In 1940, he organized the Association of Customary Chiefs (Associations des 
Chefs Coutumiers), thus extending his influence among traditional leaders throughout 
Côte d’Ivoire (Baulin 1982: 25). In 1944, he organized the African cocoa and coffee 
growers’ union (Syndicat Agricole Africain) in Côte d’Ivoire. Through this mechanism, 
he joined together large numbers of people from various ethnic groups who relied upon 
him for representation. These activities reflected his ability to create a wide network of 
popular and political support (Mundt 1987: 83). 
Mundt (1987: 10-11) observes that, in Côte d’Ivoire, the politics of independence 
began after World War II. Political activity began in the trade unions, ethnic and other 
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associations in the towns, and in a farmers’ union ahead of the elections. It was a 
coalition of these organizations that sent Houphouët-Boigny to the Constituent Assembly 
in Paris (see also Campbell, 2003). Amondji (1984: 19) also writes that while in France, 
Houphouët-Boigny succeeded in lobbying for and obtaining the abolition of forced labor, 
which gave him the undisputed prominence among the Ivoirian electorate. He then came 
back to his country to participate in the formation of the PDCI, drawing support from the 
union of African planters and other groups. 
In 1946, Côte d’Ivoire and other territories joined with France in the French 
Union, giving Houphouët-Boigny another opportunity to excel and shine among his 
peers. The same year saw the birth of the RDA, a regional party encompassing all of 
Francophone Africa with affiliated groups in each colony (Worster 1989).  
By 1950, Houphouët-Boigny emerged as the undisputed leader of the PDCI, and 
the obvious choice as spokesman for his country while it moved toward independence in 
1960 (Mundt 1987: 84). In 1956, he was successively named mayor of Abidjan, and he 
entered the French government at the ministerial level (Legum 1965).  
After a negotiated independence with France, he became Côte d’Ivoire’s first 
president on 7 August 1960. He was then re-elected again and again without any 
opposition in 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990 (Lye 2003). Though, the 1990 
political context was different as multipartyism had officially been authorized in that 
country for the first time. Houphouët-Boigny largely won against a weak opposition led 
by his long time political opponent, Laurent Gabgbo. 
As I mentioned earlier, Houphouët-Boigny played key roles as an educated 
leader, modern politician, and traditional chief during career. This navigation of identities 
14 
 
 
 
ensured his position locally, regionally, and even worldwide. He even intentionally 
manipulated the Constitution to ensure the smooth transition to Bédié’s (formerly 
president of the National Assembly) rule upon his death (Bakary 1984, Wauthier 1997, 
and Wiseman 1995). He was groomed to be the next president based on the constitutional 
provision should the president died. Ironically this was the case. 
But, most analysts and Ivoirian people remain divided over the president’s legacy. 
On the one hand, admirers such as Xavier (1971), Baulin (1980 and 1982), Zan (1986), 
Siriex (1975 and 1986), and Coulibaly (1975), have attributed the long period of stability 
to his skillful political maneuver, open-door and immigration policies towards the 
neighboring states during the economic boom of the 1960s and 1970s, and strong ties to 
the West, especially France. On the other hand, his major critics such as Gbagbo (1980 
and 1983), Kourouma (1970 and 1978) have denounced the president’s repressive tactics 
against his political enemies. Both Gbagbo and Kourouma had been imprisoned by the 
late president for their hash criticisms against the absence or lack of democracy during 
the single-party regime era. In fact, most Houphouët-Boigny supporters viewed or 
portrayed Gbagbo as rude, and someone who dared to challenge the authority of the old 
and autocratic president. In the end, they both were forced to exile to France, where 
Kourouma died.  
Indeed, numbers of events happened under the one-party rule, which were not all 
perceptible on the surface. Some painful events had occurred under Houphouët-Boigny’s 
watch. These events included: (1) the Guebie rebellion of 1969-70 in which entire Bete 
villages were wiped out by the army in Gagnoa region, (2) political opponents such as 
Ernest Boka, Biaka Boda, Kragbe Gnagbe, and Jean-Baptiste Mockey, who were brutally 
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suppressed or had lost their lives under very strange circumstances, (3) student activists 
(including Laurent Gbagbo) who were enrolled by force in the military and sent to a 
notorious camp in Seguela (northwest) as punishment for the rebellious actions toward 
the regime, (4) and the numerous alleged plots (faux complots) used by the president to 
attack his opponents. In some instances, some of these so-called political enemies, or 
suspected troublemakers were named Ambassadors to far away countries. An example of 
this was army General Bertin Zeze Barouan, a Bete from the west, who was named 
Ambassador to Brazil without any formal training in foreign affairs. These events, 
however, did not play a significant role on the national scene. They were seen by many as 
an act correction, especially those loyal to the former regime.  
Despite these events which should not be minimized, it is undeniable that Côte 
d’Ivoire’s initial impressive economic success and political stability during the early 
years of independence was owed to the vision the president had for his country. As 
Rothchild et al. (1996) and Baulin (1980) have argued for, he believed in a unified, 
stable, and modern state built on a solid base of agricultural export, translated by an 
open-door policy throughout the region, which attracted foreign migrant workers in the 
cocoa and coffee plantations, owned first by the local planters. Gradually, some of these 
migrant workers were able to purchase some land and grow their own cocoa and coffee, 
thus some of them settled permanently. Côte d’Ivoire became the world largest producer 
of cocoa, and it occupied a high rank in coffee production also (Hecht 1983, Nyong’o 
1987, Amin 1970, den Tuinder 1978, and Brayton 1979). 
Unfortunately, the relative economic prosperity of the early years of 
independence could not be sustained because of some internal and external forces which 
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are described below. The system in place started to fall apart, and the country needed 
political reform and economic change (Toungara 1986), the so-called economic ‘miracle’ 
started to tarnish (Bourke 1987), and the ideology of development in place was heavily 
challenged (World Bank 1987, Young 1982, Rapley 1993). 
In fact, the official local newspaper, Fraternité Matin (2003), argues that between 
1980 and 1990, the fall of the price of cocoa and coffee occasioned a fatal downfall of the 
Côte d’Ivoire’s economy. All the sectors of the economy were impacted severely, 
especially the agricultural sector. As a result of the economic downturn, many people 
could not afford to send their children to school, and buy basic goods, including 
medicine. Moreover, their habits and lifestyles changed dramatically creating anger, 
frustration, and general misery. Expectedly, this had put enormous pressure on the 
government both internally and externally. Domestically, the number of the discontents 
grew significantly. Externally, there was a lot of pressure from the foreign debtors, 
including the IMF and World Bank. 
On 25 May 1987, the government announced it could no longer pay its foreign 
debt, which was estimated at 6 billion U.S. dollars, forcing it to accept and implement 
some painful policy prescriptions in the form of structural adjustment programs imposed 
by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. These adjustment programs of the 
1990s have received much attention from analysts such as Bratton and van de Walle 
(1997). The initial phase of these adjustment programs was to stabilize the troubled 
economy. The second phase consisted of reforming the economic and financial sectors, 
which in turn will stimulate growth. The expectations behind this were that part of the 
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revenues generated would serve to repay the country’s foreign debt, and ensure the 
financial security of the people. 
Hence, in 1989, the World Bank required that the national economy be made 
competitive by depreciating the exchange rate and improving the public finances, and 
resulting in a significant increase in unemployment, which was already high, due to the 
closing of many factories around the country. Moreover, the government proposed to 
reduce the salaries of the workers in the same year. In Sub-Saharan Africa the 
government is the major employer, and a civil servant feeds more than his or her own 
nuclear family (husband, wife, and children). It was clear that cutting the salaries would 
have dramatic consequences on those workers and their dependents. Expectedly, these 
measures provoked huge social protests in Abidjan and elsewhere in the country, forcing 
the government to review its first round of adjustment measures. It tried without success 
to find new ways that would be less painful. Each time it met the opposition of the 
people. 
Meanwhile, the opposition led by Laurent Gbagbo began pressing for multiparty 
democracy and the organization of transparent and fair elections in the same year 
(Conteh-Morgan 1997). During these difficult moments, Fraternité Matin (2003) argues, 
President Houphouët-Boigny was caught between the demand from the foreign aid 
donors on the one hand, social organizations, and political opposition on the other hand. 
But, the government had to take courageous decisions to save the country from plunging 
further. It was in this context that president Houphouët-Boigny called upon Allasane 
Dramane Ouattara (also called ADO), a former Governor of the West African Central 
Bank in Dakar (BCEAO), who was serving as Deputy-Director of the African Division at 
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the International Monetary Fund in Washington D.C., to inject some shocks into the 
Ivoirian economy (Konate 2004).  
In April 1990, Ouattara led the Comité Interministériel de Coordination du 
Programme de Stabilization et de Rélance Economique to oversea the adjustment 
program. On 7 November 1990, he was named prime minister, the first in Côte d’Ivoire’s 
history. However, the honeymoon between the new prime minister and the people did not 
last long. Rumors about his identity were being circulated around the country. According 
to Fraternité Matin (2003), it was alleged that the former Deputy-Director of the IMF in 
Washington D.C. (1984-1988) had worked with a Burkina Faso passport. As a result, this 
made him a non-Ivoirian or alien to that country. But, nobody could voice this officially 
as, Houphouët-Boigny, although physically diminished, was still dominating the political 
machine in Côte d’Ivoire.  
Ouattara went ahead and designed a number of important, but unpopular 
measures. According to the same newspaper, the first set of measures included: to reduce 
the number of government vehicles per ministry; to force the wealthy barons of the old 
regime and private sector to pay back taxes accumulated over the years (especially 
telephone, water, electricity, and personal properties), to supress the gratuity of 
University buses that used to be free for all the students, and privatize both government 
owned and semi-owned companies. Unfortunately, this austerity measures did not yield 
the expected results either for the government’s coffer remained empty.  
Ouattara then added new measures to the list. For example, he decided to reduce 
the salaries of all the new teachers for all the levels of the education system by 50%. This 
‘unjust’ decision sparked a huge public outcry among new and prospective teachers. 
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Next, Ouattara introduced for the first time the controversial Alien Identification Card 
(Cartes de Séjour), whereby every national from the Economic Community of West 
Africa States (ECOWAS) or (CEDEAO in French) was required to pay the equivalent of 
5,000 F CFA (7.6 Euros) per year, while other immigrants outside this organization must 
pay 50,000 F CFA (76.2 Euros) annually, as a resident alien (Fraternité Matin 2003). 
At that point, these structural adjustment programs had set the stage for mounting 
and long social unrest throughout Côte d’Ivoire. The system could explode at any time. 
Nobody knew when it can collapse for sure. Between 1990 and 1991, the country 
experienced huge mass protests and strikes by students, police, customs officers, 
University professors, transport workers, professional associations, and this climaxed by 
the takeover of the airport by army conscripts in 1990.  
Akindes (2000: 126) and Kieffer (2000) have documented the different activities 
of the military during that period, while Cogneau (2003: 87), Toungara (1999: 23), and 
Bratton and van de Walle (1997) have written extensively on the social implications of 
these adjustments on the African continent in general, and Côte d’Ivoire in particular. As 
one scholar has observed, all of these protests were a direct response to the appalling and 
poor economic diet imposed on the country by the IMF and the World Bank. Côte 
d’Ivoire, like many African states and the developing world had badly failed its structural 
adjustment programs test with the Breton Woods Instititutions.  
For a while Ouattara and his drastic measures were the center of all the daily 
conversations throughout the country, especially in Abidjan the economic capital. Those 
barons who were summoned to pay back taxes disliked Ouattara so much. In the end, 
these structural adjustment measures, which were intended to improve the economy in 
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the first place, brought significant political and social turmoil to Côte d’Ivoire and its 
people. Among other things, they gave the average Ivoirian the opportunity to break 
certain taboos of the past including: defying the authority of the government, speaking 
freely and publicly about local politics, and most importantly speaking against the 
autocratic president (Houphouët-Boigny), something which was unthinkable before. It 
has also been argued the introduction of the Alien Identification Card by Ouattara led to 
the current xenophobia or ultra-nationalism toward foreigners (Fraternité Matin 2003). 
The next section discusses the political development immediately proceeding. 
2. Political Developments Immediately Proceeding 
To many attentive observers, it was clear even in 1990 that Côte d’Ivoire was set 
to face many challenges both economically and politically. Economically, although there 
were some improvements in part of 1998, the majority of the people however remained 
unhappy with the government that continued to struggle with its foreign financiers. 
Konate (2004) argues that, politically, tension grew greater and greater among the people, 
especially with the entering of Ouattara on the Ivoirian political arena in 1990. 
Meanwhile, the sick president’s health started to deteriorate at a hospital in Paris, and 
rumors of his death spread quickly all over the country.  
Finally, on 7 December 1993, Houphouët-Boigny was officially pronounced dead 
during a nationally televised address read by then Prime Minister Ouattara. Sadly enough, 
the mourning of the late president did not last long, as the battle for the succession 
between the various contenders (mainly Ouattara and Bédié) was already underway 
(Wiseman 1995 and Wauthier 1997). 
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Article 11 of the Ivoirian Constitution stipulates that in the advent of a vacancy of 
the presidency, the president of the National Assembly takes over the mandate of the 
deceased or ill Head of State. Despite this constitutional provision, the president’s death 
provoked a friction between Ouattara (former Prime Minister) and Bédié (former 
President of the National Assembly). After Houphouët-Boigny died, Ouattara 
immediately called for a national council (Conseil d’Etat), to allegedly block Bédié from 
taking over. Ouattara’s attempt to disregard the law spurred Bédié to quickly proclaim 
himself president (Konate, 2004). 
Meanwhile, a dissident group from the old Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire 
(PDCI) created in 1994 the Rally of Republicans (RDR) led by the late Djeni Kobina, an 
Abron from Bondoukou (northeast). Kobina was later joined by other important figures 
from the old party: Henriette Dagri Diabate, a native of Jacqueville southwest, who had 
held several positions in former cabinets under Houphouët-Boigny, and Ouattara, who 
had become the emblematic figure and president of that party since 1st August 1999 
following Kobena’s death. The fight between the two main contenders went on and 
quickly spread among their respective followers and partisans. 
Bédié legally won the first round of the war of succession by taking over the 
mandate of the deceased president. He won again the second round for during the 1995 
presidential elections Ouattara did not ran on the ground that the law voted by the 
National Assembly on 8 February1994 disqualified him or it did not allow him to do so 
(Konate 2004). The 8 February 1994 law roughly states that: “All presidential candidates 
must be Ivoirian, whose parents must also be Ivoirian born.” Ouattara’s legal 
disqualification allowed Bédié to easily be elected with 95% of the ballots in 1995. 
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 Meanwhile, the political opposition, workers union, and student movements 
continued to press for better living and working conditions. On February 1992, a huge 
protest organized by the opposition was severely repressed by government forces under 
Ouattara’s watch, as the prime minister. During these demonstrations, current president, 
Laurent Gbagbo, then Secretary General of the Ivoirian Popular Front (FPI), was 
arrested, jailed, and convicted on 6 March 1992 to two years in prison along with his wife 
Simone, and other important leaders of his party. Gbagbo was finally released on 1st 
August 1992 (Afrique Contemporaine 2000, Politique Africaine 2003, and Nouveau 
Revéil 2003).  
When Ouattara was elected president of RDR, he declared his candidacy for the 
2000 elections, knowing that the law that had disqualified him in 1995 was still in effect. 
There are two possible explanations to Ouattara’s bold move to declare his candidacy for 
2000 despite all his legal troubles. One explanation is that he had been challenged, 
frustrated, humiliated, and defeated twice by Bédié, thus he sought revenge. As the 
president of his party, he could count on either one or a combination of the following: (1) 
the support of important dissidents from the old party (PDCI) who did not support Bédié, 
and (2) the support of RDR influential leaders from the north who were Muslims like 
him. Capitalizing on the latter group may be crucial in that it provides not only a large 
following from the Muslim north, but also foreigners (majority of whom are Muslims), 
and also victimized by the system. A second explanation of Ouattara’s move to declare 
himself as candidate in 2000 despite the law is that he thought he could legally challenge 
the Electoral Commission about his origins, and finally establish the truth about his 
identity.  
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In fact, in order to respond to his detractors, he had applied and obtained an 
identification certificate (Certificat d’Identité) delivered by Judge Zoro Bi Ballo in 
Dimbokro (center), where he was allegedly born in 1942. Expectedly, the authenticity of 
that certificate had been questioned by the authorities, which did not want him to 
participate in the 2000 presidential race, and perhaps no elections at all. Instead, they 
claimed that he had forged a legal document. When the story became public, pro-RDR 
members took the streets to express their anger and frustration. Ironically, the same law 
(Loi Anti-Casseurs), which had banned all public demonstrations while Ouattara was 
Prime Minister, was still in effect. Under this statute, many demonstrators were 
apprehended and sent to jail. Tension then escalated between pro-RDR members and the 
Bédié regime even further. 
Meanwhile, Bédié had published a book titled: Les Chemins de Ma Vie (The Paths 
of My Life) in which he viciously attacked Ouattara for interfering with Ivoirian politics 
in the following terms: “Burkinabè by his father, he did not have to interfere with our 
business of succession” (Konate 2004). This message of exclusion drew even more 
support from the northerners, and Muslim populations for whom Ouattara had become an 
icon, representative, spokesman, and leader. Furthermore, the immigrant population from 
the Sahel region (namely Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Chad, etc…) who were being 
abused by the security forces saw in him a potential liberator. At that point, the war of 
succession had reached its pick, which each side decided to win at all costs.  
Ironically, soon after he became prime minister, Ouattara had accepted an 
invitation to face the nation in a televised interview, to discuss his new position as Côte 
d’Ivoire’s first prime minister, and reveal his true identity to the public and, perhaps, 
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dissipate the rumors about his origins. The interview was a great opportunity for Ouattara 
to confront the nation, and discuss not only his identity, but also the burning socio-
economic issues during that time.  
Raphael Lapke, the moderator, who did not shy away from these explosive topics 
started this way (quote from Fraternité Matin 2003): “A Jeune Afrique article published 
on 8 August 1984 stated: Allassane Ouattara, a citizen of Upper-Volta (now Burkina 
Faso), of Voltaic parents who had immigrated to Côte d’Ivoire, has been named Deputy-
Director of the African Division of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to replace a 
Zambian.”  
The reading of that article set the stage for some more direct questioning or cross 
examination which is to follow: “My question to you is the following. Mister Prime 
Minister, in 1982, you were a citizen of Upper Volta. Between the priod 1985-1986, you 
adopted the Ivoirian citizenship. In 1990, you were appointed Head of the Government of 
Côte d’Ivoire. I would like to ask you a question which is twofold: First, what where the 
reasons for this choice? Second, do you think that you have a strong sense of nationalism 
like other fellow Ivoirians to make the necessary sacrifices that the current economic 
situation requires for our country?” The questions asked reflected the rumors that were 
circulating in the streets, offices, and households about Ouattara’s alleged Burkinabè 
origins.  
Following that interview, Fraternité Matin (2003) claimed that Ouattara did not 
provide convincing responses to the nation. That, his apparent silence provoked even 
deeper suspicion among the people, especially politicians, some of whom did not want 
him to run for any public office in the country. Furthermore, in a desperate attempt to link 
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him to the current civil war, Fraternité Matin (2003) published several statements that 
Ouattara had made during his moments of deep anger and frustration, especially against 
the Bédié regime (see also Konate 2004). 
Note that some of Ouattara’ statements have been used and manipulated by some 
local news outlets and political leaders to try to explain who was actually behind the 
rebellion in Côte d’Ivoire. The most popular lines included: “When the time comes, I will 
hit this shaky regime (Bédié’s), and it will fall… No one can govern Côte d’Ivoire by 
arresting the people everyday, violating the rights of journalists, businessmen (…), Côte 
d’Ivoire is no longer a lawful state (…), I will return before the end of the year (1999).”   
Ironically, the first coup that brought General Guéï to power came on December 
1999. During my doctoral research to Abidjan in 2003, I realized that the average Ivoirian 
and politicians alike had already concluded that Ouattara had played a role in the 1999 
coup which overthrew Bédié, and also the September 2002 civil war, although they had 
no evidence to prove or support such claims. Others blamed the former colonial power 
(France) for the crisis. 
To be sure, FPI leaders like Koulibaly (2000), and pro-Gbagbo local newspapers 
(Le Courier d’Abidjan 2004, Le Temps 2003) have blamed the former colonial power. 
They claimed that France did not like the Gbagbo regime because it did not renew the 
license or contrat of the major French companies operating in that country. They also 
claimed that France did not like the fact that Gbagbo extended the Ivoirian market to 
other foreign nations or competitors such as China, the United States, Japan, and others. 
It should be noted that the French own significant shares in the telecommunication, 
water, and energy industries among other things since independence. A small group of 
26 
 
 
 
Ivoirians also blamed Burkina Faso for allegedly served as training ground and safe 
heaven for the rebels before the attack of September 2002. In fact, during the early 
months of the rebellion, President Gbagbo himself blamed that country and its authorities 
for allegedly providing some “tacit” support to the rebels.  
From virtually 1990 to 2002, Côte d’Ivoire went through so much tumult and 
political animosity, that it was predictable that the war would come sooner or later. The 
war broke out on the night of 19 September 2002 after a long period of relative stability. 
The failed coup was made by rebellious exiled military who attacked simultaneously FPI 
leaders’s compounds, and military and security facilities in Abidjan (south), Bouaké 
(center), and Korhogo (north). The rebels named themselves Patriotic Movement of Côte 
d’Ivoire (MPCI). Later, two new rebel groups emerged—The Ivorian Popular Movement 
for the Great West (MPIGO) and the Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP). MPIGO 
and MJP were allied with the MPCI, and the three groups subsequently called themselves 
the New Forces (Forces Nouvelles, or FN).  
The failed coup evolved into a rebellion that split the country in two parts. The 
rebels occupied the north and far west, while the rest of the country (mostly south) 
remained under government control (see conflict map in Appendix B, p. 214). The war 
has since escalated into Côte d’Ivoire’s worse crisis since independence. It all happened 
in the context of a failed democratic experiment, first the coup of December 1999, and 
civil war in 2002. The political context of the civil war was set by the contested mainly 
by the 2000 presidential elections, when a controversial Supreme Court decision 
disqualified fourteen of the nineteen candidates, including all of the Ivoirian Democratic 
Party (PDCI) and Rally of Republicans (RDR) candidates (Toungara 2003).  
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According to Toungara (2001), the PDCI and the RDR boycotted the elections. 
Before the results were tabulated, Guéï suspended the Electoral Commission and claimed 
victory. Gbagbo rapidly proclaimed himself as president, and called his party militants to 
take the streets to show support. These angry and violent protesters forced Guéï into exile 
on 25 October. Furthermore, despite the exclusion of other candidates and the low voter 
turnout of 37 percent (compared to 54 percent for the referendum), Gbagbo held his 
ground. The Electoral Commission later confirmed his victory with 59.4 percent of votes 
cast to Guéï’s 32.3 percent. Toungara notes that upon his installation, Gbagbo launched 
another round of political repression by the security forces, as did Bédié and Guéï. The 
legislative elections of 10 December 2000 repeated the debacle of the presidential 
balloting.  
Toungara (2001) writes that the U.S. Department of State’s Country Report on 
Human Rights 2000 gave details of numerous human rights violations that began under 
Bédié and continued during several months under Gbagbo. Due to the mounting evidence 
of human rights violations against northerners, the incentives for the emergence of a 
united northern opposition grew stronger. When the RDR elected Ouattara to head their 
party upon his return to Côte d’Ivoire in July 1999, and selected him as their presidential 
candidate, northerners pledged their support in solidarity. Gbagbo allowed the murders 
and other kinds of abuse to go unpunished, as security forces continued to terrorize 
civilians. All this abuse and suffering of the people finally resulted in Côte d’Ivoire’s 
socio-political and military crisis on September 2002, which some had predicted. 
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3. Overview of the Remaining Chapters 
The second chapter of this dissertation reviews the literature on civil wars (in 
general), and discusses what kind of civil war the Ivoirian civil war is. From the different 
taxonomies that are available in the literature, it identifies that the civil war in Côte 
d’Ivoire is outwardly one among the countries ethno-regional groups. Then it outlines the 
debate between cultural pluralism and political economy approaches, domestic-oriented 
explanations (materialists and resource opportunity approach) and international political 
economy approach (structural adjustment programs), and international pressures 
approaches (western democratization, French pressure and patron-client relations with 
France, and regional pressures). 
The third chapter examines the domestic and international political economy as a 
source of civil violence in Côte d’Ivoire. It examines the correlation between the civil 
war and people’s income levels to see the trend after President Gbagbo came to power. In 
other words, did socio-economic grievances stimulate the fighting? I use the following 
empirical questions: Did the population become poorer? Were the people uncertain about 
the future? Did the size of the middle class shrink? Was there a decline in the socio-
economic indicators of the people? If the population got poorer in the 1990s, what effect 
did this have on civil violence? Did this have to do with the effects of structural 
adjustment programs, falling of cocoa and coffee prices on the world market, or a 
combination of the two? What resources did the rebels go after and how they have used 
them to support themselves? Or how did their military and political strategies change as 
the situation progresses? 
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The fourth chapter looks at the role of ethnicity and region as identities of the 
civil war. It seeks to explain how have ethno-regional differences shaped the civil war in 
that country? First, I examine the ethno-regional composition of the competing military 
forces. Second, I discuss how were the various ethno-regional groups able to live together 
in such harmony up to 1993? That is, what did stimulate the previously quiescent ethno-
political forces to take up arms against each other? 
The fifth chapter analyzes the role of the foreign relations in the civil war, as well 
as the regional political context. It seeks to understand whether the war broke out because 
France withdrew its support from President Gbagbo, or was hostile to the Gbagbo regime 
in a way that it was not to the regimes of Houphouët-Boigny, Bédié, and Guéï? I also 
look at whether or not French aid declined or drop off precipitously after Gbagbo’s 
election in 2000, or if the French rhetoric changed after Gbagbo came to power? If yes, 
when and how, sending a signal to would-be rebels? This chapter also seeks to know if 
the war broke out because the neighboring countries encouraged the rebellion. I use the 
following three empirical questions: did France signal to these neighboring countries that 
their intervention was acceptable? Or did these countries have their own reasons for 
intervening in the conflict? Why such intervention was thinkable under Gbagbo, but not 
previously? 
The concluding chapter distinguishes between proximate and root causes of the 
Ivoirian civil war. Here I make judgments about the relative weight of the various causes, 
or the extent to which the weight of the causes can be measured. I want to know if it is 
possible to give an empirical answer to the question of why the war began. Can one 
explain the war, and demonstrate with scientific precision which causes were primary? 
30 
 
 
 
Finally, I want to know what does the comparative evidence from other recent wars in 
Africa that began under similar circumstances, have to tell us about Ivoirian war?  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
When the former Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, it was hoped that the 
new world order would bring both political stability and economic prosperity to all the 
regions of the globe. In fact, some regions have experienced positive developments and 
stability since that time, while in most of Sub-Saharan Africa it seems the new order has 
served as catalysis for renewed violence and non-development. The highest numbers of 
contemporary civil wars and casualties have occurred in this part of the world. 
There were nearly a hundred civil wars worldwide between 1989 and 1994 alone. 
An estimated 80,000 people died during that period (Gurr 1994, Wallersteen and 
Sollenberg 2000). The majority of these conflicts had a strong ethnic dimension to them 
(Russets and Starr 1989: 1, Lobell and Mauceri 2004: 1). The regions with the highest 
number of ethnic rivalries included the Middleast, parts of Asia, and of course Sub-
Saharan Africa. 
Michael Brown (1996: 235) shows how grim the situation was across several Sub-
Saharan African countries. According to him, between 1991 and 1993, an estimated 
400,000 people died from war-induced famine in Somalia, while nearly 800,000 
Rwandans fell victim to the 1994 genocide. In Angola, the civil war that resumed in late 
1992 reached a death toll of 1,000 per day. In Liberia, nearly half of the population of 2.5 
million died or fled the war zone. Similar tragedies occurred in Sudan where nearly 1.2 
million people died from famine and civil war since 1984, while in October 1993, well 
over 100,000 people lost lives in Burundi during a month ethnic bloodshed.  
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Unfortunately, several Sub-Saharan African countries have followed suite or 
fallen victims to civil war since these statistics were first tabulated. Some of these so-
called new civil wars were least expected due to the relative stability that reigned in these 
countries including: Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire. It should be emphasized that, in general, 
many contemporary civil wars have occurred in the context of political reform, and 
especially around electoral issues. Their numbers are likely to increase dramatically due 
to the unpredictable nature of the political culture in that part of the globe as recently seen 
in Zimbabwe, Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, and Guinea-Bissau. But, 
what led to the violence and misery that Angola, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Sierra Leone, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, the DRC, and others have experienced?  
Scholars dealing with this complex subject can be divided into two big camps. On 
the one hand, there are those who have used quantitative methods to try to explain the 
incidence of civil wars around the world. The works of these scholars basically consist of 
using numerical data, run regression analyses, and to generate findings. On the other 
hand, there are those who have used qualitative methods to try to understand and explain 
why do civil wars occur? The scholars in this latter category often put an emphasis on the 
root and proximate causes of civil wars to draw their conclusions (Ross 2004: 337).  
While both camps have been somewhat successful in generating important 
findings and explanations, their contributions have also shown some weaknesses or flaws 
in them. In fact, some findings have been easily challenged or dismissed altogether, and 
some interpretations have been labeled one-sided, ambiguous, or simply confusing.  
However, there is a large consensus among scholars that although civil wars may 
have basic similarities, they often have fundamental differences. For instance, some civil 
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wars involve two or more identity groups within a country (Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, and Sudan), while other civil wars involve one or more ethnic groups 
and the State (Uganda, Côte d’Ivoire, and the Democratic Republic of Congo). Some 
civil wars have an international dimension to them, belonging to one or combination of 
the following four scenarios: (1) the rebel groups are directed by outside forces (namely a 
foreign country or individuals living in exile), (2) the rebels or government forces use 
foreign mercenaries in their ranks, (3) foreign peacekeepers take side in the conflict, as 
the Nigerian and Ghanaians soldiers did in Liberia in the 1990s, (4) and spillover effects 
due to refugee movements, regional insecurity, looting inside a neighboring country that 
often force it to intervene in others conflicts.   
Another important characteristic is that rebellions tend to vary across countries, in 
their internal composition, size, duration, and goals. Some rebellions are well organized 
than others, some rebel groups are better-equipped than others, some rebellions have a 
large following while others do not, some rebellions are long-lasting and difficult to 
overcome while others are easily crushed, few rebel groups are able to achieve their 
initial goals while the majority do not succeed. The literature suggests that these 
specificities are extremely important, and therefore this must be taken into account in 
order to have a full understanding of the situation on the ground. Knowing these details 
clears up some of the ambiguities and confusions about civil wars in general and African 
civil wars in particular. 
The goal of this chapter is to review the literature on the causes of the civil wars, 
and let each category of approach generate hypotheses about the Côte d’Ivoire case. The 
overall goal of the entire dissertation is to try to understand why did the civil war in Côte 
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d’Ivoire occur? This in turn should inform the theoretical literature. The present chapter 
reviews the literature on civil wars in general, and it discusses what kind of civil war 
Côte d’Ivoire’s civil war is. From the different taxonomies that are available in the 
literature, this chapter identifies that the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire is outwardly one 
among the countries’ ethno-regional groups. Then it outlines the debate over the causes 
of civil wars, specifically cultural pluralism and political economy approaches; domestic-
oriented explanations (materialist and resource opportunity approach) and international 
political economy approach (structural adjustment programs); and international pressures 
approaches (western democratization, French pressure, patron-client relations with 
France, and regional pressures). 
A. Identification of Different Types of Civil Wars 
I have identify five broad categories of the causes of civil wars in Africa, and 
other parts of the world including: (1) The civil wars in which rebels aim at regional 
secession, (2) rebels aiming at state dominance of some identity group, (3) rebels aiming 
at redistribution of wealth and income across classes, (4) ethno-groups seek control of the 
local resources, and (5) civil wars against foreign colonizers or white minorities.  
1. Rebels Seeking Secession and Control of Resources 
In this type of civil wars the rebels aim at self-determination to form a new state 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2002: 2-8). These wars have occurred since the 1950s, especially 
after most countries became independent. Some countries became ethnically united while 
others were fractures by the colonialism. There are many examples of secession wars 
around the world. But, their numbers have been limited and their success rate also very 
low compared to other forms of civil wars.  
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In Sub-Saharan Africa, the first and only successful secessionist movement did 
not succeed in Eritrea until after a combined force of the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front 
(EPLF) toppled the central government of Ethiopia in 1991 (Bøas and Dunn 2007: 9). 
There were several unsuccessful secession attempts in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa 
since the early 1960s, yet this has not deterred the secessionist aspirations of certain 
communities in Angola and Senegal.  
In West Africa, there was the Nigerian civil war or Biafran war (1967-1969) in 
which the Ibo southeast region declared its independence from Nigeria.  More than a 
million people lost their lives. It took four years of warfare for the Nigerian national army 
to finally crush or overcome the insurgency (Payne and Nassar 2006: 283).  
In Central Africa, the people of the mineral rich region of Katanga tried 
unsuccessfully to separate from Congo, while in the Horn of Africa southern Sudan 
continues to battle against the Islamic north. To this date, there still exist two low-level 
insurgencies in the region involving the people of Casamance and Cabinda. The former 
seeks self-determination from Senegal, while the latter wants autonomy from Angola. 
These low-levels conflicts not only threaten the stability of the region, but also constitute 
the seeds for future civil wars.  
In Western Europe, several communities have also attempted to secede in the 
past, some of which were violent, while others appeared to be peaceful. Examples of this 
are the Basques of Spain, Walloons of Belgium, and Corsicans of France. The case of the 
Basques has received more attention in recent years due to the terrorist actions 
perpetrated by ETA against the Spanish State.  
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In Eastern Europe the Muslim Republic of Chechnya tried to break away from 
Russia after the Soviet Union officially collapsed in 1991. In 1994-1995, Russia sent in a 
huge military force or expedition that destroyed the Chechen capital. After it faced fierce 
resistance from Chechen nationalist guerrillas, and Russia withdrew in defeat. In 2004, 
hundreds of children died after Chechen terrorists took over a school and held them 
hostage (Golstein and Pevehouse 2007: 126). When Yugoslavia broke up in 1991-1992, 
several republics declared their independence as separate states. Serbia seized effective 
control of significant areas of Croatia and Bosnia that contained Serbian communities or 
linked such populations geographically. Non-Serbian populations in these areas were 
driven out or massacred-ethnic cleansing, while Czechoslovakia split into the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia in a cooperative manner. In 2008, Kossovo became independent 
from Serbia after a long political and military confrontation (Golstein and Pevehouse 
2007: 127). 
In the Middle East, the Palestinians and Kurds have, for a long time, aspired to 
have their own states. To achieve this, they developed a strong sense of nationalism and 
nationalist movement. The Kurdish (Muslims and Sunnis) population has been spread 
across Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria, parts of the former Soviet Union, and European Union 
States. Some Kurds have struggled to gain greater political autonomy within their various 
countries, while others are committed to establishing an independent country. Iran, Iraq, 
and Turkey, for example, have violently suppressed them at one time or another. The 
American invasion of 2003 gave more autonomy to some of them in northern Iraq. 
Meanwhile, the Kurdish Workers Party (also known as PKK) has been fighting the 
Turkish State for complete independence. As aresult of these attacks, Turkey killed 
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almost 37,000 Kurds, and more than 3,000 Kurdish villages were destroyed (Payne and 
Nassar 2006: 297-298). Secession was never a part of the original plan of the rebels in the 
Côte d’Ivoire case. Their main goal was to wage war against the Gbagbo regime, and 
topple it if at all possible.  
This is directly linked to the control of local resources. This type of war has some 
elements of the secessionist war where the control of the natural resources is often 
central. In this case, the rebels have no intention of assuming power. Instead, they tend to 
establish themselves either temporary or permanently in the country’s resources rich 
areas. Such wars have recently created and expanded the now popular concept of 
warlordism in some parts of the globe, particularly in the Horn of Africa (Sudan and 
Somalia). Other examples include the war in Congo-Kinshasa over mines in Central 
Africa, Sierra Leone over diamond in West Africa, Columbia over cocaine in Latin 
America, and Afghanistan over opium in Southeast Asia.  
However, the main goal of the rebels in Côte d’Ivoire was to overthrow the 
government in a very short time. The control of cocoa/coffee plantations in the West, and 
diamond/gold in the northwest region came after the rebels failed to take over Abidjan. 
When it became clear that the rebels were no longer able to pursue their initial goal, they 
engaged in the illicit exploitation, pillage of these commodities under their control and 
sell them cheap in the neighboring countries. In some instance, they took all the 
production from the local growers by force and sold it for their own gains. The funds 
collected served to enrich themselves, as well as sustain their movements. Such wars are 
extremely difficult to end for so much interest is at stake. 
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2. State Dominance of Some Identity Group  
These civil wars against the state are the ones in which the rebels aim at state 
dominance of some identity group (Clark 2002, Zartman 1996, Brown 1996, Gurr 1970 
and 2000, Joseph 1999, Rupesinghe 1992 and 1998, and William 2003). In Sub-Saharan 
Africa, this type of civil war include the civil wars in Rwanda between 1990-1993, 
Somalia in the 1990s, Liberia in the 1990s, Congo-Brazzaville in the 1990s, and Angola 
since 1975 among others. In this case, the people who oppose the state or state policies 
feel marginalized, or left out. Such wars have contributed to the collapse of countries 
such as Somalia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Liberia (Clark 2002, Mkandawire 1999, and 
Herbst 2000). Ironically, control of the state is still much sought after and valued, as the 
experiences from wars in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, 
Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and now Côte d’Ivoire suggest (Bøas 
and Dunn 2007: 26).  
It should be also emphasized that the groups that feel marginalized by the state are 
sometime regionally, ethnically, or religion based (more so in Sub-Saharan Africa). To be 
sure, in 2000, ethnic violence erupted in Nigeria when Muslims leaders attempted to 
impose the Shari’a (or Islamic law) on the Christians living in the north. In fact, between 
2000 and 2005 more than 54,000 people were killed in conflict between Muslims and 
Christians (Payne and Nassar 2006: 283) 
In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the crises opposed numerous ethnic 
groups, many of which were supported by foreign governments. For example, Uganda 
supported the ethnic groups that fought against Kabila, ethnic rivalries in Rwanda and 
Burundi spilled over into the Congo, the governments in Rwanda and Burundi were 
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involved in the Congo crisis because the ethnic groups that threaten their stability 
operated from the Congo, and participated in the Congo war (Payne and Nassar 2006: 
277-278).  
In Liberia, the Americo-Liberians dominated the other ethnic groups (the Kpelle 
20%, Bassa14%, Gio 9%, Mano 7%, and Krahn 5%) until 1980. When the Americo-
Liberian president, William Tolbert, was overthrown and murdered by a group of soldiers 
led by Samuel K. Doe, from the Krahn group. Once in power, Doe also allowed the 
Krahn to dominate the country, just as his predecessor did. The Krahn were soon 
challenged by an alliance composed of Gio and Mano groups. In late 1990, Doe was 
captured and tortured to death by Prince Johnson and members of the Gio group. More 
than 150,000 people (out of a population of 3 million) were killed, 800,000 became 
refugees in neighboring countries and in Liberia itself (Payne and Nassar 2006: 284-285). 
In 1983, the Muslim government in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, declared that 
the entire country of Sudan would be ruled by Shari’a (Islamic law) as in Nigeria. The 
Christians and Animists in the southern part of Sudan strongly resisted Islamic rule by 
forming the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) to achieve a secular democratic 
Sudan. If that could not be done, their goal was to make the south an independent 
country. To punish them, the government prevented food supplies from reaching the 
starving people in the south, and also bombed international relief centers.  
A similar situation was observed in Rwanda where the Hutu majority was given 
control of the country by the Belgians at independence in 1962. Ethnic rivalries escalated 
in 1990 between the Hutu majority and Tutsi minority, when the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF) tried to challenge the power structure. Note that the RPF was a guerrilla army that 
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defended the cause of the Tutsi minority. Moderate Hutus agreed to share power with the 
Tutsis in 1993. On April 6, 1994, violence erupted after the presidential airplane crushed 
for some unknown reasons to this date. The killing intensified thereafter, leading to chaos 
and destruction (Payne and Nassar 2006: 287). 
China has also taken extreme measures and precautions against the minorities that 
live in regions that contain a large proportion of the country’s natural resources (such as 
oil, coal, copper, gold, iron, lumber, and water) to insure that ethnic groups do not 
threaten the country’s unity and stability. China purposely stationed 1 million troops in its 
western province of Xinjiang to suppress Uighur separatists, who are Muslims and 
suspected allies of foreign Islamic extremists. The Uighurs’ goal of independence is 
strongly resisted by China. In the past, the Uighurs have attacked oil refineries, railroads, 
bridges, and planted bombs on buses, which killed several people. They also killed 16 
Chinese police officers in 1997, and have engaged in numerous hit-and-run raids on 
Chinese institutions. In response, more than 1,000 Uighurs were executed, and about 
10,000 arrested. Payne and Nassar 2006: 291) 
In Sri Lanka, the most significant ethnic division involves the Sinhalese (74% of 
the population and Buddhists), and the Tamils (22% of the population and Hindus). The 
rest of the population consists of Moors, Europeans, and native people of Sri Lanka 
known as Veddah. In 1994, President Kumaratunga made a concession to Tamils rebels 
by offering them regional autonomy in a federal system of government. However, the 
Sinhalese feared that federalism would eventually lead to creating a separate country for 
Tamils on the island nation. In February 2002, the government was forced to sign a 
cease-fire with the Tamils rebel leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran (Payne and Nassar 2006: 
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294). Velupillai Prabhakaran was killed in the summer of 2009, after a fierce battle 
between the Sri-Lankan Army and the separatist movement. 
Between 1997 and 1999, ethnic violence spread across the world largest Muslim 
country, Indonesia. Indonesia has 90 % Muslims, 9 % Christian, while Hindus and 
Buddhists account for the remaining 1%. Ethnic Chinese, who constitute a significant 
minority group (5% mostly Christian) in much of Southeast Asia, are the main targets of 
ethnic violence in Indonesia. The economic crisis that occurred between 1997 and 1999 
sparked widespread violence against ethnic Chinese. Their homes, churches, and shops 
were looted and burned. More than a thousand people were killed (Payne and Nassar 
2006: 295). 
East Timorese, who are overwhelmingly Catholic, resisted occupation by Muslim 
Indonesia. An estimated 200,000 East Timorese (25 %) died as a result of Indonesian 
military action, starvation, and disease. Under external pressure, mainly from the UN, 
President Habibie decided to allow East Timorese to vote on independence for East 
Timor. However, militia groups in East Timor that favored maintaining close ties with 
Indonesia began to acquire weapons to intimidate those who supported this idea. After 
the referendum, militia groups took the streets and indiscriminately killed thousands of 
East Timorese. Priests, nuns, and other associated with the Roman Catholic Church were 
systematically hunted down and killed. More than 200,000 people became refugees. East 
Timor eventually became independence in 2002.  
In Côte d’Ivoire, the civil war that started in September 2002 first opposed 
northerners and Muslims to the state, but this was modified as two ethnically dominated 
rebel groups from the west joined in. Thus, it became a war western and northern 
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Ivoirians against the state. In other words, it was war of Dyula, Yacouba, and Guere 
against President Gbagbo’s regime. 
3. Rebels Seeking Redistribution of Wealth and Income  
In this kind of civil wars the rebels aim at redistribution of wealth and income 
across classes. This type of war reflects the wars between the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat in the old days, which Marxists and Neo-Marxists were strong critics of. Other 
examples of such wars include the Nicaraguan civil war of 1980s, contemporary wars in 
Haiti, and Colombia. Note also that in Rwanda, identity/ethnicity and class seem to 
overlap, as do politics and class in Haiti. Such wars are very rare in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Though the Ivoirian experience provides some room for speculation, as it is believed that 
that country’s resources were not equitably distributed among the citizens. The north part 
of the country covered by the savannah is not suitable for cocoa and coffee (the country’s 
main export commodities). Thus, most people rely on government handouts and services, 
which have been inexistent. However, the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire was not triggered on 
such grounds.  
4. War Against Colonizers  
These wars are referred to as anti-colonial wars, liberation wars, or independence 
wars, the wars were perpetrated against foreign colonizers or white European minorities. 
They had occured during and in the aftermath of the decolonization of all the regions of 
the globe, where Western European colonial powers sought to dominate the local people 
in all the aspects of life (politically, economically, militarily, and culturally). These anti-
colonial wars occurred for a variety of reasons including: independence seeking, 
humiliation and exploitation of the local people, physical abuse and atrocities, rising 
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consciousness and nationalism, and so forth. Note that these anti-colonial wars proved 
very bloody in many regions, resulting in huge losses on both sides. In other instances, 
the colonizers had no choice but grant independence right away. Where they had military 
advantage, these colonialists forced the local people to negotiate. These negotiations also 
allowed the Europeans to maintain influence and certain interests (trade, commerce, 
defense, etc…) 
The sustained armed revolt in Kenya between (to 1960), Angola and Mozambique 
(to 1975), Zimbabwe (to 1980), Algeria (to 1958), and more recently South Africa (to 
1994) are cases in Sub-Saharan Africa that remain vivid to this date (Bøas and Dunn 
2007: 15). Early versions of this included the Haitian, Spanish, American, and French 
revolutions. These kinds of wars are now finished in Sub-Saharan Africa. Though, 
sporadic tensions have emerged between the white minority and indigenous Africans in 
Zimbabwe and South Africa over land rights. These were not civil wars, but it is a direct 
consequence of these past relationships. But, what kind the Ivoirian civil war actually is.  
B. Discussion of the Type the Ivoirian Civil War Is 
 
In the previous section, I stressed that the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire was one 
among the country’s ethno-regional groups. That based on the taxonomies presented in 
the previous section the current civil war in Côte d’Ivoire started as a category two-war 
(rebels aiming at state dominance of some identity group) and evolved into a category 
four-war (ethno-groups seeking control of local resources). 
On 19 September 2002, Côte d’Ivoire experienced a failed coup attempt that 
evolved into a rebellion. The civil war war started by multiple factors, including unfair 
policies and humiliating treatments adopted by the various regimes after 1993, and most 
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importantly the failure of the subsequent leaders to maintain the existing relative national 
unity. After President Houphouët-Boigny died, a fierce battle ensued over succession 
matters bewteen Allasane Ouattara and Konan Bédié, the two main contenders for the 
highest office (Wiseman 1995, Wauthier 1997, Akindes 2003 and 2004, and Bassets 
2003).  
Article 11 of the Ivoirian Constitution stipulates that in case of a vanancy of the of 
the presidency, the president of the National Assembly (in this case Bédié) takes over the 
mandate of the deceased or ill Head of State (Konate 2004). The constitution allowed 
Bédié to assume power until 1995. Bédié easily won the 1995 presidential elections by 
95% of the votes against a weak opposition, and after Ouattara’s candidacy was 
dismissed on the grounds that he did not conclusively establish that his parents were both 
of Ivoirian parentage. Ouattara was again disqualified in the 2000 elections by the junta 
led by General Guéï (Bakary-Akin 1991).  
In order to respond to his detractors, Ouattara had applied and obtained an 
identification certificate (Certificat d’Identité) delivered by Judge Zoro Bi Ballo in 
Dimbokro (center), where he was allegedly born in 1942. The Bédié regime rejected that 
certificate claiming he had forged a legal document. There was huge public outcry 
amongst Ouattara’ supporters (Konate 2004, Bassets 2003, and Toungara 2001). 
Meanwhile, Bédié had published a book titled: Les Chemins de Ma Vie (The Paths 
of My Life) in which he viciously attacked Ouattara for interfering with Ivoirian politics, 
calling him a Burkinabè (Burkina Faso citizen). Bédié also created the infamous concept 
of Ivoirité, which was aimed at discriminating between who was an Ivoirian and who was 
not. Apparently, this concept was directed to Ouattara, who was already labeled as alien 
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to that country. Ironically, the Ivoirité drew even more support and sympathy for 
Ouattara among the northerners and Muslims populations, as well as immigrants from the 
Sahel Region (namely from Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger), for whom he had become an 
icon, representative, spokesman, leader, and potential liberator (Toungara 2001: 63-72, 
Konate 2004). 
When he first came to power, Guéï claimed that he had come to clean up all the 
mess created by the Bédié regime. He promised to return power to the civilians in a short 
while. The junta then assumed power for nine months. Unfortunately, Guéï allowed his 
soldiers to terrorize, to harrass, and to victimize the northerners, Muslims, and foreign 
immigrants from the Sahel region (Africa Confidential 11 October 2002, Akindes 2003 
and 2004, Bassets 2003: 13-27, Toungara 2001, and Konate 2004). Furthermore, he 
created the Union for Democracy and Peace in Côte d’Ivoire (UDPCI), and he decided to 
run in the 2000 presidential elections. Unfortunately, he lost to Gbagbo. Once in power, 
Gbagbo also did nothing to resolve or correct the problems his predecessors had created. 
Instead, he allowed many crimes to go unpunished (Toungara 2001). 
It was in this context of deep confusion and social tension that the country 
experienced its first ever civil war after thirty-three years of relative stability. The coup 
was originally led by the MPCI, which was joined later by the MJP and MPIGO. 
Together, the three groups formed the Forces Nouvelles (FN). The FN consisted of ex-
soldiers and new recruits from the north (also Burkinabè and Malians), and Yacouba and 
Guere people from the west (also Liberians). The failed coup split the country into two 
parts. The rebels occupied the north and far west, while the rest of the country remained 
under government control.  
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 The initial goal of the rebels was to overthrow the Gbagbo regime in Abidjan 
(south). But, because the national security forces were able to push them back during the 
early moments, the rebels sought to control the north (rich in cattle and cotton), center, 
western cocoa and coffee belt, northwest (diamond and gold rich area near Seguela), and 
the port of San Pedro (southwest near the Liberian border). Part of the revenue generated 
from the sale of these commodities allowed the rebels to sustain themselves or finance 
their movement. As a result of this the market of the neighboring countries, which did not 
grow cocoa and coffee, were flooded with these cocoa and coffee. It was also alleged that 
the rebels had built fancy homes, hotels, and shops in these neighboring countries in 
preparation of their old days.  
Also, immediately after seizure of the north, west, and northwest regions, the 
rebels broke into several regional West African Central Bank branches in Bouaké (center) 
and Korhogo (north) under their control for some quick cash. Several French soldiers 
were also accused to do the same.  The above narrative suggests that the current civil war 
in Côte d’Ivoire is one among ethno-regional groups, it started as a civil war in which 
rebels aim at state dominance of some identity groups then it evolved into a civil war in 
which ethno-regional barons seek control over local resources. However, some analysts 
find this explanation of the crisis is too simplistic. 
Richard Banégas and Ruth Marshall-Fratani (in Bøas and Dunn 2007: 6) agree 
with this argument, for they argue that this conflict is primarily political, with the local 
and international intertwined, generating a war about borders in which nation-states play 
a central role. As they comment: The case of Côte d’Ivoire illustrates how those able to 
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define themselves as autochthones demand that migrants, who already have suffered 
resentment for quite some time, should be expelled.  
Thus, the current crisis is an outcome of the unwillingness of the political elite to 
acknowledge that the system of governance for citizenship and land rights established 
under Houphouët-Boigny increasingly was becoming dysfunctional, and the principles of 
citizenship and rights from the Houphouët-Boigny model of patrimonial integration to the 
exclusiveness of an autochthonous Ivoirité discourse (Bøas and Dunn 2007: 34).  
Another group of scholars have interpreted the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire as 
evidence of state “weakened,” incapable of controlling its borders, the state finds itself 
faced with “ethnic leagues” and transnational rebellions recruiting mercenaries from 
throughout the sub-region (Bøas and Dunn 2007: 8). Other observers contend that the 
Ivoirian conflict was fueled above all by the search for profit and the greed of actors. For 
this group, “much of the rhetoric of division and ethno-nationalist hatred on both sides of 
the conflict is highly theatrical and a cover for ilicit economic gain.” (ICG 2004b: 2-3, 
Bøas and Dunn 2007: 82) 
But, Banegas and Marshall-Fratani (2007: 82) do not share these interpretations. 
Instead they maintain that the Ivoirian conflict is eminently political. It is about who 
actually Ivoirian is, and who is foreigner? Or more prosaically, it is conflict over 
political, economic, land, educational, cultural rights, which the possession of identity 
papers confers, in which are opposed two distinct conceptions of citizenship, one open 
and the other based on the political ideology of autochthony, which carries within it the 
seeds of exclusion. In other words, it is a war of identification whose history is long and 
complex (see also Marshall-Fratani 2006). Finally, the current conflict is the indirect 
48 
 
 
 
result of struggles for succession following the death of Houphouët-Boigny, beyond these 
recent events it is above all the latest phase of a structural crisis rooted in the colonial 
period (Bøas and Dunn 2007: 83). 
C. Debate Over the Causes of Civil Wars 
The debate over the causes of civil wars in Africa and other parts of the world can 
be listed under four broad perspectives: (1) There are civil wars which causes are related 
to identity group difference; (2) civil wars which causes are related to social deprivation, 
class conflict, and/or resource scarcity; (3) civil wars which causes are related to 
opportunities for economic gain for ‘rebel-entrepreneurs’; and (4) civil wars that have 
neo-colonial causes. Each has a number of sub-themes underneath it. This structure is 
particularly helpful in that it makes a clear distinction between deep causes (or 
permissive conditions) and proximate causes, which is a goal of this study. 
1. Causes Related to Identity Group Difference 
In this perspective civil wars are viewed in general, as contests between different 
ethnic groups for control of the state. It is divided into four sub-themes including: (a) 
States with a history of inter-identity group conflict and animosities are prone to conflict; 
(b) States under external pressure for multiparty  (“democracy”); and (c) Appearance or 
rise of an ethno-regional group (or other identity group).  
a. States With a History of Inter-Identity Group Conflict  
 
It is often believed that conflicts involving different identity groups in Sub-
Saharan Africa are often created by the colonial leagcies. Such interpretation precludes 
that there were no precolonial ethnic warfares in Africa. Those who embrace this position 
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have argued that colonial authorities had made the identities of ethnic or regional groups 
more rigid, planting the seeds for later conflicts.   
The Rwandese case is a vivid example of this. In this case, the Belgians put the 
Hutu in control for decades, which backfired in the 1990s. Newbury (2002) and other 
scholars who worked on the Rwandese case argue that the genocide in Rwanda was 
partly due to the fact Belgian colonialists favored and privileged the Hutu majority over 
the Tutsi minority. That the granting of special identification cards to one group made the 
other subjects, inferior, and second-class citizens. 
But, Brown (1996: 2-25) remarks that old hatred among the people has never been 
a powerful tool for explaining contemporary conflicts for it is hard to prove. According to 
him, serious scholars reject the ancient hatred theory for it cannot explain why some 
disputes are more violent and harder to resolve than others. He adds that the existing 
literature on internal conflicts does a commendable job of surveying the underlying 
factors or permissive conditions that make some situations particularly prone to violence, 
but it is weak when it comes to identifying the catalytic-the triggers or proximate causes-
of internal conflicts.  
There has been no evidence that French colonial authorities favored and 
privileged an ethnic group over the others in Côte d’Ivoire. What is known, however, is 
that the Houphouët-Boigny family was very close to the colonial administration, thus it 
benefitted from this relationship. In fact, Houphouët-Boigny’s aunt Yable was married to 
one of colonial administrator. Furthermore, it was French colonial administrator, 
Lieutenant Bouet, who sent the young Houphouët-Boigny to school in the first place 
(Houphouët-Boigny 1984). The French guaranteed him and his family certain privileges 
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for their loyalty and service. He always surrounded himself with his tribesmen (the 
Baule) to whom he attributed the cabinet and other key posts. The current crisis in Côte 
d’Ivoire was not a result of ethnic manipulation by France, but the leaders themselves. 
b. External Pressure for Democratization from the 1990s  
During the 1990s, financial assistance to African nations and other regions of the 
developing world were conditioned by politico-economic liberalization, as part of the 
structural reforms that were needed in order to improve their economies. Unfortunately, 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, these IMF and World Bank structural adjustment programs 
resulted in a general misery a few years after their implementation. This led some 
scholars to quickly blame these institutions and their policy prescriptions, as the main 
cause of numerous conflicts on the continent in recent decades.  
Democratization actually brought regime change and a big hope across the 
continent in Chad (1990), Liberia (1990), Ethiopia (1991), Somalia (1991), Rwanda 
(1994), Democratic republic of Congo (DRC) (1996), Sierra Leone (1992), and Congo-
Brazaville (1997), but not without human suffering, while regimes that survived this 
wave were shaken to their roots (Young 2002: 24). It put an end to one-party regimes in 
Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, and so forth. Able African leaders such as Houphouët-
Boigny (Côte d’Ivoire), Mobutu (DRC), Kerekou (Benin), Eyadema (Togo), Bongo 
(Gabon), Biya (Cameroon) could not keep their societies under control with these strong 
external pressures from western powers for multipartyism.  
Indeed, democratic transitions allowed the creation of a large number of new 
political parties, many of which were fake parties. In some countries, members of the old 
system were allowed to create political parties that were actually sub-sections of the old 
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ones, in order to manipulate or cheat the political process. Some African countries found 
themselves with close to a hundred new parties. Those parties that were not shadow were 
either ethnically or regionally based. Only a few had clear visions and ideologies. In Côte 
d’Ivoire, for example, many leaders established their legitimacy and popularity through 
ethnic, religious affiliations and political manipulation. But, did the expectations created 
by the introduction of multiparty-ism in 1990 lead to a strong sense of grievance among 
those who were not empowered by it?  
Indeed, when the democratization wave reached all the corners of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, it was first seen as an opportunity for positive development. When the people 
realized the freedom aspect of it (weakening of the old system, and flourishing in the 
mass media), they started using it as a medium to voice their long time frustrations under 
the old regimes. In this sense, the democratization process served as an instrument to 
express grievances, some of which resulted to extreme violence. 
Former Nigerian President Obasanjo (in Keller 1996) has argued that 
democratization contributed to the growing animosities in African countries. As he puts 
it: “An obvious cause of unease in Africa today is what is seen as an attempt by Western 
countries to impose Western democratic model on African countries as a condition for 
economic assistance from the IMF, World Bank, and other donors. Such pressure led to 
some of these current crises we witnessed on the continent today. He adds that, in order 
for democracy to be successful, it must be home grown, home induced, and home 
sustained. That is, the democratization of Africa must take into account the local realities, 
not done in a vacuum.” 
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Following the same line of thought, Payne and Nassar (2006: 277) argue that 
transition to democracy in the developing world has contributed to ethnic conflicts. These 
authors maintain that (in general) changes create anxieties and threaten ethnic identities. 
That some ethnic groups lose their privileges and advantages in a system of government 
that is based on impartiality, and the rule of law. Thus, many ethnic groups are reluctant 
to compromise and to respect different viewpoints, beliefs, and cultural practices. In the 
Côte d’Ivoire case, they add, “both politicians and military rulers have proved incapable 
of rising above parochial concerns to take on truly national leadership. Instead they have 
constantly repeated past errors and flawed policies, dragging that country into a 
downward cycle of political instability, economic decay, and international isolation.” The 
democratic government of president Gbagbo came to power in 2000 with a strong 
popular backing and high hopes for a new departure in Côte d’Ivoire politics, after nine 
months of military rule. The failure of democratization in Côte d’Ivoire was essentially a 
failure of leadership because President Gbagbo and other traditional politicians 
mishandled key issues, repeating past errors in pursuit of narrow sectarian, ethnic, and 
tribal agendas. Their incessant political infighting resulted in paralysis of government, 
bringing inaction, drift, and indecision. Thus, political reform in that country has caused 
more arms than it had done good things. 
c. Appearance of An Ethnic Group in Muti-Ethnic States 
This constitutes a proximate cause of civil wars only. In this case, the rebels 
stimulate a feeling of identity group grievance as a means of getting into power. But, who 
were the rebel leaders in Côte d’Ivoire, and could they have emerged under Houphouët-
Boigny? Indeed, the situation in Côte d’Ivoire is a very interesting one. Under the 
53 
 
 
 
Houphouët-Boigny regime, the Bete people (center-west) and Abbey people (south) 
attempted to rise up against the system on several occasions. The former were brutally 
suppressed, while the latter suffered complete isolation by the Houphouët-Boigny regime 
for several years.  
The current rebellion consists of northerners, and Muslims from the north and 
northwest (generically called Dyula), and people of Yacouba and Guere descent from the 
mountain west. Note that the MPCI also recruited largely in Mali and Burkina Faso, some 
of whom speak the same language. MPIGO and MJP used similar considerations by 
adopting Liberians in their ranks. However, none of these groups could rise up under the 
first regime for reasons I explain below. 
Under the one-party system, the northerners and westerners were generally kept 
satisfied. The Houphouët-Boigny regime offered them key positions in the cabinets, 
parliamentary, as well as the army, police, and gendarmerie. It also made sure that no 
regions were left out of the resources distribution process (e.g.: the construction of roads, 
regional development projects, hospitals, or the then famous indepdence celebrations in 
key cities). In fact, Houphouët-Boigny built presidential residences or palaces 
everywhere these celebrations took place during the glorious days of the economic boom. 
Every region was proud to host these independence festivities, and more importantly to 
have the president spend several the nights there.  
The same tactics were used during the celebration of the Franco-African summits-
Hosting La Francophonie summit was regarded not only as a huge honor for the host 
countries, but also an opportunity to get help from the mother colony. The coming of the 
French president to the host state guaranteed it with a substantial aid package that is 
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given in advance for the preparation of the summit, and the positive outcome of the 
summit reflects positively on the Head of State of that particular country.  
 It could be argued that the tactics adopted by the PDCI made it less likely for 
anyone to attack it. Had anyone tried it, he would have certainly failed because nobody 
was going to follow. Besides, because of the good things he had done in the past, any 
attempts to overthrow Houphouët-Boigny would be considered a total disrespect of the 
“old man.” whith France on total look out this was unthinkable. The sudden appearance 
of the MPCI, MJP, and MPIGO on the political arena in September 2002 against the 
Gbagbo regime was clearly an indication of the breaching in the peaceful relationships 
that existed between the Houphouët-Boigny regime and the Ivoirian people, and Côte 
d’Ivoire and its neighbors, by the subsequent regimes. 
Cultural pluralism is also important in the African context. The majority of these 
people are related to one another by history, origins, geography, language, and religion. 
While some have been able to live in such a perfect harmony, others have experienced 
serious ‘animosities’ towards each other for control of the land, resources, and power. 
The records of inter-ethnic rivalries have not been encouraging in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Many lives have been lost in Angola, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
Mozambique, Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda 
since the end of the Cold War (Brown 1996: 237). The most recent cases have occurred 
in Zimbabwe, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire, and Kenya, which nobody had anticipated, 
due to the relative long stability that existed there. 
Multi-ethnic states are believed to be more prone to internal turmoil as different 
groups compete over power and other things. Wars often erupt for a variety of reasons, 
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including when a society is un-integrated across class lines as in Rwanda, only strong or 
charismatic leaders can temporarily hold them together. In this case, the focus tends to be 
on a proximate causes including outside interference as in Rwanda in 1990 and Congo-
Kinshasa in 1996, death of a charismatic leader as Houphouët-Boigny in Côte d’Ivoire; or 
sudden de-legitimacy of the ideology of the charismatic leader (for example, Tito in 
Yugoslavia, and Mobutu in Congo-Kinshasa). 
For those scholars who have used multi-ethnicity to explain the outbreak of civil 
wars in parts of the world, and particularly Sub-Saharan Africa, the recurrent question is 
been whether ethnic pluralism constitutes a curse or blessing for countries that have 
multiple ethnicities? Some think it is, while others say it is not. The dominant view is that 
civil wars often erupt between identity groups that are regionally based, as in Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Kinshasa, Nigeria, Sudan, and Ethiopia 
(Adejumobi 2001, Gurr 1993 and 1994, Zartman 1996, Keller 1996, Howard 1983, and 
Clark 2002). 
Colonialism is often blamed for the creation of multi-ethnic states in general. A 
good example of this in Sub-Saharan Africa is Nigeria. The formation of Nigeria was the 
result of the incorporation of several African nations into a single state by British 
colonialists. The most dominant groups are the Ibo, Yoruba, and Hausa. But, colonialism 
also did also divide formerly unified African nations into several states. An example of 
this is the old Somaliland, where the northern portion became the French Territory of the 
Affars and Isas (independent Djibouti), the Ogaden region annexed by Ethiopia remained 
a province of that country, while the southeastern portion of the Somali nation became 
part of the British colony of Kenya (Schraeder 2004: 49-77). If yes, ethnicity has been a 
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problem in some parts of Africa, how was national unity managed in Côte d’Ivoire before 
and after 1993? 
I have explained elwhere that Houphouët-Boigny was a charismatic leader and 
very skillful politician, who was respected by his peers across the continent and abroad. 
The young generation of African leaders came to visit him on regular basis for advice and 
help (Baulin 1980 and 1982). Unconditional servant of France, he benefited politically, 
economically, and militarily from France throughout his career. Inside Africa, 
Houphouët-Boigny had won the respect and trust of his people (both rural and urban), the 
neighboring countries loved him for his opened door policy that alleviated some of their 
poverty burden. Many of his major spechees toward the neighbors were inclusive, as he 
did the same for his people to make sure the country stayed united. Thus, he encouraged 
Le dialogue (dialogue) among the various groups, and la tolérance religieuse (religious 
tolerance) between people of different faiths. In that sense, he was a true uniter unlike his 
successors. 
As for Bédié, many Ivoirians saw him as someone who had come to purposely 
destroy all Houphouët-Boigny had built since independence. Many Ivoirians think of him 
as arrogant and opportunist, someone who has never suffered in his life, and for whom 
the old president had paved the road to the presidency. In fact, Houphouët-Boigny 
intentionally manipulated the Constitution to ensure that Bédié becomes president when 
he dies. Some people have speculated that Houphouët-Boigny wanted to make sure that 
the Baule remain in charge of the country after him. But, Bédié was no Houphouët-
Boigny. He did not have the stature and charisma that the late president had. His visions 
for the country were not attractive and fully developed. In fact, he had many things 
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against him from the past. Besides the perception that he never worked hard enough to 
climb the social ladder, he celebrated his first Billions (in CFA) at the age of 27. He had 
also been accused of fraud in the past when he was the Head of the sugar industry. Also, 
many people think of him as an elitist, someone who do not speak the language of the 
poor and understand their concerns. Since he created the Ivoirité, to allegedly destroy 
Ouattara aspirations for the presidency, Bédié was seen as a divider rather than a uniter. 
In fact, many people blame him for starting all the troubles since 1993. 
Laurent Gbagbo got his legitimacy by becoming the historic political opponent of 
Houphouët-Boigny, someone who vowed to speak out against the old regime, where 
others would not take a chance. After spending some time in jail he was forced to exile to 
France in the 1980s. In the 1990s, he got a strong support among University students and 
professors, other intellectuals, and part of the middle class. Many thought he had the right 
message to lead the country if given a chance. Unfortunately, a combination of factors 
(internal and external) moved him away from his then atractive political agenda. Like 
Bédié, he does not have the stature of say a Houphouët-Boigny, but has benefited from 
support of the Parti Socialiste Français (PSF), and he is also friend with several Heads of 
States including Eduardo Dos Santos of Angola, Tabo Mbeki of South Africa, and John 
Kuffuor of Ghana. He inherited a position that was already set on fire since 1993. That is, 
the atrocities and frustrations culminated under Bédié and Guéï increased the pressure on 
him. In fact, the civil war that occurred under his watch could have happened had Bédié 
or Guéï stayed in power a little longer. 
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2. Causes Related to Social Deprivation, Class Conflict, and Resource Scarcity 
The perspective examines civil wars resulting from social deprivation, class 
conflict, and/or resource scarcity. It says that even when wars are over ethnicities, they 
are really about distribution of resources. Beneath this perspective lie five distinct sub-
themes: (a) Civil wars arise because of maldistribution of wealth or income resulting in 
social deprivation, (b) rebellions often consist of people (mostly men) with no social 
prospects, (c) sudden mal-distribution of wealth to the upper classes or contraction of 
material or material resources for would-be-rebels, (d) a proximate cause of such 
contraction is structural adjustment programs, (e) finally another proximate cause relates 
to the downfall of the value of a country’s main commodity crops. 
a. Maldistribution of Wealth or Income Resulting to Social Deprivation 
Some scholars have often linked the causes of civil wars to social deprivation, 
class conflict, and/or resource scarcity. Payne and Nassar (2006:276), for example, argue 
that competition among groups for scarce economic resources is a major cause of violent 
ethnic conflict. That economic development often results in unequal distribution of 
resources among individuals, groups, and regions within a country. Moreover, growing 
economic disparities may increase the fears of those ethnic groups that are disadvantaged. 
These authors use the Nigerian case to show how Ibo secessionists fought (1967-1969) 
unsuccessfully, to create a separate Biafra state because of they did not want to share 
their wealth from the petroleum found in their region.  
Other materialists have made similar comments. Perhaps, the biggest contributor 
to this debate remains Paul Collier (1998, 2000, and 2002). His “Greed and Grievance” 
theory is one the most debated in academic circles today. Collier and his supporters 
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believe that conflicts erupt when few people steal or embezzle the wealth that is supposed 
to provide for all the citizens. This kind of wars is been more prevalent in countries 
where corruption and authoritarianism have taken place, including Africa. 
Bøas and Dunn (2007: 9-10) are categorically opposed to such interpretation. 
They insist that, rather the contemporary African guerrilla movements are the 
manifestations of a rage against the dysfunctional neo-patrimonial state, and provide 
political opportunities as well as basic survival strategies for those navigating the 
continuing crises of modernity. According to them, current mainstream debates often 
imply that all African wars are resource wars, fought not over political issues, but in 
order to gain access to profits. These authors charge that the so called “greed kills” 
arguments by scholars such as Collier (2000), Berdal and Malone (2000), and Klare 
(2001) have now flooded the academic circles and attracted a huge following, while 
elsewhere the global economy is believed to have foster the rise of so-called “new wars” 
theory set forth by the Klare (2001), Kaldor (2001) and Duffield (2001) alike in the Sierra 
Leonian and Liberian cases, for example. That scholars such as Keen (2005: 25), for 
example, has argued that in some African conflicts, the goal of some actors is not 
necessarily the defeat of the enemy in battle but the continuation of fighting and the 
institutionalization of violence for profit. They claim this interpretation often mistakenly 
assumes that the predations are the reasons for the guerrillas struggle. 
Bøas and Dunn (2007: 11) maintain that the “greed kills” thesis explain why these 
incentives have come to play such an important part in recent wars: that is, the economic 
agenda research assumes the profit motive on the part of the belligerents, but it fails to 
explore why or to what extent political-military actors become profit-seeking, market-
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based entities. In order to understand this transformation, one needs to take into 
consideration political, cultural, and historical factors in addition to the economic 
dimensions of conflicts. Berdal (2003 and 2005), for example, later recognized that the 
“greed” thesis focuses excessively on material explanations and greed-inspired 
motivations of factors, which may lead to one-sided explanations of conflicts.  
b. Rebels As People Without Other Social Prospects 
Ted Gurr is one the leaders of this theory. Gurr and the other have suggested that 
the rebel armies consist of persons (mostly males), with no other social prospects, or 
urban unemployed, implying that if jobs were available, those who are rebels would take 
the gainful employment instead. But, Bøas and Dunn (2007: 1) warn against the 
dominance of what they call “greed-based approaches,” which some scholars have used 
to explain the true nature of African conflicts. For these authors, treating African 
guerrillas as devoid of any kind of political agenda, greed-based approaches present them 
as bandits. That such an interpretation significantly narrows the number of possible 
policy interventions. As they puts it : “You can negotiate with armed rebels with a 
political agenda, but bandits are to be crushed by force…Much of the recent literature on 
insurgencies has mistakenly focused on single-factor explanations, such as greed, 
resources, and culture.” (3-4). 
One helpful way to explain African insurgencies is to examine various 
motivations including: ideology, grievances against the central government, regional and 
social marginalization, elite desires to capture state power, the crisis of the post-colonial 
state, and the extreme politicizing of autochthony debates. It should include an 
examination of the external context of insurgency groups, the end of Cold War, global 
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“war on terror,” as well as important changes in international and regional markets, 
which in turn will promote an understanding of African insurgency movement as both 
creations and responses to the crisis of modernity and its dysfunctional institutions in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (Bøas and Dunn 2007: 5). 
In his conceptualization of youth movements in Africa, Morten Bøas (in the same 
volume) writes that Africa is a continent of youth, and those who fight are mostly young 
men. However, young African fighters are often depicted as ruthless murderers or 
powerless victims. He notes that, both views oversimplify by failing to account for the 
nature of war. That the only way to understand youth involvement in such processes is to 
take their experiences seriously, even if the narrative presented by such youthful dramas 
does not fit well with existing categories for understanding political behavior. 
Abdullah (1998: 204) has also received mounting criticism from Bøas and Dunn 
(2007) regarding his work that focuses on the socially marginalized youth, to understand 
the origin and character of the RUF in Sierra Leone. Abdullah regards the “revolution” of 
the RUF as a product of a rebellious youth culture in search of a ‘radical alternative’ to 
the regime of the All People’s Congress (APC). He pays attention to lumping-
unemployed and unemployable youths (mostly males) whom he regards as being “prone 
to criminal behavior, petty thefts, drugs, drunkenness and gross indiscipline.”  
For Bøas and Dunn (2007: 7), Abdullah’s explanation fails to establish a causal 
connection between lumping social status and their supposedly inherent violent behavior, 
answer some obvious questions such as: why do some youth opt the ‘brush path to 
destruction’ and others do not? What role does gender play, given that most youth opting 
for violent alternative are males? What political factors are involved in shaping these 
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youth cultures and sub-cultures? Is this situation really just a “wanton use of violence for 
the sake of violence” or more complex dynamics at work? (13) 
The rebel rebellion in Côte d’Ivoire consisted of persons of different backgrounds, 
men outnumbered women soldiers. The MPCI had a sizeable number of women from the 
north, while MJP and MPIGO soldiers appeared to be all males. Moreover, the soldiers 
were made up of former professional soldiers who deserted their posts or were previously 
fired, rural and urban youths without jobs, professionals of the public and private sectors, 
University and High School students, and foreign mercenaries. The Côte d’Ivoire case 
shows that the explanation by Abdullah (1998) and others does not always apply to all 
African cases. Rather, it confirms the arguments advanced by Bøas and Dunn (2007) and 
others, which I can subscribe to for the purpose of this study. 
c. Sudden Redistribution of Wealth to the Upper Classes  
 
Some materialists emphasize the sudden redistribution of wealth to the upper 
classes or contraction of material resources for would-be rebels.  For instance, if the lives 
of peasants or urban workers are relatively good under one political economy regime, and 
then their lives suddenly get worse under a subsequent regime, they will become 
disgruntled, and join a rebellion. Such case is very rare in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Indeed, it is natural and normal that human beings react when their physical 
security and financial wellbeing is threatened. Based on this assumption alone, the people 
who join rebellions may have valid reasons to do so. But, did the subsequent regimes 
withdraw sources of economic sustenance previously available to workers and peasants 
in the Côte d’Ivoire case?  
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There was no evidence of such thing in the country. As I have mentioned 
elsewhere, the situation in that country since 1993 is a political one, that is, it gravitates 
mainly around succession matters. That is, it started as electoral issues and spread beyond 
electoral issues. The Bédié regime was preoccupied with succession matters so that it did 
not have the time to accumulate wealth. Also, there was no evidence of such thing under 
the military junta led by Guéï. One thing that was clear, however, was that the economy 
plummeted during those years, and many peasants fell neglected or forgotten by the 
various regimes. This was not done intentionally to affect a specific groups, it was more a 
natural consequence of what the country had experienced in those years. Therefore, it is 
safe to argue that the situation in Côte d’Ivoire is not one that concerned the 
redistribution of the country’s wealth.  
d. Structural Adjustment Programs  
One proximate cause of the contraction of material resources for the would-be-
rebels is believed to be the structural adjustment programs imposed by the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund. These adjustments were supposed to generate some 
revenue, help states repay part of their debt, and improve the lives of the people, but they 
did not yield the expected results. Instead, they have brought more misery, including wars 
over political reform. In fact, most contemporary Africanists and Third World scholars 
have forcefully argued that the sudden “belt-tightening” that goes along with the 
conditions of a structural adjustment program generates a sense of social betrayal and 
hardship, leading to civil war.  
Between 1972 and 1992, Africa experienced a weak economic performance due 
to some internal and external factors, though the level of performance was country-
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specific. While few countries have been able to control the crisis, many have experienced 
serious trouble going from excessive borrowing, unability to pay the workers, or provide 
basic services for the populations. The root causes of these economic and social crises 
that led to the adjustment policies have been the subject of ongoing debate in political 
and academic circles.  
Today, the debate has shifted from examining the root causes of SAPs to looking 
at the impacts of IMF’s interventions in these economies. On the one hand, the neo-
conservatives argue that structural adjustment is not only necessary and unavoidable, but 
the only viable alternative for survival in a changed global economic environment. On the 
other hand, neo-Keynesians criticize the manner in which the IMF’ SAPs are designed 
and implemented. These scholars maintain that the IMF’s macroeconomic prescriptions 
accentuate the impact of the crisis on the poorest and most vulnerable sections of society, 
forcing the government to cut social welfare and government workforce. The victims 
were the weak, poor, and those without a job.  
In Africa, the impact on the agriculture sector is a major one for various reasons 
and especially for those countries that rely heavily on agricultural products for exports 
(roughly 85% of Africa’s populations rely on the agricultural sector). Critics have also 
argued that the IMF’s reforms had adversely affected the agricultural sector, and the 
impacts are country-specific. For example, in Zimbabwe, tax and pricing reforms under 
adjustment have brought windfall gains for commercial farmers, but relatively modest 
improvements for smallholders. In Zambia, Tanzania, and Mozambique, most poor 
producers were excluded from profitable trading by lack of land, credit facilities, and 
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marketing infrastructure. Instead, the beneficiaries have been monopolistic private sector-
traders, who are well placed to exploit the poorest producers and most marginal areas.  
In the Sahel region, the liberalization of agricultural sector has had adverse 
consequences for many of the poorest producers. Since the poor are concentrated in rural 
areas, the impacts of adjustment on poverty is still determined by what happens to rural 
smallholders and rural self-employed outside the agriculture, where welfare is linked 
closely with the performance of, and incentive structure in agriculture. Generally 
speaking, SAPs have not been friends of the farmers in the Global South. These farmers 
have been negatively impacted, which have dramatically changed their living conditions 
and habits. The problems faced by the African farmers include lack of foreign 
investment, access to land, and credit.  
But, should the IMF and World Bank be blamed entirely for this failure? A quick 
answer is: not really. Scholars such as Nicholas van de Walle believe that it would be 
wrong to ascribe the worsening poverty in many developing countries entirely to World 
Bank-IMF policies. These scholars point to such things as the inappropriate forms of state 
intervention, corruption, excessive military spending, and an adverse external trading and 
financial environment, have played a role in undermining human welfare.  
Van de Walle (2001), who has written extensively on this issue, claims that 
African states have plenty of autonomy, and therefore they do not have to answer to their 
own populations. Furthermore, African states are also autonomous vis-à-vis the 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs), they do not have to accept these 
conditionalities. But, African countries do get aid. He is convinced that these states have 
not really implemented the structural adjustment programs in full. Van de Walle’s 
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argument implies that African leaders have pretended to implement SAPs, but have not 
really tried hard enough. They have gone slowly with privatization as matter of fact. They 
have done it out of the desire to control the desire to maintain political control. This 
author also suggests that the aid African countries have gotten is in fact too much, not too 
little. That the aid they have received has corrupted them, and made them unaccountable 
to their people. As a result, they remain detached from their people, and do not need to 
extract much revenue from them. Van de walle (2001) also rejects the theory that SAPs 
are bad, and do not work. He insists that the partial and differential implementation of 
such programs is the real source of rapid economic contraction for the impoverished of 
African countries. Hence, the blame should not be entirely on these institutions, but on 
the local leaders.  
But, did any of these structural adjustment programs increase economic hardship 
in the 1990s in Côte d’Ivoire, leading up to the war? Moise Koumoue (1994: 5-7), a 
former Minister of Economy and Finance (1989-1990) under Houphouët-Boigny, and 
who was personally involved in the process notes the following:  
In 1990, the measures of stabilization in the financial sector resulted in massive 
strikes and other social protests, forcing the government to renounce its first plans to 
reduce workers’ salaries (3/4 of the total budget). At the same time, the government put 
an emphasis on structural reforms in order to improve the budget. It can be said that the 
expected results were achieved in 1992, when 9 billion CFA Francs were generated, by 
improving the fiscal surplus and lowering government expenditures by 16.7 billions…At 
the social level, the effects of the crisis and the reform in the public and private sectors 
led to the contraction of the job market…The Gross national product (GNP) shrank by 
3% in 1990, and 1% in 1991, about 4.5% on average per capita annually from 1989-1991. 
The persistence of the situation made the politics of adjustment more difficult…On 31 
July1992, a joint communiqué from the Heads of States of the CFA Franc zone, decided 
to maintain the parity that existed between the CFA Franc and the French Franc (FF), 
reinforce their internal structural adjustment programs, as well as regional cooperation. 
As a consequence, the principal instrument to the adjustment remained the budget, 
therefore the necessity of finding a new internal formula for adjustment in Côte d’Ivoire. 
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Hence, an objective examination of Côte d’Ivoire’s economic and financial crisis 
in 1989 led to the creation of a program that would cover the entire period of 1989-1996, 
a stabilization phase (1989-1990) to reduce public expenditures and increase savings 
(1991-1993), and stimulate growth (1994-1996) (Koumoue 1994: 9-11). In order to 
succeed, the people had to make the necessary sacrifices to save the country from 
plunging further. When the first attempt of SAPs did not yield the expected results, 
President Houphouët-Boigny then called upon Allasane Ouatara, a former IMF deputy-
Director for Africa, to rescue the declining economy. Later, Ouattara became the 
country’s first Prime Minister. He designed some important, but painful measures that 
resulted in massive protests across the country.  
In 1994, when the CFA franc was devalued, more people became poorer, unable 
to provide for their families, or send their children to school. The government succeeded 
in adjusting the areas that were less likely to meet social protests. Poverty became even 
more pronounced among the people in the subsequent regimes. Because the crisis 
economic crisis started in the late 1980s, one must argue with caution that whether this 
has played a major role in the uprising of September 2002 in Côte d’Ivoire. 
e. Sudden Downturn in the Relative Value of a Country’s Main Commodities 
Various scenarios can cause a sudden downturn of commodity prices including: 
the commodities lost their importance or value on the world market, the buyers found a 
substitution for them, or are effectively produced by other countries. 
Côte d’Ivoire relies heavily on cocoa and coffee. Up to the mid-1980s, this 
country was the world largest producer of cocoa (800,000 tons in 186/87), and it 
occupied a high rank for coffee (210,000 tons in 1989/90) in Africa (Koumoue 1994: 18). 
68 
 
 
 
As I stated elsewhere, cocoa and coffee production brought a huge number of migrant 
workers from the Sahel region including: Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, and Guinea. Within 
Côte d’Ivoire itself, the cocoa and coffee belt formally located in the center and southeast 
regions attracted many people from other regions, and from nearly states. As time went 
on, the rapid depletion of the forest area compounded with a high demand for cocoa and 
coffee plantations caused many people to move to dense rainforests of the western region.  
Unfortunately, the prices of these products fell dramatically in the 1980s and 
beyond. According to Koumoue (1994: 18), the prices of cocoa, which was already low 
in 1987, continued to decline following the fluctuation of the dollar and increase in the 
world production. By 1990, the price of coffee also declined sharply due to the crisis on 
the world market. In 1986, the price of coffee reached catastrophic levels. After 1991, the 
prices of cocoa and coffee dropped to record low, because of the high stocks of on the 
world markets. The economy of Côte d’Ivoire plummeted further and has not recovered 
since. 
As a result of this, the Ivoirian farmers (including cocoa and coffee growers) who 
account for nearly 80% of the population became bankrupt, unable to take care of their 
families as they used to. Their hopes were again dashed when the economic recovery 
plans imposed by the IMF and World Bank did not work to their benefit. The lives of the 
Ivoirian farmers have deteriorated significantly since 1986 on. The numbers of the 
unemployed, universities and technical schools graduates was a record high, while the 
youths remained hopeless. These young men and women now engage in all sorts of 
criminal activities in order to survive. The general misery has created lots of discomfort 
among the people. Those in power and their associates live abundant and flashy 
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lifestyles, while the poor people continue to struggle to survival on daily basis. It is not 
clear whether the downfall of the price of the main commodities have played a role in the 
uprising against the Gbagbo regime in September 2002. Though, their effects were felt 
across the board for the country was hit very hard.   
3. Causes Related to Economic Gain for “Rebel-Entrepreneurs” 
The argument here is that civil wars started by those who wanted to seize part of 
the country and exploit resources or seize control of the state. There are several 
competing explanations of this. 
Hirshleifer (1995 and 2001), for example, argues that the possible causes of 
conflict relate to the notion of preferences, opportunities, and perceptions. He writes that 
proxies for opportunities have three common sources including: extortion of natural 
resources, donations from diaspora, and subventions from hostile governments. In their 
part, Sachs and Warner (2000) believe that the causes of civil wars include poor public 
service provision, corruption, and economic mismanagement.  
Paul Collier is a leader of this theory. His great works on the subject command 
tremendous respect and this has won a name for himself. To be sure, Collier (1998, 1999, 
2000, 2001, and 2002) has recently made the powerful claim that civil wars result from 
the desire of rebel group leaders to get control over natural resources or commodity 
products, including processed commodities, cocaine in Colombia, for example. That the 
permissive conditions for such wars include: International market for commodities 
(coffee, cocaine, opium, diamond), and sufficient state decline for the rebels to seize 
control over commodities with impunity. As proximate causes, they are the emergence of 
rebel groups that armed themselves and feed themselves through the sale of commodities, 
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and/or a sudden rise in the price or scarcity of the commodity in question. Indeed, many 
recent civil wars around the world seem to be linked to such causes: For example, the 
Colombian cocaine rebels in Latin America, Sierra Leonean blood diamonds in West 
Africa, Afghan opium Talibans in Asia.  
In Côte d’Ivoire these could be called the cocoa and coffee cowboys. Noted that 
these economic entrepreneurs often couch their appeals in materialist terms, that is, they 
claim to be fighting for social justice (like Colombian rebels) when their real aims are 
simply to seize power and enrich themselves. But, have the rebels in Côte d’Ivoire sought 
to control cocoa and coffee in order to enrich themselves and sustain the rebellion? Have 
they abandoned other, putative motivations for going to war?  
As I mentioned elsewhere, the FN’s initial motivations were to remove President 
Gbagbo from power. These hopes were dashed during the early hours of the uprising 
when the loyal forces to the Gbagbo regime succeeded in pushing them back to the 
center, and northern regions of the country, where they had settled permanently. Foreign 
troops were put on the ground to prevent both sides from clashing any further.  
 When it became clear that the rebels would not go to Abidjan, they then turned to 
the exploitation of the natural resources under their control. They engaged in the illegal 
exploitation of cocoa, coffee in the west, and diamond in the northwest, near Seguela. 
The revenues generated served to enrich themselves, and to sustain their movements. 
Some local newspapers have reported that some rebel leaders have built villas, hotels, 
and shops in neighboring countries Guinea, Mali, and Burkina Faso. Also, during the first 
hours, the rebels broke into many banks under their control and stole undisclosed amount 
of cash.  
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4. Neo-Colonial Causes 
The main argument is that developing countries become unstable, and the 
conditions for civil war are created, by the withdrawal of support by a former colonizer, 
or previous great power external patrons (especially United States or former Soviet 
Union). But that this is a proximate cause only. In this perspective the causes of Africa’s 
numerous conflicts are divided into two main categories: the permissive conditions and 
proximate causes. In the first category, Africa’s internal conflicts are believed to have 
roots that extend to various conditions present at independence. One of them is that 
colonial powers established borders that corresponded little to African political, cultural, 
and economic life (Brown 1996: 328).  
Furthermore, the first generation of African leaders, or the “Pères de la Nation,” 
accepted colonization borders rather than entering into the arduous and politically volatile 
process of redrawing them. In fact, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU), now African Union (AU), places great emphasis on the permanence of existing 
borders and principle of territorial integrity (Brown 1996: 240). In the second category, 
two factors contributed to Africa’s wave of political instability in the late 1980. The IMF 
and World Bank structural adjustment programs jeopardized the neo-patrimonial state. 
However, some countries were still benefiting from superpowers patronage (Brown 1996: 
243).  
For Young (2002), the roots of Africa’s violence lie principally with political and 
economic conditions that existed after independence, and the policies pursued by elites to 
gain and consolidate power. He writes that, commons patterns of state and class 
formation in Africa have led to endemic, intense internal conflict. Even Southern Africa, 
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where wars of independence and majority rule continued into the 1990s, violence was 
exacerbated by conditions inherited from colonialism and the policy choices of new 
leaders. The recent changes in international policies have affected the state, namely the 
new global economic, political, social, and cultural transformation may have an impact 
on the stability of African states, and may even combine to serve as a primary cause of 
major political unrest.   
Francis Deng (in Rupesinghe 1996) also stresses the effects of the colonial 
heritage on post-colonial African states. He argues that because of the way in which 
African states were created and people were separated, the states are now confronted with 
a crisis of nation building. That, the ethnically highly heterogeneous states are now 
challenged by competition for state power and national resources, often escalating to 
crisis and armed conflicts (in which the legitimacy of the state and the controlling 
authorities falls into question). Deng argues that politicians and military rulers have 
proved incapable of rising above, what he calls “parochial concerns,” to take on truly 
national leadership. Instead, they have constantly repeated past errors and flawed 
policies, resulting in a downward cycle of political instability, economic decay, and 
international isolation.  
Stedman (in Brown 1996: 236) makes similar comments that Africa’s recent 
internal conflicts have arisen from long-term permissive conditions and more immediate 
proximate causes. According to this author, legacies from colonialism predisposed much 
of Africa to violent conflicts over the distribution of resources in societies, access to 
political power, and basic political identities. Using Nigeria as an example, he notes that 
colonialism created both class conflict and multi-ethnic states. Such legacies help create a 
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pattern of state and class formation in which African political leaders relied on external 
support to reward internal allies, and ignored the needs of their citizens.  
In the Côte d’Ivoire case, it should be noted that, in the past, Houphouët-Boigny 
offered and guaranteed almost the entire Ivoirian market to French corporations. After his 
election in 1995, Bédié tried unsuccessfully to change that. He was victim of a military 
coup four years later. Also, the Gbagbo regime had a strong resentment via-à-vis French 
economic dominance in Côte d’Ivoire before it took power. Mamadou Koulibaly, an 
influential member of the regime, co-wrote a book in which he explains why the French 
dislike the Gbagbo regime. If yes, this is true, one can say that French is committed to 
protecting its interests in Africa at all costs, including Côte d’Ivoire. An argument could 
be made that France stimulated the civil war because Gbagbo threatened (somehow) its 
interests in Côte d’Ivoire.  
The present chapter has also provided different taxonomies of the different kinds 
of civil wars. Based on these typologies, the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire is one that is 
among the country’s various ethno-regional groups. A discussion of the Ivoirian civil war 
shows that it first started as a category 2-war (civil wars against the state) then it moved 
to a category-4 war (civil wars against over the local resources). The various explanations 
suggest that the war in that country is complex, but overall, it is a war that eminently 
political. The Annual Review of Sociology (1994: 14) argues forcefully: 
 There remain some serious difficulties to overcome. Repeated observations over 
time are needed for the dynamic analysis that could begin to disentangle causal 
sequences. In spite of numerous controversies and confusing empirical findings, the same 
basic conditions for ethnic conflict repeatedly are identified in the works here reviewed, 
most important are: Strong ethnic identies/boundaries’ grievances, opportunity structures; 
resource mobilization. Any research that seeks explanations should attend to all these 
simultaneously. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Chapter three is about the domestic and international political economy as a 
source of civil war in Côte d’Ivoire. It seeks to examine the correlation between the civil 
war and people’s income levels, to see the trend after President Gbagbo came to power in 
2000. Morever, it looks at the effects of the various structural adjustment programs, and 
falling prices of Côte’Ivoire’s main commodities (cocoa and coffee). In other words, did 
socio-economic grievances stimulate the fighting? Finally, it examines the attitude 
adopted by the rebels towards the resources under their control after the civil war broke 
out, to determine whether this was a part of their initial plan, or it was a pure 
coincidence?  
A. Background On the Ivoirian Economy 
Although Côte d’Ivoire has important natural resources deposits (petroleum, 
natural gas, diamond, manganese, iron ore, cobalt, bauxite, copper, and hydropower), it 
relies heavily on agricultural products such as yam, cocoyam, manioc, rice, banana 
plantain, maize, peanut, millet, and palm oil, for subsistence, and cocoa, coffee, rubber, 
citrus, palm oil, cotton, tobacco, pineapple, and recently cashew, for cash crops. These 
two types of crops, and especially the latter, generated an impressive economic growth 
between 1960 and the mid-1980s (Kouadio and Gottlieb 1997).  The production of export 
commodities such as coffee and cocoa imposed by the French colonial administration, 
and a comparatively high level of industrialization, attracted foreign interests into Côte 
d’Ivoire in the first place (Amir 1967, Nyong’oro 1987, and Cohen 1974). 
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Significant components of the Ivoirian population remain divided by occupation. 
While a small fraction of the population serve as civil servants at all the levels of 
government, agriculture constitutes by far the most important occupation for the majority 
of the people. For instance, Akan farmers (in the center and East) mostly cultivate cocoa, 
coffee, rice, pineapple, bananas, and rubber. As for Senufo farmers (in the north), they 
specialize in rice, sugarcane, millet, mangoes, and cotton; some northern communities are 
pastoralists also. Bete and Dida farmers (in the west) also grow rice, coffee, and cocoa, 
while other farmers in the country tend to have small plots growing a variety of the above 
crops. 
As for the commercial sector, it is controlled by Dyula and Malinké traders, with 
men dominating large-scale trade and women prominent in small-scale trade, while the 
transportation has been led predominantly by Dyula as well as Kulango, Baule, Agni, and 
Bete men. Meanwhile, forestry has largely been left to Lebanese, European businessmen, 
and some local elite. In fact, the logging industry in Côte d’Ivoire started with French 
colonialism in the 1900s. The savage exploitation of the country’s rainforest continued 
even after independence, which resulted in a huge deforestation due to excessive and 
illegal logging, and loss of the beautiful fauna present in the region (Kouadio and 
Gottlieb 1997). 
Other immigrant populations control specific sectors of the economy as well. For 
example, the Ghanaians dominate the fishing industry, while the Europeans control the 
shipping industry. The French companies particularly own important share in the energy, 
water, and telecommunication sectors. The Lebanese are in the restaurant and imported-
goods shops business. As for the Nigerians they owned food and household good shops, 
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while Senegalese and Moroccan own imported technologies and clothing shops. A 
combination of all these activities made Côte d’Ivoire an economic success in the early 
years of independence.  
From the start, Côte d’Ivoire’s economy was shaped in such a way that it was 
difficult to shift from one sector of production to the other. Although some people have 
been able to switch career, in general, each group have been able to hold on tight to their 
primary occupation until recently. Indeed, the initial division of labor has significantly 
been changed in recent decades, due to the high unemployment rate, retirement from a 
previous job, massive layoffs, businesses closures, overpopulation, unregulated 
immigration, growing informal sector, and migration from-and-to urban centers. The 
informal sector has become the domain of the young people and women. The lack of 
decentralization of state institutions, and the civil war of September 2002 have made the 
situation worse. Abidjan, the capital city, is now polluted and overpopulated. 
According to former Budget Minister Moise Koumoue (1994: 15), in 1994, 44% 
of the people of Côte d’Ivoire lived in urban centers, 56% lived in the rural areas, 70% 
attained schools, 6 million people were active, 43% were less than 15 years old, while life 
expectancy averaged 52 years. The agricultural sector occupied a good place in the 
country’s economy, with 30% of the gross domestic product (GDP), and 80% of state 
revenues came from exports. The growing of cocoa and coffee (the main commodities for 
exports) covered approximately 2.5 millions acres, with some 400,000 workers who 
supplied direct and indirect jobs (1994: 17).  
Between 1985 and 1986, this country had experienced a huge growth in the cocoa 
sector with 800,000 tons in 1994. However, the price of cocoa fell in 1987 on. As for 
77 
 
 
 
coffee which was estimated to 210,000 tons between 1989 and 1990, fell due primarily to 
aging plants. The situation was worse in 1991 for the price of both commodities. As for 
the rubber production, it augmented to 60,000 tons since 1987 until 1988, and was 
130,000 tons in 2000, although the price fell in 1984 and 1987. As for cotton production, 
it was estimated to 300,000 tons, while pineapple and banana productions dropped to 
160,000 tons each since 1988, palm oil reached 902 tons in 1986-1987, but fell to 785 
tons, and sugar was 150,000 tons between 1989 and 1990. Timber production also fell, as 
forest protection became a major concern on the world stage. The government also 
sought to industrialize the mining (gold, diamond, iron, nickel) and industrial sectors 
until 1970. However, in 1981, the government was forced to perform its first structural 
adjustment program as a result of the economic crisis (Koumoue 1994: 18-24). 
Because of the rapid depletion of the rainforest that resulted from excessive and 
illegal logging, and the traditional ways of farming (mostly slash-and-burn), many Baule 
farmers from the center moved into the deep rainforests of the west in search for better 
lands to grow cocoa, coffee, or both. As a result of this, the western region experienced a 
significant increase in population resulting in serious environmental stress. The 
settlement also created land disputes and resources scarcity in the region. In the 1990s, 
there were multiple clashes over land tenure and ownership involving the locals and alien 
populations. Some of these confrontations resulted in many deaths, which made headlines 
in the local and international news media.  
Chaleard (2000: 54) who has carefully documented, and examined some of these 
clashes in the western region writes that these tensions were fueled, in part, by what he 
calls “the blockage of the plantation economic system, and lack of sound policies by state 
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leaders.”  He argues that the readjustment following the huge forest loss since 1980 
created tensions between various ethnic groups (locals and foreigners), some of which 
had opposed the Baule to Burkinabè, Bete to Burkinabè, and Bete to Baule. Chaleard 
(2000:54) also remarks that the change in leadership in the government since 1994 is a 
reflection of the alliances made around the concept of Ivoirité created by President Bédié, 
which privileged nationals over foreign migrant workers.  
Chaleard describes how these foreigners were stripped their rights to vote since 
1994, an anti-immigrant laws regarding land tenure was voted in 1998. It occasioned 
xenophobic acts against foreigners, especially from Burkina-Faso, Mali, and Niger. Many 
foreign farmers were expelled from their lands in the southwest region in November 
1999. The expulsion also included Ivoirians from the north (also called Dyula).  
Akindes (2004: 8-9) takes the discussion back to the colonial era. He argues that, 
President Houphouët-Boigny inherited a colonial policy from France that favored 
vigorous agricultural development, this coupled with a high concentration of foreign 
capital, led Côte d’Ivoire to becoming a sub-regional economic pole that attracted other 
factors of production including: sub-regional labor, capital, and a variety of expertise. For 
instance, labor migration from Togo, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Benin increased 
significantly as a result of this economic euphoria of the 1970s and 1980s. The coastal 
region with 3,733,413 inhabitants, of whom 622,372 were international migrants, offered 
more opportunities for employment and self-employment than elsewhere. Furthermore, 
the economic crises in Ghana and Nigeria in 1970 and 1980 caused part of this migration 
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toward Côte d’Ivoire. To be sure, the 1998 census estimated the total population of the 
country to 15,366,672 inhabitants, 26.03% of whom were immigrants.  
However, it should be stated that immigration alone does not cause tensions when 
it is well regulated. On the other hand, an uncontrolled immigration can be a source of 
tensions between the local and immigrant populations. In fact, immigration becomes an 
issue, and this is true for all societies, during tough times and economic crises. Under 
these conditions, the immigrants are often seen as invadors, thus the source of a country’s 
trouble. 
In Côte d’Ivoire, these tensions were created because of lack of regulation of the 
land tenure system by the Ivoirian government, and absence of legally binding documents 
between initial landowners and their buyers at the time of the various deals or 
transactions. In fact, one of my closest relative who had been involved in these types of 
deals once told me that, in some cases, some people had bought their land or sold it 
verbally to others, which turned out to be the recipe for conflicts later on. He also added 
that, in some instances, the landowner sought to retake the land now in full production 
capacity from the original buyer under fallacious grounds, either to sell it to someone else 
for more profit, or use it for their personal gain. Some people viewed them as xenophobic 
and tribalism toward certain groups. It was in this context that the western region of Côte 
d’Ivoire had experienced several confrontations and atrocities between the local and alien 
populations, resulting in many deaths, injuries, loss of livelihood, and ethnic tensions, 
and even hatred. Unfortunately, the leaders exploited the situation for personal gain.  
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In order to spare their own lives and those of their family members, some alien 
farming communities had abandoned their cocoa and coffee plantations altogether, and 
returned to their native regions or countries, thus loosing all their assets they had so 
tirelessly worked for for years. That and other factors had ultimately contributed to the 
misery of the Ivoirian people in general, and the farmers in particular. But, did these 
socio-economic related issues stimulate the war in any ways? 
To answer this central question, I have divided and outlined the period of the 
economic boom, followed by the period of economic decline to see the implications. I 
have designed a number of empirical questions that need a close examination. For 
instance, did the population of Côte d’Ivoire become poorer? Were the people uncertain 
about the future? Did the size of the middle class shrink? Was there a decline in the 
socio-economic indicators of the people? If the population got poorer in the 1990s, what 
effect did this have on civil violence? Also, what resources did the rebels go after and 
how they have used them to support themselves? Or how did their military and political 
strategies change as the situation progresses?  
1. Period of Economic Growth (1960-1980) 
Indeed, Côte d’Ivoire’s impressive economic take-off after independence in 1960 
was followed by an economic downturn that made it very vulnerable toward the end of 
the 1980s. Many observers have structured the eras of economic boom and economic 
downfall in that country with a minor difference. Of the many works produced on this 
subject, Akindes (2000: 126) has proposed a more comprehensive structure. He has 
divided the short economic history of Côte d’Ivoire into two main periods. He calls the 
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first period the growth period (also called economic miracle), and the second period the 
period of uncertainty (also called economic mirage). He writes that, on the macro-
economic scale, Côte d’Ivoire experienced eighteen years of steady economic growth 
(1960-1978) followed by twenty years of uncertainties (1979-1999).  
President Houphouët-Boigny engineered this success never stopped bragging 
about it. In fact, he did so many times when he was given the opportunity during his 
puclic appearances. Below is one statement he had made in the past (my own translation):  
At independence in 1960, we had two options available to us. The first option, 
was the immediate africanization of the workforce, replacing foreign nationals with 
Ivorians, this was the easiest option. The second option, and the most difficult, was to 
train leaders capable of gradually replacing those expatriates who were in positions of 
high responsibility. It was the second option that we chose, because Côte d’Ivoire did not 
want unqualified leaders. We did not want an africanization for the sick of doing so. 
Therefore, we chose a legitimate africanization that included young ministers and 
graduates from highly reputed institutions (Koumoue 1994: 33). 
 
Houphouët-Boigny made the above statement during a meeting with the 
international business community. The president used this medium to defend his 
economic policies, and vision for Côte d’Ivoire. He had made similar statements in 
several of his public speeches, including party conventions, national conferences, as well 
as annual addresses to the nation. Not only he personally took pride of the good reputaion 
this country enjoyed at that time, but also he wanted to show that he was in fact the main 
artisan of the relative economic success that country. Houphouët-Boigny and Côte 
d’Ivoire became a success story both economically and politically in Africa and the 
developing world from 1960 until the mid-1980s. As a result, this country was highly 
respected worldwide, especially by the former colonial power, France. 
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The Ivoirian success was the result of a number of factors including: open-door 
economic policies that focused primarily on the agricultural sector, along with relatively 
high levels of industrialization, as well as a model of an “African democracy” that 
emphasized regional and ethnic inclusion in the management of the affairs of the state.  
According to Akindes (2000), the period between 1960 and 1980 constituted the 
era of economic growth or economic boom in Côte d’Ivoire. The so-called ‘Ivoirian 
economic miracle’ was characterized by the availability of finances, important 
investments, and in general the importance of public spending. That the success was also 
based on a combination of an opened policy to the outside that consisted of recruiting 
foreign workers, capital and expertise, and a liberal economy based on the exportation of 
coffee, cocoa, and timber (see also Amir 1967, Nyong’oro 1987, and Cohen 1974). This 
period was remarkable for investments by the government in sanitary supplies, 
multiplication of infrastructures in the education sector, or training in engineering 
schools, creation of public enterprises, political granting of government scholarships and 
recruitment of University graduates to gradually replace foreign expatriates, political 
clientelism, free access to public education, formation, and healthcare.  
However, Akindes (2000: 127) remarks, this distribution of the fruits of economic 
growth were unequal across communities and regions. The populations of the forest 
zones were the biggest beneficiaries of this, due to the exploitation of timbers and cocoa 
and coffee, as opposed to the people from the center and north. The government had tried 
to fix this unbalance by creating several sugar factories in the north, the opening of the 
port of San Pedro (southwest), and the creation of a hydroelectric dam in Kossou (center). 
Abidjan, the economic capital, became the symbol of the politico-economic success, far 
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ahead of other towns and cities, where people, especially the elites showed luxurious 
lifestyles, and the political class introduced in the business world. The middle class 
showed some signs of these lifestyles also. The external signs of this wealth in Abidjan 
influenced the people in the sub-regions who migrated to Côte d’Ivoire in great numbers 
in search for better opportunities (2000: 128) 
It should be noted that the first two decades of independence had for principal 
objectives a strong industrial growth, which was characterized by two phases. Until 1975, 
the industrialization relied on foreigners, namely French-at the end of the 1970s. New 
public industrial enterprises were put in placed. During those years, the Ivoirians (both 
public and private) accounted for 1.4% of the industrial sector, and 6.6% of foreigners 
who were non-French. The enterprises had a social capital of 92%, 90.6% of investments, 
94.1% of value added, and 93.8% of the workers, of which 97.5% were expatriates 
(Chevasu 2001: 10-11). 
The strategy of large openness to foreign capital and investments in the industrial 
sectors stimulated growth respectively from 22% to 23% per year between 1961 and 
1971. But, the politics of welcoming foreign investors cost lots of money. Thus, the 
number of foreign workers had to be reduced by educating young Ivoirians, who did not 
shine in the sciences (4.7% in the industrial sectors in 1971, 90% of direction personnel, 
86% for cadres, and 49% for Agents de Maitrise high salaries), other Africans in the 
factories accounted for 38%, (Chevasu 2001: 12). Finally, in 1975 and 1977, the prices of 
Côte d’Ivoire’s products rose significantly (for coffee and cocoa), due to the effects of 
freezes in Brazil, drought in Colombia, the war in Angola, stagnation of the production in 
other African competitors, and some Asian countries that were starting industrialization 
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process (14). An analysis of the industrial sector of Côte d’Ivoire in 1995 showed a 
reduction of the productivity since 1977.  
After this impressive economic growth, the Ivoirian economy began to fall apart 
in the 1980s, because of an unprecedented economic crisis that resulted in inexcessive 
foreign borrowing and a huge national debt. The crisis impacted the public and private 
sectors, as well as the different segments of the Ivoirian society. The so-called economic 
miracle had now turned to what Akindes and others have called economic mirage, 
explained next. 
2. Period of Economic Downfall (1981-1990) 
At the beginning of the 1980s, Côte d’Ivoire’s economy started to experience 
some serious problems. The causes of these troubles were both internal and external. 
According to Toungara (1990: 37-38), from 1960 to 1989, cocoa registered a ten-fold 
increase passing from 80,000 to nearly 800,00 tons, and coffee output more than doubled 
to 300,000 tons, placing Côte d’Ivoire among the world’s top producers. The loss of an 
extended struggle against unusually low prices for Côte d’Ivoire’s main agricultural 
exports (cocoa and coffee), resulted in a drastic cut of 50% in the price of kilo paid to 
peasants, hence a drop from 400 to 200 CFA for cocoa, and from 200 to 100 CFA for 
coffee in the 1988-89 seasons. In 1989, the public debt was estimated at 14,000 million 
USD, the highest per capita in Africa. 
Toungara writes also that during the period between 1981 and 1993, poverty rose 
significantly. The economy plunged in a deep recession that reached its picked in 1987. 
As a result of this, the government, which was unable to service its foreign debt, decided 
to suspend its payment. It then adopted a structural adjustment programs in which it tried 
85 
 
 
 
to cut government spending under tremendous pressures from the International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs), namely the IMF and World Bank.  
Unfortunately, these adjustments did not yield the expected results, and things 
became worse. Then, the need for the third phase came: The devaluation of the CFA 
Franc, through the infamous structural Adjustment programs imposed by these Bretton 
Woods Institutions (Akindes 2000: 128-129). The next section discusses these structural 
adjustment programs imposed on Côte d’Ivoire, and their effects on the people. It also 
looks at the trend of the country’s main commodities (cocoa and coffee) prices on the 
world market up to 2002.  
B.  Structural Adjustment Programs  
I have mentioned earlier that the period between 1960 and 1980 was marked by 
significant economic and developmental progress that led some analysts to describe Côte 
d’Ivoire (perhaps too quickly) as an exception in Sub-Saharan Africa. Among these 
observers were Amin 1970, Cohen 1974, Hecht 1983, and Nyong’o 1978 and 1987, 
Chevasu 2001, Toungara 1990, Akindes 2000. According to these scholars, Côte 
d’Ivoire, not only was regarded as the mirror of Western and Francophone Africa, but 
also a symbol and model of political and economic success on the continent and the 
developing world. Politically, President Houphouët-Boigny was considered the main 
architect of that success and stability due to the fact that he was able to hold the various 
ethnic and religious communities together (Chabal 1993, and Rothchild et al. 1996). 
Economically, he created an African capitalist model for his country that generated a 
huge success in the first two decades of independence, as well as massive West African 
immigrant communities into Côte d’Ivoire. A large number of people of Lebanese 
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descent, French, and North Africans settled in Côte d’Ivoire also (Nyong’oro 1978 and 
1987). 
As Rothchild et al. (1996) write, the president believed in a unified, stable, and 
modern state built on a solid base of agricultural export, which was translated by an open-
door policy throughout the region, which attracted foreign migrant workers in the cocoa 
and coffee plantations owned first by the local planters (Baulin1980). Gradually, some of 
these migrant workers were able to purchase some portion of the land and grow their own 
cocoa and coffee, and thus some of them settled permanently. Thus, Côte d’Ivoire 
became the world largest producer of cocoa, and occupied a high rank in coffee 
production as well (Hecht 1983; Nyong’o 1987, Amin 1970, den Tuinder 1978, and 
Brayton 1979).  
Unfortunately, the relative economic prosperity of the early years of 
independence could not be sustained, because of a number of internal and external forces.  
The country desparately needed political reform and economic change (Toungara 1986), 
for the so-called ‘economic miracle’ was now being tarnished (Bourke, 1987), and the 
ideology of development in place was heavily been challenged (World Bank 1987, 
Akindes 2004, Young 1982, and Rapley 1993). Between 1980 and 1990, the fall of the 
price of cocoa and coffee occasioned a fatal downfall of Côte d’Ivoire’s economy.  
The official newspaper, Fraternité Matin (2003), reported that all the sectors of 
the economy were hardly hit, especially the agricultural sector. As a result, many people 
could no longer afford to send their children to school, and buy basic goods, including 
medicine. Moreover, the habits and lifestyles of the people changed drastically creating 
anger, frustration, and general misery among the majority the population. Expectedly, 
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this had put enormous pressure on the government both internally and externally. Inside 
the country, the number of the discontents grew rampant, while in outside there was a 
pressure from the foreign debtors, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank. On 25 May 1987, the government announced it could no longer pay its 
external debt, which was estimated at 6 billion U.S.D., forcing it to accept and implement 
some painful policy prescriptions (also known as structural adjustment programs) 
imposed by the foreign donors led by the IMF and World Bank.  
Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) explain that these structural adjustments 
programs (SAPs) consisted of two phases. The first phase (also called stabilization phase) 
aimed at injecting some cash into the system to keep it running. The second phase (also 
called reform phase) consisted of reforming the economic and financial sectors, which in 
turn would stimulate growth. The expectations behind these adjustments were that part of 
the revenue generated would serve to repay the country’s foreign debt, and ensure the 
financial security of the people. 
Hence, in 1989, the World Bank and IMF required that the national economy be 
made competitive by depreciating the exchange rate and improving the public finances, 
resulting in a significant increase in unemployment, which was already high due to the 
closing of many factories. Moreover, the government proposed to reduce the salaries of 
the workers in the same year. Knowing the fact that in Sub-Saharan Africa the 
government is the major employer, and also that one civil servant feeds more than his or 
her own nuclear family (husband, wife, and children) it was clear that cutting the salaries 
would have dramatic consequences on the population as whole. Expectedly, these 
measures provoked huge social protests in Abidjan and elsewhere in the country, forcing 
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the government to review its first round of adjustment measures. It tried without success 
to find new ways that would be less painful. Each time it met the opposition of the 
people.  
It was in this context that president called upon Allasane Dramane Ouattara (also 
called ADO), a former Governor of the West African Central Bank in Dakar (BCEAO), 
who was serving as Deputy-Director of the African Division at the International 
Monetary Fund in Washington D.C., to inject some shocks into the Ivoirian economy 
(Konate 2004). In April 1990, Ouattara led the Comité Interministériel de Coordination 
du Programme de Stabilization et de Rélance Economique to oversee the adjustment 
program. On 7 November 1990, he was named prime minister, the first in Côte d’Ivoire’s 
history. However, the honeymoon between the new prime minister and the people did not 
last long. Ouattara designed a number of necessary, but unpopular measures that is to 
follow.  
The first set of measures included: reduce the number of government vehicles per 
ministry, force the wealthy barons of the old regime and private sector to pay back taxes 
accumulated over the years (especially in telephone, water, electricity, and other personal 
properties), suppress the gratuity of University buses that used to be free for all the 
students, and privatize both government owned and semi-owned companies (Faternite 
Matin 2003). 
It should be reminded that the round of the austerity measures implemented by 
Mr. Ouattara did not reach the expected results for the government’s coffer remained 
empty. Each time Ouattara decided to add new measures he met mounting social unrest 
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throughout Côte d’Ivoire. The end result was the takeover of the airport by army 
conscripts in 1990.  
Akindes (2000) and Kieffer (2000) have carefully documented this military, while 
Cogneau (2003: 87), Toungara (1999: 23), and others have extensively written on the 
social implications of these adjustments in the country. These authors see these protests 
as a direct response to the appalling and poor economic diet imposed on the country by 
the IMF and the World Bank. Côte d’Ivoire, like many African states and the developing 
world, had badly failed its first structural adjustment programs test with the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank.  
For a while, Ouattara and his drastic measures became the center of all the daily 
conversations throughout the country, especially in Abidjan. Those barons who were 
summoned to pay back taxes disliked him so much. In the end, these structural 
adjustment measures, which were intended to improve the economy in the first place, 
brought more misery to Côte d’Ivoire and its people. President Houphouêt-Boigny’s 
death on 7 December 1993 opened the door for another phase of adjustment, the 
devaluation of the CFA Franc by 50%, which was tied to the former French Franc (FF). 
 Some analysts have argued that had he been alive, Houphouët-Boigny would have 
stopped this devaluation. In fact, the president had always opposed that the CFA be 
devalued when he was still alive. The devaluation of the CFA Franc on 10 January 1994 
was part of the global structural adjustment programs that were set up by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) in the developing world including Côte d’Ivoire, in order to help 
these countries improve their economic status, and the living standards of their citizens.  
Also, more adjustments took place in the industrial sectors. As Chevasu (2001: 
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10-11) notes, despite the risks, some French investors such as Groupe Bolloré in the 
shipping industry, the buyout of the SOGB (rubber plantation) privatized in 1995 of 20% 
of CIDT (Textile) in 1998. The first company to transform cocoa and coffee, SACO 
increased its capacity by 10,000 tons in 1996. Note that French companies were 
important and present in Côte d’Ivoire. Some had been there long before independence in 
1960 (for example, CFAO and AXA). Of the most recent ones, Bouygues, through 
SAUR remains the main shareholder for the Compagnie Ivoirienne d’Electricité (or CIE), 
CIPREL (for electricity production), and Société des Eaux de la Côte d’Ivoire (or 
SODECI) for water.  
French banks and their branches dominate the financial market: The Société 
Générale de Bank en Côte d’Ivoire (SGBCI) for the Société Générale, Société Ivoirienne 
de Banque (SIB) for Crédit Lyonais, Banque Ivoirienne Pour le Commerce et Industrie 
de Côte d’Ivoire (BICICI) for Banque Nationale de Paris (PNB). The Group Bolloré is 
also active in the transportation sector via SAGA, SDV and SITARAIL. It is also a 
tobacco producer thanks to SITAB. Other groups are also present and continue to 
contribute significantly in the infrastructure industry (SETAO and COLAS, Bouygue, 
and Jean Lefebre), while Total and Elf possesses 25% of the oil refinery, Société 
Ivoirienne de Rafinage (SIR). 
According to the same report, at the end of 1997, the stock of French direct 
investment in Côte d’Ivoire was 22% of all it had in the Franc zone (with Gabon and 
Congo on top because of huge investment in oil). Investment rose from 52% between 
1995 and 1997, to reach 226 billion FCA Franc, while investment in the Franc zone 
diminished (2001: 25). In 1997, France Télécom bought 51% of Côte d’Ivoire-Télécom. 
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Public enterprises were privatized because they were loosing, which has a negative 
impact on the state budget. Bernard Contamin found that in the case of CIE, there were 
50% of unpaid bills before privatization took place, now the unpaid bills amount to 55 
after privatization. 
Meanwhile, a development strategy called Eléphant d’Afrique (African Elephant), 
which was created under the Bédié regime projected that in the years 2015-2025, a newly 
industrial country will be born in Africa (a more vibrant private sector must be created) 
(Chevasu 2001: 23). Until 1998, the results of this new politics were remarkable (with 
2% growth in 1994, 7% annual growth until 1998. It helped reduce the budget deficit 
significantly, which moved from 11.9% of GDP in 1993 to 6.5% in 1994, it fell to 1.8% 
in 1998 (Cabrillac 2000). The growth was supported by the production of coffee and 
cocoa which price augmented on the world market, pushing growers to intensify 
production. But, the commodity prices fell again in 1999.   
The manufacturing and construction also rose for about 10% per year. The 
manufacturing sector moved from 20.5% in 1993 to 24.6% in 1998. This was the result of 
a return of foreign investments, which rose from 7.8% of GDP in 1989, to 16.6% of GDP 
in 1998. Foreign investors contributed to this re-establishment in the economic and 
financial sectors (Chevasu 2001:  24). Despite this improvement at the governmental 
levels, there were no clear signs of improvement in people’s lives. Their pockets 
remained empty. That is, at the same time these adjustments were happening the 
population was getting poorer and poorer. The next section discusses the difficulties face 
by the Ivoirian people. 
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1. Effects of Structural Adjustment Programs 
A 2003 GRIP report suggests that, between 1970 and 1979, Côte d’Ivoire 
witnessed an annual growth rate of 6.7%. But, it was in the early 1990s that the first signs 
of weakness became apparent. In 1990, the Houphouêt-Boigny regime collapsed 
following the Franco-African summit of La Baule, the structural adjustment programs 
imposed by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) prevented Côte d’Ivoire’s economy 
to benefit from the international markets. The Ivoirian economy was hard hit, with 50% 
devaluation in 1994 of it’s the CFA Franc, which impoverished a large portion of the 
population. The social conditions were negatively impacted, and tensions rose between 
the various communities (GRIP 2003: 7). 
According to same report, Côte d’Ivoire was expected to be the major beneficiary 
of the devaluation, due to the increase in its commodities prices (coffee and cocoa) from 
1.5% in 1994 to 6.5% in 1996, to reach 5.75% in 1999. The effort to manage the inflation 
rate (starting at 32.2% in 1994, fell to 7.7% in 1995) had no serious impact on the people 
for the period following the devaluation contributed to the deterioration of the living 
standards of the households. As public services such as gas, electricity, and transport 
were increasing, the price of basic products such as cereals, vegetables, and others 
experienced an increase (Akindes 2000: 129). 
Akindes notes that in fact these early good results of the devaluation hide the 
social inequalities and other social indicators. As he writes, in reality, poverty rose from 
10% in 1985 to 32.3% in 1993, then 36.8% to in 1995. Urban populations witnessed 
higher levels of poverty especially households who relied on the informal sector were 
hardly hit. These inequalities could be seen at the national scale also. To be sure, in 1993, 
93 
 
 
 
1995, 1998, the national ratio of poverty were respectively 31.3%, 35.4% and 33.4% for 
households headed by an Ivoirian, and 35.4%, 44.7%, and 34.3% for households headed 
by a foreigner. Between 1994 and 1996, the various police brutalities increased with the 
instauration of the Identification Card for foreign nationals, which resulted in massive 
return in the neighboring countries (for instance, Mali, Guinea-Conakry, Burkina Faso, 
and Niger), especially those who were illegal and poor. These brutalities reduced the 
number of poor among foreigners in 1995 (Akindes 2000: 129).  
The period 1981 to1990 was the period when the negative effects were more 
severe. For instance, in both the urban and rural areas, the health services were unable to 
cover the needs of the people, where there was a lack of equipments and medicine, 
resulting in many deaths in the hospitals people. As for the schools, they had no supplies, 
the number of people wanted to go to school surpassed that of facilities available. Classes 
were overcrowded along with low quality of the education system. 
In his part, Chevasu (2001: 10-11) argues that the problems started to become 
perceptible in the economy at the end of the 1990s as a result of state debt, the low 
purchasing power of the population, of which the GDP was only 455, 000 CFA (734 
USD) per capita, and high social inequalities that impeded social consumption. The 
household consumption fell from 74.2% of GDP in 1993 to 58.1% in 1998. The state 
encouraged foreign investment in order to create employment and salaries. The factors 
related to the bad distribution of household revenue created serious health and education 
problems. A World Bank report in 1997 shows a lack of good education and social 
services. The same report revealed that 37% of Ivoirians lived with less than 12,000 CFA 
Franc (19.7 USD) per month (Chevasu 2001: 24).  
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Before the outbreak of the civil war in September 2002, the people from Abidjan 
were already facing economic hardships, 44% of households were living with difficulties 
35% said they were using their savings, while 43% said their resources were unstable. 
Only 7% of the people said were living well, and only 2% could save. Poverty among the 
people living in Abidjan rose significantly. A survey conducted during the first semester 
of 2001 and the first semester of 2002 indicated that 2/3 of the household thought their 
general economic conditions were deteriorating, while 5 % said it was not (that is largely 
negative –62 points). Only 1/10 household said their purchasing power was improving. 
On the job market, since the period 1996-1998 (dates of available surveys), the 
unemployment rate became stable while the salaries remained high, due to high education 
attainment (Roubaud 2003: 60-61). 
It is safe to argue that the effects of the crises of the 1980s and early 1990s 
resulted in a major fall in the living standards of the Ivoirian population. The 
consumption of the people fell by 50% on average between 1985-1993, according to a 
report by the Institut National des Statistiques (INS), by 75,000 CFA Franc per year (1.5 
USD/day per person), which moved from 10% to 31.3%.  The same report reveals that 
half of the poor people were concentrated in the savannah zone of the north in 1985, 
however, the fall of the cocoa and coffee prices had a negative impact on the forest zone 
as well. Poverty rose significantly in the secondary cities and towns as well, from 8% to 
31.2%. In 1993, Abidjan was the last region to be protected by extreme poverty with 5% 
of poor people. During the period 1994-1998, the living standards rose by 2.5%. Only the 
western region showed a significant reduction of poverty level from 38% to 24%. It 
doubled in Abidjan (11%). On the national scale, the inequalities increased significantly 
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in Abidjan (from 0,49 to 0,53) as in the rural areas (from 0,42 to 0,49), but it remained 
stable in other urban centers (Cogneau and Mesple-Somps 2003: 98). 
In 1995, unemployment rose to 17%; PIB was 9.4 billion USD in 2000, 9.2 billion 
USD in 2001, growth rate was –2.3 in 000 and +0.1 in 2001; foreign debt was 15.8 
billion USD (GRIP 2003: 8). The poverty level rose by 16 % between 1985 and 1988. In 
1997, the World Bank admitted that 37% of Ivoirians were living with lower that 12, 000 
CFA (less than $20). The urban employed of government and private sectors were the 
first victims of the structural adjustment programs (Campbell 2000: 146-151). 
GRIP (2003) writes that in 1998, the numbers of non-military public workers 
were reduced by 4% and the average salaries fell by 28% for civil servants. It was 
expected that household utilities bills (mainly electricity and water) would go down in 
1985-1993. Instead, they had gone up between 1993 and 1998 both in rural and urban 
areas. Meanwhile, malnutrition rose between 1985 and 1993, while in 1994 and 1998 
HIV/AIDS became very preoccupant in the country (GRIP 2003: 99). Between 1993 and 
1998, the urban poor and average poor were most impacted by the crisis. Poverty among 
the employed deepended in Abidjan, and by five in other urban centers (100) 
According to Campbell (2000: 149), when he took power, General Guéï told 
foreign debtors the coffers were empty. At first, he vowed to suspend any debts incurred 
by his predecessors. However, this decision was revised on 13 January 1999, so that he 
can pay the army personnel and government workers. In 1998, the foreign debt of Côte 
d’Ivoire was estimated to 14.7 billions USD. The unpaid bills by the Bédié regime 
amounted to nearly 1 billion USD (584 billion CFA) between 1998 and 1999. The IMF 
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estimated that 1999 would see a deficit of 197 billion FCA (322 billion USD). An in-
depth audit showed that the dues culminated to 7% of GDP were about 500 billion CFA. 
It was hoped that in 2000 the country was to take care of its foreign debt estimated to 
756.8 billion CFA. However, the International Financial Institutions already suspended 
their help for the democratic process ended with the military junta, compounded with bad 
management, and massive fraud by the Bédié regime. Below is a table the Human 
Development Index of the country for 2002 provided by United Nation Development 
Programme (UNDP). 
Table 4: Human Development Indicators (2002) 
 
INDICATORS STATISTICAL DATA 
Poverty Rank in the World 79 
Life Expectancy at birth in 2002 41.2 Years 
Population below $1 a day 1990-2002 15.5% 
Population below $2 a day 1990-2002 50.4% 
Population below the national poverty line in 1990-
2002 36.8% 
GDP in 2002 11.7 billion USD 
GDP Per Capita in 2002 707 USD 
 
Source: UNDP Statistics (2002)-Côte d’Ivoire 
 
 A close reading of the above United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
statistical report on Human Development Index (HDI) also confirms this. These data also 
paint the same grim picture that scholars and researchers have explicitly highlighted. The 
table indicates that in 2002, life expectancy in Côte d’Ivoire was among the lowest on the 
continent (41.2 years). Although this could be attributed to poverty, it should be noted 
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that Côte d’Ivoire was also among the African countries that were severely impacted by 
HIV/AIDS, which reduced the life expectancy significantly. According to the same 
UNDP statistics, between 1990 and 2002, 15.5% of the people lived under $1 USD a day, 
while 50.4% lived under $2 a day. The people who lived under the national poverty line 
accounted for 36.8%, while the gross domestic product (GDP) was only $707 in 2002. 
The table also shows a fluctuation in the Human Development Index between 1975 and 
2002. Côte d’Ivoire was rank 79 in 2002 among the world countries based on these 
figures. The above observations suggest that there is a large consensus among scholars 
and researchers that the situation in Côte d’Ivoire was a dire one. The population was 
suffering terribly from the economic recession, now coupled by these structural 
adjustment programs imposed by the international debtors. But how did the people of 
Côte d’Ivoire cope with these socio-economic problems? The answer follows. 
2. Coping With the Crisis and Effects of the Adjustments 
In every society there is a natural tendency to create coping mechanisms during 
difficult times at the individual, community, and state levels. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
first two levels take precedent over the latter for the state is quasi-poor, and unable to 
help. Moreover, in that part of the world, sociological and anthropological findings 
suggest that the group is more important than the individual. Not only this traditional way 
helps retain a strong sense of identity, but also reinforce the social, political, ethnic, 
religious, and regional solidarity, and loyalty among the people.  
Indeed, when the crisis became apparent, and the consequences well assessed, 
many Ivoirians began to create coping mechanisms to support one another. According to 
Akindes (2000: 129-130) the gravity of the crisis led many Ivoirians to adopt important 
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coping mechanisms. Among others things, the creation of traditional structures of 
solidarity that served as social security for the severely impacted, as they were unable to 
respond to the needs of the people who used them. That the deepening of the crisis also 
changed the relations between the people and communities, the consequences of which 
were the weakening of the traditional social relations, and the emergence or the 
reinforcing of structures of intermediations, namely the many competing religious sects 
or denominations who specialized in the healing of these problems and hope providers. 
The author adds that the inability of the state to provide for everyone widened the 
itinerary of exclusion (unemployment, declassification, and marginalization), which 
became an itinerary of refusal, characterized by the prosecution of the state, accused of 
injustice and corruption. Gradually, the masses became a critic in the opposition parties.  
The devaluation following the CFA Franc caused an increase in the household 
food budget, the slow increase in the salaries (from 10 to 20%) failing to cope with 
inflation. There was an increase across the household budgets of the various social layers, 
causing the suppression of such things as meat, fish, and fat products (Akindes 2000: 
126). Another strategy was to modify the structures of expenses on things like 
entertainment, clothing, social expenses, and consumption of industrial drinks. These 
households limited all to necessary, or vital needs. For example, people started to seek 
the help of traditional healers, traditional medicine, and second hand clothes (131). 
In order to feed themselves some poor households used both legal and illegal 
means to generate funds, for example, multi-activities, child-labor in the informal sector. 
Corruption in the public administration sectors increased rapidly. Some households made 
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up of friends, neighbors, co-workers, or religious fellows in Abidjan organized 
themselves in associations or buying groups to reduce the costs of basic food necessities 
(rice, meat, chicken, frozen fish). Finally, those with savings specialized in real estate, to 
improve their buying power (132). 
As for members of the middle class, they made relations with wealthy women to 
benefit from their assets and revenues to save their own households. Several analysts of 
social standards in Côte d’Ivoire showed two phenomena: the importance of women in 
the urban and household economies, due to the weakening of men due to salary crisis. 
Men never thought of doing certain jobs believed to be dishonoring or dirty (for instance, 
gate keeper or vigil, garbage collector, low skilled factory worker, and small vendor) 
which was performed traditionally by non-Ivoirians (especially from Burkina-Faso and 
Mali, and Niger) now done by high school students (Akindes 2000: 133-135).  In the 
rural areas, many young people migrated from the poor regions of the center and north 
towards the southwest agricultural zone where competition was already high on land 
tenure (Akindes 2000: 135; see also Charleard 2000).  
Côte d’Ivoire experiences with these adjustments were not good in the sense that 
they did not benefit the people who got poorer across the board. The state did benefit 
somewhow but this was short lived, perhaps because these adjustments were never fully 
implemented in the first place. It could be argue that the SAPs have been responsible for 
a major increase in poverty –for reasons now well documented summarized as follows: 
huge national debt leaving no money for infrastructure programs in education, health, 
jobs, etc…--and hence an increase in general misery of average and poor people, thus 
higher general dissatisfaction (Kouadio and Gottlieb 1997). 
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The economic crisis in Côte d’Ivoire’s was the result of the fall of its main 
commodities prices, low confidence of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
following a massive embezzlement of funds given by the European Economic 
Community, fear of foreign investors because of the unstable and uncertain political, fear 
of the old regimes to be held accountable for their acts, that they might be punished for 
complicated things further (Akindes 2004: 28). The only option left President Gbagbo 
was to change the behaviors and mentalities in Côte d’Ivoire, if he wanted to reduce 
poverty, re-establish confidence, and restart the economy with a competitive industrial 
sector. He tried, but his attempt was short-lived. 
In sum, Côte d’Ivoire experienced its first round of structural adjustment program 
in 1981. But it was not until 1994 that these SAPs became really known to the general 
public. In the 1990s, SAPs became popular for a variety of reasons including: their direct 
effects on the general public, devaluation of the CFA that made everything expensive, the 
appointment of Allasane Dramane Ouatara to oversee and manage that process, the 
various measures undertaken by him, and of course the political problems that ensued 
after he became interested in the highest office in the country.  
It could be argued that despite all the bad impacts this had on the people and the 
country as a whole, the SAPs as a process did not play a significant role in the crisis per 
say, perhaps, the fact that it has revolved around the person of Ouattara. The crisis in 
Côte d’Ivoire did not only hit the northerners and western communities who are now 
fighting against the Gbagbo regime, this may have played only a role as a root cause, not 
a proximate one that actually triggered the war in September 2002.  
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C. Rebels’ Attitude Toward the Local Resources  
I have mentioned elsewhere in this dissertation that when the civil war broke out 
the rebels occupied the north and part of the west, after they failed to topple the Gbagbo 
regime.  I also mentioned that the initial motivation of the rebels was to remove Gbagbo 
from power, as they claimed. These hopes were dashed during the early hours of the 
uprising when the loyal forces to the Gbagbo regime succeeded in pushing them back to 
the center and northern regions of the country. Thus, they settled permanently. Therefore 
the war moved from a category-two (against the state) to a category four-war (war of 
occupation). MJP and MPIGO fighters who later joined the MPCI also claimed that their 
only ambition was to avenge their Yacuba brother, Guéï, who was killed during the night 
of 19 September 2002. The New Forces (FN), as they finally called themselves, failed to 
advance toward the economic capital, for foreign troops were already on the ground to 
prevent both sides from clashing again.  
 When it became clear that the rebel fighters would not go to Abidjan, they then 
turned to exploiting the natural resources and commodities under their control. Thus, they 
engaged in the illegal exploitation of cocoa and coffee in the west, as wellm as diamond 
and gold in the northwest, near Seguela. The revenues generated alledgly were used to 
sustain their movements, and also for personal gain. In fact, several local newspapers 
have reported that some rebel leaders, among whom Sherif Ousmane and Kone Zakaria, 
have exploited these resources to build villas, hotels, and shops in neighboring countries 
including Guinea-Conakry, Mali, and Burkina Faso.  
Also, during the first hours, the rebels broke into a couple regional central banks 
under their control and stole undisclosed amounts of cash. The evidence from other wars 
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shows that when rebellions fail their initial plan, they often turn to alternatives ones. In 
this case, the war became a war of occupation. Their action, it could be argued, was more 
of a coincidence than anything, for they thought they could do the overthrow Gbagbo in 
less than a week. The next chapter discusses the role of ethnicity and region as identity of 
the war. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
ETHNICITY AND REGION AS IDENTITIES IN THE WAR 
 
Chapter four discusses the role of ethnicity and region as identities in the civil war 
that broke out in Côte d’Ivoire in September 2002. It seeks to explain how have ethno-
regional differences shaped the current civil war in that country, and whether they are a 
root or proximate cause of that war? The chapter has been organized in a straightforward 
fashion. First, it discusses how the various ethno-regional groups in Côte d’Ivoire were 
able to live together in such harmony from 1960 up to 1993? What stimulated the 
previously quiescent ethno-political forces to take up arms against each other?  Second, 
the chapter examines the ethno-regional composition of the competing military forces on 
the ground, namely the national armed forces (FANCI) and rebel groups (FN), and seeks 
to understand whether the superficial appearance of the war between different ethno-
regional forces is wrong, or it is more complicated than it seems.  
The current section examines the relative unity that existed under President 
Houphouët-Boigny in Côte d’Ivoire from 1960 until he died in 1993, and explains how 
the subsequent regimes failed to maintain this precious unity. In order to have a good 
understanding of what went wrong in that country, it is important that the situation be put 
in historical context. It should be understood from the start that President Houphouët-
Boigny ruled this country for nearly four decades under the one-party state system. 
During that period, every Ivoirian national was de facto perceived a member of the 
Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), although there was some limited opposition 
on the ground, which operated in the shadows. The single party system drew a large 
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following for reasons that I have explained in the introductory chapter. And it continued 
throughout the presidence’s tenure. 
In 1990, the political landscape in Côte d’Ivoire was dramatically altered with the 
advent or installation of multiparty-ism. The new dynamic not only marked the end of an 
era in that country, but also opened the doors to new behaviors, habits, and culture. Most 
importantly, it brought more competition, participation, and hope for freedom among the 
people. It should be noted that Côte d’Ivoire’s politics has been much influenced by its 
physical environment, ethno-sociology, and cultures. Because of these complexities it is 
important that to examine its physical geography, history of settlement, socio-
ethnography, as well as history of the relationships that has existed between the people, to 
have a full understand of the current situation on the ground. 
A. Unity Under Houphouët-Boigny (1960-1993) 
Several factors, including socio-cultural, political, and economic, can explain the 
initial relative success that Côte d’Ivoire has had in achieving unity among its 
heterogeneous population between 1960 and 1993. The first set of factors relate to the 
president himself. Houphouët-Boigny was a charismatic leader, wise man, tactical and 
career politician, who held positions in various French governments prior to Côte 
d’Ivoire’s independence in August 1960. Appointed traditional Chief of his tribe (the 
Akwe), he was able to navigate sharply between traditional ways of ruling and conduct 
modern politics. Very respected at home and abroad, Houphouët-Boigny was also a 
source of inspiration and consultation for many other leaders around the world, especially 
the young generations of African leaders (for example, Thomas Sankara, Jerry Rawlings, 
Samora Machel, and Charles Taylor). 
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The second set of factors has to do with the economic and development vision 
Houphouët-Boigny had for his country. For example, he wanted to build a successful 
modern state that could compete in the world economy. Moreover, he created a national 
political identity that further united the people, and boosted their confidence. He achieved 
numerous personal and national goals, aided by his close ties with the traditional leaders, 
and their integration in the decision-making process across the nation. Thus, he 
understood the importance of ethnicity and culture in national development, rewards in 
the agricultural sector, other traditional activities, resources distribution, firm control of 
the political machine, opened door foreign policy, urbanization, religious tolerance, 
national and regional geopolitics, education and civism, law and order, presidential 
pardons, and national dialogue were the cornerstone of his political agenda. A major 
concern of the government after independence was to foster interaction not only among 
the locals, but also locals and foreigners (Kouadio and Gottlieb 1997).  
Michael Cohen has dedicated a large portion of his graduate work to explain how 
and why President Houphouët-Boigny was able to consolidate unity of his country, and 
develop successful economic policies for nearly four decades. According to him, after 
independence the towns of Côte d’Ivoire were assigned specific roles within the national 
strategy for economy development. As a result, secondary towns have developed along 
routes to Abidjan, particularly after the construction of the Abidjan-Ouagadougou 
railroad line at the beginning of the century. Transportation, processing, and marketing of 
agricultural products have created waged employment, which has attracted streams of 
migrants from country villages to towns of the south. Urbanization of the country has led 
to increasing contact between the sixty different tribes within its boundaries. Naturally, 
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increasing interethnic contact has led to a nascent national culture (Cohen 1974: 21-22). 
While the interaction between Ivoirian nationals and foreign Africans witnessed some 
friction (often resulting in sporadic violence), the country has, nevertheless, become 
dependent on foreign participation in the economy. The multi-ethnic and multinational 
character of the economic life is also evident in the political process of the country 
(Cohen 1974: 22). 
 In the political arena the early PDCI members consisted of a broad coalition of 
both Ivoirian ethnic groups and representatives of foreigners living in the country. The 
organization of the PDCI reflected this multi-ethnic membership, which individual ethnic 
committee (comites ethniques) linked to sub-sections (sous-sections), which were 
themselves represented in the national council (conseil national), the directing committee 
(comite directeur), and the political bureau (bureau politique). These structures operated 
on the principle of ‘democratic centralism’, with decisions communicated unanimously to 
higher levels (Cohen 1974: 23). 
In the agricultural sector, the Ivoirian development strategy was based on the 
productivity of cash crop to support a modern urban industrial sector (Côte d’Ivoire was 
among the most industrialized on the continent in the early 1960s-1980s). This strategy 
requires cheap agricultural labor to maximize agricultural earnings and trained manpower 
to operate and manage the technology of industrial growth (Cohen 1974: 24). Such 
consideration urged the president to open the doors to new regional migrant workers, 
especially from the neighboring countries. These regional laborers not only were 
considered regional brothers, but also ethnic and religious brothers. Note also that 
Guinea-Conakry, Mali, and Burkina Faso made up the former French Sudan, which Côte 
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d’Ivoire was a part. Their contribution was positively felt and desirable during the first 
decades of independence until the price of the major products (cocoa and coffee) started 
to fall in the 1980s on the world market.  
On the one hand, critics have warned that dependence on foreign labor and capital 
could eventually lead to economic stagnation, and subject the country to external forces 
over which it may have little control. Côte d’Ivoire had experienced just that, since the 
economic crisis of the 1980s and on. On the other hand, admirers of the Ivoirian approach 
have pointed to the failures of African countries like Ghana (quick economic downfall) 
with limited foreign investment that sought economic independence immediately after 
self-government in the 1970s. 
Meanwhile, the mal-distribution of income and concentration of wealth in 
Abidjan had deepened the disparity in the level of economic well being among the 
regions of the country. Tremendous differences between the wealthy south, clustered 
around Abidjan, and the impoverished north raise the issue of balanced national 
development. National development plans have continually emphasized the problem of 
regional disparities, yet from a few highly publicized efforts, such as the rotating annual 
national independence celebration, the Kossou (center-west) hydroelectric dam, or the 
San Pedro project in the southwest. There has been little consistent distribution of 
resources to areas outside of the economic capital city, Abidjan (Cohen 1974: 27).  
The distribution of rewards was evident during the first regime to ensure 
individual or group loyalty. Urban resources of all kinds, including electricity, water, 
housing, schools, markets, maternity clinics, and administrative facilities, were all tied to 
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ethnicity and support for the government. The failure to express sufficient militancy for 
the PDCI and the government led to neglect, as this was the case of the town Agboville 
(south) throughout the 1960s. On the other hand, support for the government or one of its 
key figures was rewarded with the granting of public resources. Thus, in 1962, when 
former Minister of Construction and Town-Planning Kacou Aoulou had to choose one 
hundreds villages to receive urban improvements, he received a list of localities from 
Philippe Yace (then president of the National Assembly and PDCI secretary-general). It 
was an effort by the president and the PDCI to reward loyal populations and encourage 
support from oppositions (Cohen 1974: 90)  
It should be added that even with a neo-patrimonial system in place the 
distribution of rewards was not equitable. The Houphouët-Boigny regime continued these 
selective, discriminatory, and conditioned policies until 1990, which had sporadically 
sparked protests among the people, especially in the urban centers. Government response 
to urban protests was largely successful for the first decades of independence. Although 
occasional opposition to specific policies developed throughout the same period, the 
administration was able to either co-opt it by the politically profitable distribution of 
urban resources or to suppress it by closing off the nonviolent means of expression. By 
the end of the 1960s, however, opposition became increasingly evident, and on occasion, 
violent. The military was used to put down street actions or student strikes-it did show 
that opposition did exist within the one-party state, outside the party (Cohen 1974: 95). 
These protests were ethnic or regional in character. A good example of this was 
the 1970s rebellion of the Bete people in the Gagnoa region (west) following the death of 
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Kragbe Gnagbe, an early political activist and ethnic brother, that led to thousands deaths 
for entire villages were massacred by the military, and the Abbey people of Agboville 
(center), who were also on the government black list after one their ethnic brother, Biaka 
Boda (political prisoner), was allegedly killed by the Houphouët-Boigny regime. 
However, the Houphouët-Boigny regime had carefully crafted a strategy to fight these 
oppositions that proved successful between 1960 and 1993. 
The Houphouët-Boigny regime’s response to ethnic mobilization was a unique 
institution officially known as le Dialogue (the Dialogue). Consisting of a series of mass 
meetings between President Houphouët-Boigny and all the “Couche Sociales de la 
Nation (national social groups), the dialogue emerged as an effective means of political 
communication (Cohen 1974: 115). There were many examples of this. 
In February 1963, after the creation of a court of state security to investigate an 
alleged plot against the government 1,000 people gathered at the palace in support of the 
President. After a second plot was uncovered in September 1963, both the government 
and party organized a huge rally of some 100,000 people at the Houphouët-Boigny 
stadium in the capital city, Abidjan, during which speakers from all the regions, ethnic 
groups, and professions expressed their adherence to the government and the president. 
Public officials promised new policy measures for political support (Cohen 1974: 116) 
On 22 September 1969, at a meeting of the bureau politique of the PDCI, 
President Houphouët-Boigny proposed meeting all the couches sociales (social groups) 
of the country, including teachers, students, students parents union (UNAPEECI), the 
executive committee of the workers union (Union Générale des Travailleurs de Côte 
d’Ivoire) or (UGTCI), the bureaus all the unions, employers, Lebanese community, 
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tenants, construction workers, transporters, pharmacists, doctors, bookstore owners, and 
sports clubs. The schedule would end with a meeting of the bureau politique, which 
would examine the issues discussed in the dialogue (Cohen 1974: 120). 
Expectedly, the president’s choice reflected careful ethnic criteria. He appointed a 
popular and respected Bete from Daloa (west), Jean Lorougnon Guede, as Minister of 
Education, leading Agni from Aboisso (southeast), Joseph Tadjo Ehue, as Minister of 
Civil Service, Edmond Bouazo, another Bete from Issia (west), and Albert Vanie-Bi Tra, 
a Gouro from Zuenoula (center-west) all of whom represented the politically important 
forest peoples.  
The coastal lagunaire groups were also included in the persons of Grah Kadji, 
from Jacqueville (southeast), Hypolite Aye from Anoumanbo (south), and Etienne Ahin 
from Bingerville (south). The youth of the new ministers as well as their ethnic identities 
satisfied possible criticisms from the students, Bete, and the Agni of Aboisso who were 
vicious critics of the President (Cohen 1974: 148). The above discussion clearly suggests 
that the crafting of the responses to mass protests was carefully planned by the 
Houohouet-Boigny regime. While individuals may seem unimportant, therefore easy to 
control, the ethnicity or regions were given much attention. The following three strategies 
speak to this effect. 
The first aspect of this strategy—reconciliation with former political opponents 
was an ideological one. Throughout 1970 the former political leaders who had been 
purged during the plots of 1962-64 gradually received public attention. The first of these 
men, Charles Donwahi (a Bete from the west), received land in 1969. As for Germain 
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Coffi Gadeau (a Baoule from the center), he received a concession definitive (garanteed 
house) in Treicheville, Abidjan (Cohen 1974: 174).  
The second strategy Houphouët-Boigny used to gain electoral and political 
support was the demonstration of respect for traditional chiefs across the country. For 
example, in April 1970, Philippe Yace was made the spiritual Chief of the Alladians, a 
tribe living along the Ebrie Lagoon. In a well-attended ceremony at Jacqueville, Yace 
performed traditional rites indicating his respect for his elders. In August of the same 
year, Yace attended the Fete de Generation (generations celebration) at Debrimou 
(south), a clan near Abidjan, and donated 100,000 CFA francs to the age group in the 
name of the PDCI and the government (Fraternité Matin, 24 April 1970: 4). 
The third aspect of the electoral strategy concerned the identity of those 
individuals maintained as secretary-generals of sub-sections of the PDCI, later nominated 
as deputies to the National Assembly (Cohen 1974: 175). It should be noted that under 
Houphouët-Boigny and the PDCI deputies consisted of people loyal to the regime, with 
limited or no knowledge of government. Some deputies could not read and write even. 
The case of the late Kassoum Coulibaly, a rich Senufo transporter from Korogho (north) 
was an example in point. Such flaws were permissible as there was no apparent 
opposition during that time. What mattered was the ethnic or regional posts distribution 
all the branches of government. 
On the economic front, the initial division of labor or occupation was a natural 
one, and it varies from region to region. Though, agriculture constitutes the most 
important occupation for well over 60% of people nationwide. The Akan mostly cultivate 
cocoa, coffee, rice, pineapple, bananas, and rubber trees, while Senufo farmers specialize 
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in rice, sugarcane, millet, mangoes, and cotton. As for Bete farmers; they grow rice, 
coffee, and cocoa; while farmers of other groups tend to have small plots growing a 
variety of the above crops. Commerce it is largely controlled by Dyula and Malinké 
traders, with men dominating large-scale trade and women prominent in small-scale 
trade. The transportation sector has been led predominantly by Dyula, as well as 
Kulango, Baule, Anyi, and Bete men, while forestry has largely been left to the Lebanese, 
European businessmen, and some political elite (Kouadio 2007, and Bassetts 2003). 
Meanwhile, many farmers started to move to rich soil areas hoping to capitalize in 
cocoa and coffee production. A massive migration to the west ensued, which changed the 
population dynamics in the region, and also created serious environmental concerns. 
People of other regions, as well as foreign immigrant were able to acquire portion of the 
land to grow their own cocoa and coffee. As time went by, incidence started to arise, 
sometimes leading violence between the locals and these migrant workers. These clashes 
were fought alone ethnic and regional lines. Because, it had no sound laws regarding land 
tenure, the government failed to address the problem, which resulted in several deadly 
clashes between the alleged landowners and migrant workers in Gagnoa and Issia (west), 
and San-Pedro (southwest) regions. In the past, these groups were able to live in near-
perfect harmony. Unfortunately, this relative unity on the surface had been broken due to 
new economic and political developments. 
B. Dis-Unity Under the Subsequent Regimes (1993-2002) 
In 1990, a new political dynamic emerged in Côte d’Ivoire in which the 
Houphouët-Boigny regime was forced to adopt multiparty elections for the first time, 
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after well nearly four decades of single-party system. Several important, as well as 
insignificant political parties were created as a result of this. The most important of these 
parties were the Ivoirian Popular Front (FPI) of Laurent Gbagbo, and Ivoirian Workers 
Party (PIT) of Francis Wodie. Table 5 below shows the names of the main political 
leaders, birth places, ethnic affiliations, and time spent in power. 
Table 5: Major Parties and Leaders’ Affiliation 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES LEADERS ETHNICITY YEAR 
Democratic Party of Côte 
d'Ivoire (PDCI) 
Houphouët-Boigny 
Henri Konan Bédié 
Baule-
Yamoussoukro 
Baule-Daoukro 
1960-1993 
1993-1999 
Rally of the Republicans (RDR) Allassane Ouattara Dyula-Dimbokro 1990-1993 
Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) Laurent Gbagbo Bete-Gagnoa 2000-Present 
Union for Democracy and Peace 
in Côte d'Ivoire (UDPCI) Robert Guéï Dan-Biankouma 1999-2000 
Over 20 smaller parties    
 
Source: Adapted from CIA Factbook (2001)-Côte d'Ivoire 
As time went by, new parties were added to the list. An example of this was the 
Republican Democratic Rally (RDR) created by the late Djeni Kobina, who led a 
dissident group that left the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI). The new political 
dynamics and the fracture within the old party completely changed the political landscape 
in Côte d’Ivoire. 
At first, these were ideological parties that sought to correct the so-called 
mistakes of the first regime. They all claimed to be against the Houphouët-Boigny 
political agenda, especially the single-party system. Thus, they formed a common front 
against the PDCI. As time went by, many of them could not be sustained, forcing their 
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members to join other parties or go out politics for good. While multipartyism opened the 
doors to more political competition and participation, it also created many problems in 
the Ivoirian political arena.  
Tensions grew even greater with the entry of Allasane Ouattara (an alleged 
Burkinabè) on the political arena, as the country’s first prime minister in 1990. 
Immediately after Houphouët-Boigny’s death in December 1993, Ouattara displayed his 
ambition to run for the highest office. Then, the battle for the succession between 
Ouattara and Bédié began. A number of painful events ensued, which divided the country 
along ethnic and religious lines. In fact, a number of painful events had occurred under 
Ouattara (1990-1993) when he was prime minister, and Bédié as interim president (1993-
95), and as president (1995-1999). Both leaders neglected and downplayed the social 
cohesion that was created by Houphouët-Boigny and the PDCI over three decades by 
manipulating their respective religious and ethnic followers. Bédié especially created the 
xenophobic concept “Ivoirité” which aimed at defining who was a citizen and who was a 
foreigner.  
In December 1999, General Robert Guéï led a military coup that overthrew Bédié. 
Guéï claimed he had come to clean up the mess created by the Bédié regime, and return 
power to the civilians. The junta held power for nine months. Unfortunately, the so-called 
liberator and his followers continued to victimize certain Ivoirians and foreigners. In the 
end, Guéï did not keep his promise to return power to the civilians. Instead, he decided to 
run for the Presidential 2000 elections. Worse, he excluded Bédié and Ouattara from 
running for the presidency in 2000. Thus the main contenders for these elections were 
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Gbagbo and himself. Gbagbo won the elections, but Guéï tried to steal it. When Ggagbo 
assumed power, he also failed to re-unite the country. He indirectly and directly created 
more discontents among the people. These ethnic and religious rivalries or tensions had 
sparked fear, distrust, and suspicion among the people across the country under the 
Bédié, Guéï, and Gabgbo regimes. 
Under Houphouët-Boigny, these tensions were mitigated and eased by 
government policies of rewards. The president created a model of ethnic and religious 
tolerance that was promoted using mass media, administrative, ideological, and other 
means to promote positive communication and interaction among members of different 
ethnic and religious groups.  Following Houphouet's fall, a variety of factors, including 
constant armed forces and police harassments of certain groups promoted division 
between ethnic and, especially, religious groups. Such divisions initially began with 
electoral politics and then spread beyond electoral issues (Kouadio 2007). Also, see 
pictures of leaders and affiliation in Apendix C (p. 215). 
Steck (2002: 4) notes the Ivoirian case that the identity crisis and the tensions 
between groups (national, ethnic, and religious) exacerbated everything…the electoral 
context and the fight among the major leaders for the presidency precipitated the crisis. 
According to him, the death of Houphouët-Boigny in December 1993 changed 
everything, and it moved the debate toward the fight for succession won by Bédié 
originally supported by Guéï against Ouattara. However, the main source of rising ethnic 
tensions was due to the political insecurity in the country (Steck 2002: 6). 
According to the same author, Bédié used the concept of Ivoirité against Ouattara. 
The Ivoirité is a concept based on the following three principles: First, deny Ouattara’s 
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nationality, and most importantly Ouattara’s relation with Côte d’Ivoire (due to its 
lineages within Burkina-Faso) and the foundation of Ivoirian identity, in part because he 
was from a northern region where the cultural, religious, and historical influences cross 
over, are multiple, where the colonial borders were drawn over three ethno-linguistic 
between three states (Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso). Second, its purpose was to deny 
Gbagbo as the main and historical opposition figure-a Bete, who incarnates or carries the 
clichés of the old rivalry between Bete and Baule. Third, go into retreat in his hometown, 
Daoukro (center), managing the local clientelism, image of a man the terrain and fidelity 
to the Akan people where Houphouët-Boigny was a symbol. Hence, Bédié had opened up 
the presidential bid on the basis of national authenticity, guaranting the authenticity of 
being an Ivoirian. But, the explanation of the crisis should go on and must not stop at the 
breakdown of national unity alone. Perhaps a good look at the compositions of the 
various forces on the ground can offer more insights as well. 
C. Composition of the Competing Military Forces 
In this section I examine the composition of the two competing military forces 
that are involved in the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire. First, I examine the composition of the 
ensemble of the three rebel forces (also called the New Forces or FN). Second, I look at 
the composition of the national armed forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI). Understanding 
the composition of these two camps is critical, for it may help explain, in part, why these 
rebel groups, and not others, took up the arms against the Gbagbo regime? 
1. New Forces (FN) 
The insurgency against the Gbagbo regime consisted of exiled former soldiers and 
co-conspirators in Abidjan, who simultaneously attacked government leaders campounds 
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and institutions, and security facilities in Abidjan (south), Bouaké (center), and Korhogo 
(north) (U.S. State Department, 31 March 2003). The Patriotic Movement of Côte 
d’Ivoire (MPCI), Ivoirian Popular Movement for the Great West (MPIGO), and 
Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP) joined together to formed the Forces Nouvelles 
(New Forces) (Welsh 2003). 
The military branch of MPCI consisted of former servicemen who participated in 
the overthrow of President Bédié on 24 December 1999.  These officers included 
Ibrahima Coulibaly (also known as IB), Zacharia Kone, Tuo Fozie, and Massamba Kone 
(all northerners from Senufo and Dyula ethnic groups). These soldiers had been detained 
and tortured under the junta (1999-2000) led by General Robert Guéï. They had escaped 
and fled to Burkina Faso after they attempted to overthrow the regime of President 
Gbagbo on 7 and 8 January 2001 (Zoro 2003).  
Note that the exiled soldiers that led the attacks were under the command of Staff 
Sergeant Ibrahim Coulibaly, a Senufo from the north. They began the preparation of the 
armed movement in Ouagadougou (Burkina-Faso) in 2001. Other superior officers of the 
FANCI also joined the rebellion. However, these were from other ethnic groups. Among 
them were Colonel Michel Gueu (a Guere from the west) and Colonel Soumaila 
Bakayoko (Dyula from the north). Many other soldiers have joined the rebellion as 
mercenaries from Burkina Faso, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Conakry (Diallo 
2005: 13-14). 
The political branch of MPCI was led by Guillaume Soro, an ex-University 
student organization leader who served as Secretary General. Before he joined the 
rebellion, Soro was an influential member of the (now) powerful and feared University 
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organization, the Federation Estudiantine de Côte d’Ivoire (FESCI). The FESCI was 
basically created in the late 1980s, and early 1990s when Côte d’Ivoire was experiencing 
a huge political “earthquake” that led to the adoption of multipartism. With regional 
branches located throughout the country (including Universities, technical and high 
schools), the FESCI’s main purpose was to fight for the rights of all the students, namely 
their working and living conditions. That is, it served as a civil organization that mediated 
between the student body and the government. 
Unfortunately, as this is common across Sub-Saharan Africa, the FESCI was 
quickly transformed from its original mission, when the political elite sought to recruit 
followers among the youth in general and students in particular. This divided the FESCI, 
especially the leadership. Consequently, several pseudo-associations of students emerged 
that did not have the impact the original FESCI had. A great deal of animosity divided 
this organization further, leading to sporadic clashes between the various factions. It was 
in that context that machetes were introduced for the first time, both on campuses and in 
students’ dormitories. The same context produced the two most powerful youth/students 
leaders during the pick of the crisis, Guillaume Soro and Charles Ble Goude, both 
became known to the general public and the country.  
When the civil war started Blé Goudé and his pro-Gbagbo followers called for 
patriotism and demanded that all stood up and defender the Republic, therefore the 
Gbagbo regime. Ble Goude and Gbagbo are both Bete from the west. Ble created the 
Alliance des Jeunes Patriotes to fight the rebellion led by his old friend and colleague 
Soro, who had become the emblematic figure, or for lack of better word, the visible face 
of the rebellion in Côte d’Ivoire.  
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According to Welsh (2003), a British Broadcast Corporation (BBC) 
correspondent in West Africa, the main and original rebel force (MPCI) began as a group 
of around 700 soldiers from various backgrounds who took up arms against their own 
country, because they were about to be demobilized against their wishes. Some of them 
joined the army when Guéï was in power, while others had participated in the coup that 
overthrew Bédié in December 1999. These soon to-be-demobilized soldiers were joined 
by ex-soldiers, who had been living abroad, who also recuited heavily in the areas it 
occupied (inckuding the north, center, and west). They demanded that President Gbagbo 
step down, and that fair, and transparent elections be organized within six months, that 
will be open to all Ivoirians. 
Initially, the government accused the MPCI of being sponsored by some 
neighboring countries. Burkina Faso, for instance, was occasionally single out and 
accused by the Gbagbo regime for serving as a safe heaven for the rebels, though there 
was no evidence to support such claims. Seven years, there still is some mystery about 
the rebellion that has yet to be revealed or answered. As Welsh (2003) puts it: “one thing 
that is clear is that the rebels are getting funds from somewhere. What is even clearer is 
that the new shady groups do have links across the borders.”  
Diallo (2005: 15) also argues that after the outbreak of the civil war, the MPCI 
was able to quickly mobilize the dozos, who then took an active part in the rebellion. The 
donsos or dozos who are traditional hunters from Bambara origin (from Mali) are long-
standing voluntary associations of men carrying guns. They dress in traditional uniform, 
wearing gris-gris (mystic power), and accessories like a fly whist, whistle, and hunting 
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knife. The dozos also claim to have healing skills, and are feared by others. To be a dozo 
is a matter of individual choice, and recruitment is achieved by co-optation. Conditions of 
belonging to a dozo association (or donsoton) include the ritual observance of common 
values based on the moral and intellectual probity of group members, including respect, 
courage, cooperation, and internal solidarity. In Côte d’Ivoire, most of the dozos are from 
the Senufo, Dyula, and Malinké ethnic groups (their number is estimated to 40,000 
dozos). 
Diallo (2005: 14) also writes that the total number of dozos fighters mobilized by 
MPCI is not exactly known, though the international Crisis Group (ICG) has estimated 
their number at 1,000 fighters, including at least 500 from Mali. MPCI reportedly 
recruited at least 10,000 civilians. Other dozos joined the rebel faction MPCI in Bouaké 
(center) and Korhogo (north). But, why and how did it come about that the dozos sided 
with the northern rebel groups?  
Before joining the rebellion, the dozos assumed the role of a supplementary police 
force for several years. In fact, their mobilization began in the 1990s. In 1994, the 
northern region became increasingly lawless. Therefore, Colonel Issa Diakite, a former 
administrative officer in Korhogo (MPCI Minister of Territorial Administration) in the 
Government of Reconciliation, appealed to the dozos for assistance. Subsequently, they 
were given the assignment to combat rural banditry (Diallo 2005: 15). 
One must not underestimate the fact that the north and west under rebel control 
constituted a large reservoir for recruiting fighters. In fact, the MPCI, MJP, MPIGO 
heavily recruited young women and men under their direct control during their 
occupation, either by will or force. As the next section will show the composition of 
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MPIGO and MJP largely reflect their own base, dominated by Yacuba and Guere 
fighters, these two groups belong to the generic language community known as Mande. 
As for the MPCI, its ethnic composition remains arguably complex because of the huge 
territory it controls. For instance, it has juridiction over important ethnic groups from the 
north, center, and northeast. These ethnic groups include the Senufo, Malinké, Dyula, 
Tagbana, Djimini, Baule, and Abron. The majority of them are mostly northern and 
Muslim (some Senufo are not Muslim), Baule who practice some types of Christianity or 
African traditions (Diallo 2005).  
If the identities and roles of the rebel leaders were clearly established during the 
first hours of the civil war, it was not the case for their fighters. There have been many 
mysteries surrounding the origins of certain rebel fighters, and most importantly their 
sponsors. Some scholars and journalists have attempted to quantify the composition of 
thre rebel army, but no one actually knows exactly how many foreign and local fighters 
there were? How many were killed during the battle following the uprising? Another 
problem is that most (if not all) foreign fighters have already gone back to their homes, as 
have local fighters whose promises were not met by rebel leaders. Also, it is unclear who 
trained, sponsored, and equipped them with the sophisticated logistics or equipments 
such as radios, satellite telephones, or machine-guns, which the rebels had displayed 
during their occupation of the second half of the country. There have been rumors, and 
finger pointing in the local press, internet blogs, while the rebels remained silent about 
the attack (LePape 2003: 30)  
Welsh (2003) also highlightes the mystery about the involvement of foreign 
fighters in the border with Liberia. He notes that during the Liberian civil war, Yacuba 
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and Guere were recruited to fight alongside some Liberian rebel groups. Therefore, it is 
no surprising to see the same favor being returned to their ethnic brothers in order to 
abenge Guéï. That during a BBC interview with Felix Doh and Gaspard Deli, 
respectively leaders of MJP and MPIGO, the two had confessed that they were fighting 
because Guéï (a Yacuba from the west who was killed) was an ethnic “brother”. 
Ironically, Gbagbo had come to power by defeating Guéï during the controversial 2000 
presidential elections from which other significant opposition leaders (namely Ouattara 
and Bédié) were excluded. When Guéï decided to proclaim himself the winner, Gbagbo 
asked his supporter to storm the presidential palace. They did, and Guéï fled. Many of 
these Liberians, however, appeared to be more interested looting than as a struggle for 
any cause, welsh writes. They came from Liberia and Sierra Leone, two countries that 
have both suffered from long vicious and interrelated wars involving numerous rebel 
movements. The rebels from these two war-torn West African countries, and from 
Guinea, had supported and provoked each other’s conflicts; now it seems they were ready 
to do do the same in Côte d’Ivoire. 
While I was doing dissertation research in Côte d’Ivoire, I learned that in a clash 
between MPIGO/MJP fighters, and the national armed forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI) 
in Man and Danane regions (west) some of these alleged foreign fighters were 
apprehended and shown on national television. The authorities displayed them to convey 
foreign involvement in the crisis. Some of these fighters allegedly spoke English and 
other tribal languages from Liberia and Sierra Leone. They had allegedly confessed that 
they were recruited to fight in Côte d’Ivoire, though they did not reveal for how long and 
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the compensation for their service. Also, neither MPIGO nor MJP leaders officially 
confirmed or denied the presence of foreign fighters in their midst.  
It was unclear whether this was propaganda on the part of the Ivoirian 
government, a tactic used by it to deter more foreign fighters from getting involved, or 
was it an invitation to the international community, and the governments of these 
neighboring countries to do something about it? So far, there have been no answers to 
these questions. And no one has attempted to give one publicly or officially. 
 In sum, the MPCI, MPIGO, and MJP were led by ex-servicemen, who had in their 
midst officers and low ex-soldiers, who were apparently unhappy about their conditions 
in general, and particularly the army. As time went by, they started to make new 
demands, including political ones. These rebel groups also recruited in the neighboring 
countries with the exception of Ghana, which was not accused of any involvement in the 
war. The foreign recruits fought alongside a huge pool of local recruits, especially from 
the Muslim north.  
The New Forces also drew some strong support from many towns across the 
country, especially among foreign and Muslim communities. But many of them could not 
voice their origins publicly for fear of retaliation against their families by the government 
forces, or its sponsored militia groups that mushroomed in the southern half of the 
country controlled by it. The reasons for their support of the FN were twofold: First, they 
perceived the rebels as their saviors, who who could put an end to the harrasment and 
brutality perpetrated against them along with their northern counterparts.  Second, they 
saw in the rebellion a group they could count on and join forces to fight for social, 
economic, and political justice.  
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These observations show that the current crisis is one among the country’s ethno-
regional groups. The MPCI was highly dominated by northern constituencies, while the 
other two, MPJ and MPIGO, were filled with Yocuba and Guere from the west. Few 
other ethnic groups were also involved. For instance, Colonel Michel Gueu is a Yacuba 
from the west, and former MPCI minister of sport in the Seydou Diarra transitional 
government. The late MPIGO leader Felix Doh was a Baule who camouflaged his real 
name and origins during the first hours of the rebellion. As for Kouakou Fofie, he is an 
Abron (northeast) who joined the MPCI, currently the military commander in Korhogo 
(north), while MJP leader Gaspard Deli is a Guere from the west. Louis Dakoury Tabley 
(current MPCI minister) and Alain Lobognon (MPCI communication director) are Bete 
from the west, as is President Gbagbo himself. Now is what war the composition FANCI 
like?  
2. National Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI) 
In multi-ethnic societies such as those of Sub-Saharan Africa, the internal 
composition of a so-called national army may take two forms, each with its costs and 
benefits. The first type reflects an army that is ethnically balanced, and one in which the 
major ethnic groups are somewhat well represented from the top down. The second type 
is an army dominated by one or two major ethnic groups, or representatives of one major 
national region. Sometime regionalism matters more. 
The first type of army may be advantageous to a ruler in that it reflects the social 
fabric of the country. In other words, it is representative of all ethnic groups. There is a 
sense of stability in it. In this case, the president, who is commander-in-chief, may be 
forced to respect the rule of law in his relations with the armed forces. The disadvantage, 
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however, is that an ethnically balanced army may be hard to manipulate, thus detrimental 
to the policies of the president and his government. Some do fairly well. In fact, no 
country in the world has an army that is perfectly balanced, let alone Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The second type of army is typical of most Sub-Saharan African countries. In this 
type, the army is dominated either by a single ethnic group, usually the ethnic group of 
the president, and led by officers very close and loyal to him. Moreover, the minister of 
defense is usually a trusted friend or relative of the president who appoints him. These 
arrangements are crucial in the African context, as the army, gendarmerie, presidential 
guards, and police are great instruments of both law enforcement, and political coercion 
in most countries. Note that there is often a difference between the regular army 
(ethnically diverse) and the favored praetorian guards, who are completely loyal to the 
president (Decalo 1976 and 1989). 
In a chaotic situation such as the one discussed here, these organizations are often 
called upon to quell uprisings, riots, rebellions, protests, attempted coups, etc…The 
disadvantage of an army that is dominated by one or few ethnic groups is that such 
arrangements can easily create an atmosphere of suspicion and friction within the 
organization, whereby excluded or minority groups seek to unite against the dominant 
group. Such patterns are the recipe for political instability. Many African rulers with an 
ethnic army have ruled over stable regimes: Mobutu in ex-Zaire, and Bongo in Gabon, 
for example. The current composition of the armed forces in Côte d’Ivoire reflects this 
second type. But, this is nothing new. The current turmoil in the army, which Kieffer 
(2000) has documented, did not suddenly start under the current regime, which is now 
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paying the ultimate price. It started under Houphouët-Boigny, and continued in the 
following regimes. In fact, since the death of Houphouët-Boigny in December 1993, each 
of the subsequent regimes (Bédié, Guéï, and Gbagbo) has had its share of turmoil. 
 Under Houphouët-Boigny, the army was ethnically balanced. However, the 
Minister of defense was a Baule, a loyal ethnic brother of the president. For example, 
Mbahia Blé Kouadio, a Baule from Mbahiakro (center-east) held this position for a long 
time. His brother Colonel Mbahia was also among the army elite at the military base in 
Bouaké (1970s and 1980s). Houphouët-Boigny’s Chief of Staff was also a Baule. 
However, he allowed other ethnic groups to lead as well. An example was General 
Ouattara Dakin (a Taguana from Katiola, north), Colonel Oulai (a Guere from Man, 
west), General Guéï (a Yacuba from Biankouma, west), General Zeze Barouan (a Bete 
from Issia, west), General Palenfo (a Lobi from Bouna, northeast), and General Coulibaly 
(a Senufo from Korhogo, north). There were similar ethno-regional representations in the 
gendarmerie, police, and navy (for example, Admiral Lamine Fadiga, a Mahoka from 
Touba, west).  
Both the mutinies and rebellion in Côte d’Ivoire must be understood in relation to 
the prevailing socio-political situation, and in the context of changes generated by army 
reform. The same ethnic and political cleavages that run through the Ivoirian society exist 
in the armed forces and the police. The FANCI and police suffer from not only low 
salaries and poor conditions, but also ethnic nepotism. Since Bédié, Guéï, and Gbagbo 
came to power the tendency has been to recruit soldiers based on ethno-regional origins 
(Diallo 2005, Coulibaly 2002, and Kieffer 2002). For example, Gbagbo was accused of 
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the Bete-ization and Dida-ization of the armed forces, in addition to ethno-regional 
militias. The Bete and Dida are two regional groups that live side by side and very close 
to each other in many respects including history, language, and culture. Since he came to 
power, President Gbagbo appointed Bete and Dida at the highest positions in the armed 
forces, to allegedly secure power. The situation may have contributed to the frustration of 
ex-soldiers who took at arms against his government. 
While the size of the army was limited to few thousands soldiers under the 
Houphouët-Boigny and to some extent the Bédié regime, its nature drastically changed 
under Guéï and Gbagbo. From 1999 to 2002, the number of young recruits increased the 
number of army personnel, police, gendarmerie, and navy and forestry, to alledgely 
secure the two regimes.  
Diallo (2005) argues that despite a lack of equipment, the armed forces 
experienced a rapid expansion, with recruitment of young soldiers especially under 
Guéï’s junta in 1999-2000. The majority of these young soldiers, recruited according to 
their ethnic affiliation, were members of special paramilitary units known as Zinzins and 
Bahefoues. With the help of President Taylor in Liberia, Guéï recruited a number of 
Liberian and Sierra Leonean fighters for his presidential guard, known as the Red 
Brigades. That the actions of the Red Brigades and other special units, like the Camorra 
and the Cosa Nostra, to which Guéï delegated security, resulted in a land of military 
factionalism.  
In September 2000, soldiers of the Cosa Nostra, indicted for plotting to overthrow 
the Guéï junta, were arrested. Among those who took refuge in Burkina Faso were the 
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leaders of the current rebellion. The situation in the army worsened in January 2001, 
when a group of soldiers revolted against the presidency of Gbagbo. Loyal troops tot eh 
presudent subdued the rebellion, while the young northern soldiers who had led it fled 
and found refuge in Burkina Faso (Diallo 2005: 13). 
In January 2002, Moise Lida Kouassi, the then Minister of Defense, announced a 
reform program for the army. The imminent demobilization of paramilitary units caused 
resentment and exacerbated frustrations. Members of the Cosa Nostra, Zinzins and 
Bahefoues units considered too close to Guéï were expected to be demobilized. Lida 
Kouassi also unilaterally removed two major northern officers (Generals Palinfo and 
Coulibaly) also considered to be close to Ouattara’s party (RDR), and replaced them with 
southerners in Bouaké (center).  
It was a mistake on his part to replace a disloyal officer with another disloyal one. 
For example, Lida Kouassi sent Colonel Michel Gueu (an officer from the west), who 
was responsible for the presidential guard of Guéï, to Yamoussoukro first, and later to 
Bouaké, where he became one of the senior officers of the current rebellion. The situation 
in the army and the subsequent changes in the security forces, leading to the exclusion 
and frustration of former soldiers, triggered the armed conflict (Diallo 2005: 13). 
 It should be noted that at the time the attack was perpetrated in September 2002, 
the army was in a bad shape in all the aspects including equipments, training, and morale 
to go to war.  It had few combatants with no war experience, and very limited (but also 
updated) logistics or equipments. There are several explanations for this. The first 
explanation is that the country had experienced such a long period of stability that the 
leaders thought the probability of a war was almost zero.  
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The second explanation is that under the single-party regime, the likelihood of 
war with another country was minimal or inexistent, for Houphouët-Boigny had great 
influence over the neighboring countries, and their leaders. He was also well respected in 
the region, and his open door policy to towards foreign migrant workers gave the leaders 
of neighboring countries a sense of brotherhood and tranquility that they did not want to 
undermine.  
The third explanation, and perhaps the most important, is that at independence 
Côte d’Ivoire had signed multiple agreements (including one military) with France in 
which the former colonial power vowed to intervene militarily on its behalf, in the advent 
of internal and external aggression. Côte d’Ivoire was a symbol of the French presence in 
West Africa for many years. To be sure, France stationed a battalion of hundreds of its 
soldiers in that country since independence near the Felix Houphouët-Boigny airport, the 
distrit of Port-Bouet. If needed at all their numbers will be increased in a timely manner, 
as there are several other French bases across Francophone Africa, in Dakar (Senegal), 
Liberville (Gabon), and Chad (Ndjamena), Bangui (Central African Republic), and 
Djibouti (Djibouti)  (Manning 1982).  
There was this anecdote among the Ivoirians during the Houphouët-Boigny era 
that the nationale armed forces of Côte d’Ivoire were an army of officers, for it had more 
officers than servicemen. That the bellies of these high ranked officers demonstrated that 
they were fed well by the system, thus they did not rebelling against the system. Their big 
bellies also suggest that in the advent of an aggression the army would not be able to 
fight, and win against the ennemy. Unfortunately, these jokes about the army of Côte 
d’Ivoire revealed some truth, as the rebel groups seriously challenged government forces 
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on the night of the uprising in September. Despite the warning signs that were visible to 
most observers, the war seemed to have surprised the armed forces and cohort of officers, 
and the fact that the army was not prepared fully meant it could not sustain a long battle 
against the enemy. In fact, the first clashes with the rebels on multiple fronts attest to this 
fact. Both sides suffered significant collateral damages. The armed forces suffered huge 
losses in materials and combatants in particular.  
In fact, Radio correspondents form the British Broadcast Corporation (BBC) and 
Radio France International (RFI) had reported that the rebels had more sophisticated 
communication tools than the national armed forces. The French soldiers were accused of 
allegedly supporting and sharing secret information with the rebels about the planning 
and liberation of the strategic town of Bouaké, now the headquarters of the rebellion. The 
same radio outlets also reported that desperate as it was, the government with the help of 
the people who did not support the rebellion took upon themselves to recruit more 
fighters and buy some ammunition. These fighters were maid up of both ethno-regional, 
government-created militia groups, as well as those groups who did not share the 
rebellion cause, or who had lost everything and fled the rebel-controlled areas to seek 
refuge in the government control one. The governent was able to acquire two warplanes 
(Sukoi MI-24) from an Eastern Europe country in the hope to crash the rebellion.  
Meanwhile, the government recruited many young people and ethnic militias 
(mainly of Bete descent) to re-establish order throughout the country. President Gbagbo 
recruited ethnic militias and paramilitary forces, and mobilized thousands of southern 
youths with the help of the main student organization (FESCI). A presidential decree on 9 
December 2002 allowed the government to recruite 3,000 youths into the army and a 
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further 1,000 in early 2003 (Diallo 2005: 17). These new recruits were mainly from the 
south, pro-Gbagbo, and claimed to be proud defenders of the nation. 
A 2002 International Crisis Group (ICG) also reported that an estimated 6,000 
youth were recruited into the armed forces. The students and other youth movements 
formed a coalition called Alliance Des Jeunes Patriotes Pour le Sursaut National. It was 
also alledged that the Gbagbo government hired European, South African, and Angolan 
mercenaries estimated to 500 that helped the FANCI to recover Daloa on 17 October 
2002, when the rebellion tried to take over the entire cocoa belt. 
 Based on the explanation above, one can argue that the internal compositions of 
the FANCI and the FN were highly ethnic and regionally based. Moreover, their 
respective leaderships tended to be dominated by persons whose images were directly 
associated with an ethnicity, religion, and region. On the one hand, MPCI members 
consisted of northerners, and Muslim. As for MPIGO and MJP fighters, they were 
Yacuba and Guere, while the majority of the nationale forces were of Bete and Dida 
descent (Kieffer 2000 and 2002).  
It should be noted that the Gbagbo regime made some adjustment in order to 
reposition some army leaders, and to accommodate individual desires (including his 
own), and for the future. The government admitted (after the fact) that it had a weaker 
army that needed to be rebuilt and reformed.   
The present chapter has shown that ethno-regional differences have shaped the 
contours of the current conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, demonstrated by the composition of the 
people involved on the government and rebel sides, and the goals they tried to achieve. 
Political stability can be achieved only when there is social cohesion. In this case, ethno-
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regional tensions rose up because the subsequent regimes failed to maintain that social 
cohesion under the new political context.  
The contemporary civil war in Côte d’Ivoire, which began in September 2002 and 
continued into 2007, has been fought mainly by an alliance of northern rebels, mostly 
alienated youth and ex-soldiers who have (allegedly) been tired of the north’s 
marginalization. Rather than seeking secession, they aimed to oust President Laurent 
Gbagbo, a southerner, and to gain control of the government. The armed struggle in Côte 
d’Ivoire is indicative both of the long-term state neglect serving to generate regionally 
anchored rebellion and of the extent to which the failure of nation-state integration and 
the diminished institutional capacity of the state can make it possible for a rebel alliance 
to seize control of the vast territories (Forest 2005: 33)  
Because the state is the supreme resource, power is needed for gaining access to 
other resources and building wealth and status. In the power struggles the politicians are 
the principal actors who appeal to ethno-regional loyalties to gain support and acquire or 
preserve privileged positions. The politicization of groups’ identities has sharpened 
ethno-regional divisions, exacerbated tensions and created a cycle of violence among 
various ethnic communities living in Côte d’Ivoire. The same ethnic and political 
divisions that characterize civil society also exist in the army and police. The recent 
military factionalism, added to the changes in the security forces, has aggravated 
frustration within the army and caused mutinies, culminating in a rebellion on 19 
September 2002 (Diallo 2005: 3). 
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During his tenure, Houphouët-Boigny was able to manage ethno-regional tensions 
by co-opting representatives of all regions and ethnic groups in his party and offered 
them positions in the administration and the army, through the “politics of distribution” 
and co-optation, he provided personal friends and traditional chiefs-including those from 
the north-with financial resources and different kinds of services in return for electoral 
and political support. The politics of distribution of resources and positions, which 
contributed to the easing of tensions, was the key to managing conflict. The president was 
somewhat like Yugoslavia’s Tito who was able to ward off the rise of ethnic conflict until 
his death. Since 1993, the appeal to ethnic loyalties has come to characterize political 
competition. Differences between PDCI, RDR and FPI are no longer ideological, but 
phrased in ethnic terms. Each party is identified with the ethnic group of its leader (Diallo 
2005: 7 and Tessy 1997: 58). 
The ethno-regionalism and widening of the north-south divide are phenomenon 
manifesting itself through a different access to power, services and wealth. The 
north/south divide remains one of the major political challenges for contemporary West 
African states as a whole, and Côte d’Ivoire in particular. This is at the heart of the 
current crisis that started under the Bédié leadership, and got intensified by both the Guéï 
and Gbagbo regimes. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ROLE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS IN THE CIVIL WAR  
Chapter five is an analysis of the role of foreign relations in the civil war in Côte 
d’Ivoire. First, it gives a brief overview of Franco-African relations in order to put the 
Franco-Ivoirian relations in context. Second, it examines the Franco-Ivoirian relations 
under the first and sunsequent regimes. Third, it discusses the regional political context, 
that is, the relations between Côte d’Ivoire and its neighbors (Ghana, Liberia, Mali, 
Burkina Faso, and Guinea-Conakry). The existing literature suggests that the Franco-
Ivoirian relations cannot be understood in isolation, they must be examined in a broader 
context of Franco-African relations, while the regional political context must be put in 
historical perspective. 
In other words, the current chapter seeks to understand whether the war broke out 
because the former colonial power, France, withdrew its support from President Gbagbo, 
and wether it was hostile to the Gbagbo regime in a way that it was not to the regimes of 
Houphouët-Boigny, Bédié, and Guéï. The chapter also wants to learn whether French aid 
declined or dropped off after Gbagbo’s election in 2000, or if the French rhetoric changed 
after President Gbagbo came to power. If so, when and how did this happen, sending a 
signal to would-be rebels? The regional political context will help me discover whether 
the war broke out because the neighboring countries encouraged the rebellion. Also, did 
France signal to these neighboring countries that their intervention was acceptable? Did 
these neighboring countries have their own motives for intervening in the conflict? Why 
such intervention was thinkable under President Gbagbo, but not previously?  
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A. Franco-African Relations: An Overview 
 There is a large consensus among scholars that French policy in Africa can be 
divided into two distinctive periods. First, there is the old policy that covers the Cold War 
period (roughly 1947-1991). Second, there is the new policy of the post-Cold War period 
(1991 to present). The first policy consists of the ‘successful management’ by France of 
the decolonization process period (for example, absence of wars of decolonization, 
transition to full independence without large-scale violence or bloodshed, and France’s 
ability to maintain its post-colonial presence in French Africa, and France’s close ties 
with Africa during the the post-colonial period). The second policy that dominates the 
Franco-African relations is France’s ‘disengagement’, and the so-called ‘normalisation’ 
of these relations (Chafer 2001: 165, Martin 1995 and 2000, and Levine 2004). 
The signs of disengagement, however, include the reduction of French coopérants 
working in Africa since the 1980s, notably in the education field; the devaluation of the 
CFA Franc in 1994; the reduction of French military forces stationed in Africa in the 
1990s; and the increased unwillingness to intervene militarily in Africa since the 
controversy over France’s role in the Rwandan genocide of 1994 (Chafer 2001: 166, 
Martin 1995 and 2000, see also Lavine 2004). France and its former colonies have 
cultivated close relationships that seem unbreakable on the surface in many ways. 
At the military level, for instance, Black Africa has been the chosen zone for the 
projection of French military power beyond the metropole. Examples of these are the 
signing of a series of defense and military accords with the former colonies, the 
stationing of French troops in several countries (Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Central African 
Republic, Djibouti, and Senegal), and a series of military interventions, which took place 
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at an average rate of one a year in the first thrirty-five years after independence (Chafer 
1996: 557-64, see also Gardiner in Clarck/Gardinier 1997).  
 At the economic level, the deployment of French public development aid, the 
great majority of which has gone to France’s former Black African colonies, has served 
to underpin French strategic interests in the region (Chafer 1996: 556, also see Levine 
2004).  
At the ideological level, France has cultivated a sense of association and common 
heritage with Africa, which has served to cement the links between them, both during and 
after the colonial period, the projection of the ‘universal’ French republican values, 
liberty, equality and fraternity offered generations of French-educated Africans in the 
hope of progress and the prospect of a partnership with France to bring it about (Chafer 
2001: 68).  
The first phase (also called period of continuity) of these relationships did not see 
any major changes on the ground. All the private and public treaties remained intact, and 
were respected by both sides due to the Cold War context. The second phase came with 
significant changes, which neither France nor Africa had full control over. The Ivoirian 
crisis must be looked at in the last context.  
 The new Franco-African policy since the 1990s has been marked by distinctive 
events that have served as powerful tools to explain this relationship. Six separate 
(though interrelated) events are symbolic of France’s new African policy including: the 
passing of Houphouët-Boigny (1993) and Jacques Foccart (1997); the la Baule doctrine; 
the Abidjan doctrine and the devaluation of the CFA Franc; French setbacks in the Great 
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Lakes region, the Zairian debacle; Franco-South African rapprochement; and revised 
French immigration policy (Martin 2000: 6). 
The passing of two key figures of “La Françafrique”, Felix Houphouët-Boigny 
(December 1993) and Jacques Foccart (May 1997) truly signaled the end of an era in the 
Franco-African relations. When he died in December 1993, Houphouët-Boigny had been 
president of Côte d’Ivoire since August 1960 and was unquestionably the Dean of 
Francophone Africa and key ally of France in the region. His personal ties with several 
generations of French leaders were reflected in the level and size of the French delegation 
to his state funeral in Yamoussoukro in February 1994, which included the late French 
President François Mitterrand, Prime Minister Eduard Balladur, former President Giscard 
D’Estaing, six former prime ministers, and more than seventy other dignitaries. As the 
New York Times envoy stated well, “Houphouët-Boigny’s death is not the end of a 
political era here, but perhaps as well as the end of the close French-African relationship 
that he came to symbolize.” (Martin 2000: 6-7). 
During the cohabitation regime in which a socialist president (François 
Mitterrand) co-existed with a right-wing government (with Charles Pasqua as Minister of 
Home Affairs)—between 1986 and 1988, and between 1993 and 1995, France enacted 
extremely restrictive immigration policies specifically targeting francophone Africans 
(including Maghrebins from North Africa). Taking various disaggreable forms drastic 
reduction in the delivery of entry visas to France; multiplication of administrative 
obstacles and extreme bureaucratization of the visa issuance process, forced expulsion on 
charter planes of ‘illegal’ immigrants in humiliating conditions-French policy succeeded 
in antagonizing many francophone Africans (including students, businessmen, and 
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politicians) and further contributed to a significant degradation of France’s image in 
Africa (Martin 2000: 12). 
In addition, France’s non-intervention in the 24 December 1999 military coup in 
Côte d’Ivoire that overthrew President Bédié also marked a turning point. The decision 
must be viewed within the context of the new European Union’s coordinated foreign 
policy under which France’s bilateral African policy must henceforth thereafter be 
subsumed. French Cooperation Minister, Charles Josselin, had indicated that France’s 
approach reflected a new policy of non-intervention in Africa. As he observed at the time, 
“We will no longer intervene in internal political debates.”  
Similar feelings were expressed by French Minister of Foreign Affairs (Martin 
2000), Hubert Vedrine, when he remarked: “Disengagement from Africa is not on the 
agenda; nor is the intervention in internal conflicts, which now belongs to a bygone era.” 
“This being said, we remain firmly opposed to any forcible removal of a legitimate 
government.” The Bédié case clearly demonstrated that France wanted to show that it can 
be friendly without being complacent (Martin 2000: 18). 
The Cold War had opened a ‘space’ on the international stage in which France 
was able to preset itself as the guarantor of Western interests in Black Africa, preserving 
it for the West and keeping it out of Soviets hands. In reality, France was motivated by 
the besoin de rayonnement on the global stage (Chafer 2001: 173). Following the end of 
the Cold war, France had to find ways to reduce the cost of maintaining its influence, 
including through the devaluation of the CFA franc by 50% in 1994. France’s 
introduction of economic conditionalities known as the Balladur Doctrine, which made 
the granting of French public development aid conditional upon the prior signature of any 
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accords with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. The policy aimed 
at reducing cost to France of its African policy and thus making it more financially 
sustainable.  
During the 1990 La Baule France-African summit Mitterand observed that those 
countries that undertook political reform signaled a significant break with past France 
practice. France’s African reseaux continued to operate and even proliferated. The key 
strategic pillars in France’s African relationship including Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, 
Cameroon, and Gabon have remained the principal beneficiaries of French aid (Chafer 
1996: 556 and 2001: 174). 
The real post-Cold War turning point of the Franco-African relations was French 
role in the genocide of Rwanda (where 800,000 Tusi and moderate Hutus were killed). 
French support for the genocidal Habyriamana regime in Rwanda marked the nadir of 
French African policy and has been attributed to “France’s failure in the mid-1990s to 
recognize and respond to dramatically changed circumstances in those parts of its 
expanded pré-carré (estate) it knew least well, a former Belgian colony” (Chafer 2001: 
174). 
Although there are some particularities in France’s relations with specific African 
states, the situation described above affected all the francophone African countries across 
the board. Nonetheless, some francophone African states did not have a particular status 
with the former colonial power. The nature of these relationships depended upon 
France’s investments and strategic interests in each country, including Côte d’Ivoire, 
which I discuss next. 
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B. Origins of Franco-Ivoirian Relations  
Côte d’Ivoire’s first encounter with France dates back to 1637, when the first 
French missionaries landed at Assinie (southeast) near the Gold Coast (present-day 
Ghana) border. In 1843-1844, Admiral Bouet-Williaumez signed treaties with the kings 
of Grand-Bassam (southeast) and Assinie regions, placing their territories under French 
protectorate. French explorers, missionaries, trading companies, and soldiers gradually 
extended the area under French control inland from the lagoon region (south and 
southwest). Complete pacification, however, was not accomplished until 1915 (Mundt 
1995).  
The formal granting of Côte d’Ivoire as a colony of France came during the Berlin 
Conference (1884-1885) that sanctioned the scramble for Africa. It was the former 
German Chancelor, Otto von Bismark, who convened the fourteen Western European 
countries and the United States. The United States was invited as an oberserver nation, 
and was represented by John A. Kasson. Not a single African leader was invited to this 
important meeting that was to change the destiny of Africa and its peoples. The main 
objectives of the conference were the following; to break up the African continent into 
spheres of influence among the various powers; to establish the rules of engagement in 
order to avoid confrontation between Europeans on the ground; and to divide up the 
remaining unoccupied territories. France then formally occupied and ruled over Côte 
d’Ivoire virtually from 1893 until 1960, the date of its independence.  
Unlike Algeria, Guinea-Conakry, Mozambique, or Angola (to name just a few), 
Côte d’Ivoire got its independence from France through negotiation. The smooth 
transition was facilitated by the fact that President Houphouët-Boigny had previously 
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occupied several key legislative and cabinet positions in various French administrations 
during the late colonial era. He was a member of the French National Assembly, and also 
served for three years as a minister in the French Government (1946-1959). In April 
1959, he became Côte d’Ivoire’s first prime minister, and he was elected president the 
following year, making him a close ally and friend of the French (Baulin 1982, and 
Houphouët-Boigny 1994). These precious relationships were kept until Houphouët-
Boigny died in December 1993. 
It should be remembered that in April 1990, the Houphouët-Boigny regime 
officially allowed the formation of opposition parties for the first time. As a result, a 
plethora number of both fake and real opposition parties that definitely changed not only 
the political landscape, but also the political culture in that country were created. 
Expectedly, the advent of multipartyism brought swift changes at the domestic and 
external levels. These transformations became even more pronounced after Houphouët-
Boigny died.  
The death of Houphouët-Boigny in December 1993 created a power vacuum that 
needed to be filled right away. Bédié had won the succession on constitutional grounds 
and finished the 1990-1995 mandate of the dead president. In 1995, he was elected 
president after excluding his main political opponent, Allasane Ouattara, on the grounds 
that his biological parents were not of Ivoirian parentage (Konate 2004, Toungara 2001, 
and Akindes 2003).  Also, Ouattara was accused of working at the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) with a Burkinabè passport, thus making him inelligile for the 
presidency in Côte d’Ivoire. 
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 Ouattara and his followers were frustrated and took the streets to protest. 
Meanwhile, Bédié had created and infected Côte d’Ivoire and his supporters with a 
xenophobic concept “Ivoirité” that led to the division of the people along ethnic, religious 
and regional lines. The “Ivoirité” concept basically made one group feel to be more 
authentic citizen than the rest. This was an ingredient for ethnic division. Côte d’Ivoire is 
a multi-ethnic country where locals and foreigners have relatively lived peacefully side-
by-side for decades without any major incident. However, police brutality against 
Ouattara’s party officials, followers, and suspected pro-Ouattara foreigners from the 
Sahel region (especially Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger) increased significantly. Even 
foreign diplomats were concerned that Bédié’s Ivoirité would move the country into the 
wrong direction.  
The French were particular concerned by Bédié’s exclusionary tactic directed 
primarily to Ouattara and other political leaders. On 24 December 1999, a military 
mutiny of soldiers led to a bloodless coup that ejected Bédié from power without French 
help to restore order. Their action was limited to camouflaging the deposed president and 
his families out of the country, first to Togo then to Paris. Meawhile, French interests 
represented 33% of foreign investments in Côte d’Ivoire, and 30% of its gross domestic 
product (GDP). Since Côte d’Ivoire’s independence in 1960, French companies have 
used one-sided contracts to repatriate 75% of the wealth generated there. President Konan 
Bédié, Houphouët-Boigny’s constitutional designated successor, tried to correct these 
anomalies in 1994 by granting coffee and cocoa export contracts to major United States 
companies, and by licensing another American company, Vanco, to prospect for oil. 
French interests were threatened in the country, as Bédié openly advocated and 
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envisioned to make his country the “Eléphant d’Afrique” (African Elephant) and “La 
Locomotive de l’Afrique Occidentale” or West Africa’s Economic Engine (Diop 2005). 
Some analysts have explained the silence of France during the 1999 Coup by this very 
fact. 
Robert Guéï then assumed power for nine months. He publicly announced on 
national television and radio that he came to clean up Bédié’s mess and return power to 
the civilians. Unfortunately, keeping promises has never been the forte of African 
military dictators. Instead, Guéï decided to stay in power and ran for the presidency in 
2000 against Gbagbo, after Guéï and Gbagbo conspired against Bédié and again Ouattara 
in the 2000 elections. Mewanwhile, right after the otherthrow of Bédié from power, the 
junta warned the French government against any attempt to intervene militarily in the 
internal affairs of Côte d’Ivoire. The new rulers warned that such intervention would 
receive the appropriate response from the junta, without specifying the nature of the 
response. Although the French soldiers stationed in Dakar (Senegal) and Liberville 
(Gabon) were alerted and ready to enter Côte d’Ivoire at any time, the French officials 
decided not to.  
In reality, Guéï was mindful that the French had intervened elsewhere to maintain 
their influence in the internal affairs of their former colonies in crisis situations. The junta 
was suspicious that the French military might take advantage of the situation to restore 
Bédié or put someone else in power.  It knew about the cases of Central African 
Republic, and Camerron (several times). During the junta’s nine months reign political, 
economic, and social conditions in the country worsened. Politically, all the major 
organizations and parties were silenced. The economy crisis worsened, and foreign aid 
144 
 
 
 
stopped. Police brutality also mounted, while many locals and foreigners who could leave 
left the country altogether. The tension grew between the France and the junta. It was the 
first time that France’s authority was being challenged in the country and, France tried by 
any means to retain its influence. Its first move was to cut aid to Côte d’Ivoire. In the end, 
Guéï himself experienced a failed coup attempt in 2001 that led to the jailing of alleged 
plotters who happened to be soldiers. After nine months of military government, a 
popular uprising put Gbagbo in power in 2000. Like Bédié, he attempted to loosen the 
grip of four French companies. Saur, Electricité de France, Orange, and Bouygues which 
control transport, water, electricity, and communication respectively on Côte d’Ivoire’s 
economy, three other-Société Générale, BNP Paribas, and Crédit Lyonnais-dominate 
banking.  
When he came to power, Gbagbo began to open markets to international 
competition in these and other areas (especially to Japan, China, some EU countries, and 
the United States). When bids were invited for a third bridge across the Ebrie Lagoon in 
Abidjan, the commercial capital, and for an airport for the coastal city of San Pédro, the 
tender of Bouygues was significantly less competitive than those from South Africa and 
China. The discovery of a major oilfield in 1977 at Jacqueville (south-west), near 
Abidjan, raised the stakes. The exploitation started in 2002. There was suspicion in Paris 
that Gbagbo was trying to cosy up to the United States. By the end of 2004, the pressure 
was overwhelming, and Gbagbo announced the confirmation of some French contracts, 
mainly those from the transportation, energy, communication, and water sectors (Diop 
2005: 2)  
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During his long tenure as the main opposition leader, Gbagbo had criticized the 
Houphouët-Boigny regime on many fronts. Specifically, he had been an advocate of free 
enterprise and economic liberalization. When he assumed power after the chaotic 2000 
elections, Laurent Gbagbo realized that he had to liberalize the economy and reduce 
French domination, which would have helped Côte d’Ivoire to open up to all parties who 
wished to help improve its economy, and increase free competition for buying of the 
cocoa, which remained the principal export product. Evidently, France perceived this as a 
threat to its interests. Intense negotiations (both on the surface and below the table) with 
the Gbagbo regime did not yield Franco-Ivoirian reconciliation. 
The projet de société (governing program) of the Gbagbo regime was called la 
refondation (refoundation). La Refondation is a nationalist governing method that put the 
interests of the people over that of France (Koulibaly 2003: 4). Mamadou Koulibaly, a 
former President of the National Assembly and also an influential member of the Ivoirian 
Popular Front (FPI), was particularly vocal against French policies of economic and 
political domination towards the country, especially its previous dealings with the 
Houphouët-Boigny regime. He was criticized France’s insatiable thirst for Ivoirian 
resources and significant control over areas of development.  
Koulibaly has discussed the role of France in the current crisis and its 
implications. He claims that La Refondation challenges French interests in Côte d’Ivoire, 
and therefore France is hostile to the Refondation and the Ivoirian leaders who have 
promoted it.  
He notes that the French have multiple interests in Côte d’Ivoire, but they have 
never keep promises, despite Côte d’Ivoire’s sacrifice for its former colonial master: For 
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example, France-Telecom benefited from a privatization agreement, which France did not 
respect. Some contracts obtained by Bouygues over water and electricity under 
Ouattara’s Prime Ministership during the 1990s were not only poorly written, but also 
poorly executed. Moreover, the famous third bridge across the Ebrie Lagoon in Abidjan 
priced and does not reflect the guenuine needs of the Ivoirian people. France also wanted 
to see the north highway project contract go to Bouygue while it sought the rehabilitation 
of the old railway system ought to be carried out by Bollore (Koulibaly 2003: 4-5). 
Koulibaly criticizes the Hyazi dossiers and their deceptive multiple accounting 
techniques, and the CFA itself, whose management is very unfair to Côte d’Ivoire. 
Koualibaly believed that the current crisis provoked by French interests that do not 
always respect their engagements, the financiers of this coalition with Burkina Faso 
against the Gbagbo’s regime.  
Several other observers have speculated that the chocolate maker, Barry-Callebaut 
also sponsored the uprising (Koulibaly 2003: 5) As Koulibaly writes: “We must be 
conscious that Côte d’Ivoire also has some interests that it wishes to guarantee and see 
respected by all its partners. After this war, the cooperation will never be the same” 
(Koulibaly 2003: 8). Prime Minister Affi Nguessan also made similar claims on 
numerous occasions. “We are no longer a French colony and we are asking that France 
puts an end to its imperial aspirations in Côte d’Ivoire…They [the French] want to 
absolutely control the commerce of cocoa and coffee which are very lucrative” 
(Koulibaly 2003: 16) 
For Affi Nguessan believed that the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire was due to the fact that 
the left wing (their socialist friends) is no longer in power in France since April 2002. As 
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he puts it: “our problem today is the right wing in France” therefore “our combat is 
ideological.” For Affi, the right wing in France, through their multinationals, are 
determined to combat the politics of la Refondation at all costs. Meanwhile, in his view, 
La Refondation advocates the well being of every Ivorian, while the capitalist right 
advocates only personal interests. (Fraternité Matin 17 July 2003). 
Both Koulibaly and Affi, along with the first lady, Simon Gbagbo, were 
considered anti-French and hardliners of the Gbagbo regime. Koulibaly however tends to 
dominate the headlines as far as France is concerned. Koulibaly claims that, “The 
Françafrique is a pact between a French ‘mafia’ and some African leaders (Houphouët-
Boigny, Bongo, Biya, Senghor, and so forth). The French side of this mafia is named la 
Chiraquie; yesterday it was called the Le réseaux Foccart (Koulibaly 2005: 1) 
He goes further to stress that, under the single-party regime, Côte d’Ivoire was 
managed for the Elysée (French government), and that such arrangements need to be 
changed (Koulibaly 2005: 2). Under these circumstances the government became a 
predator toward own population to which it should instead have been accountable. He 
argues that the complex and discriminatory fiscal system in the country discourages 
private enterprise and the right to ownership. Everything is state propriety and the state is 
in the hands of the elite who have organized to steal public goods to the detriment of the 
citizens (Koulibaly 2005: 3). He also argues that Francophone African elites let 
themselves fooled. They trusted France, but France does not keep its words or promises. 
To be sure, France does not respect or honor its international engagements towards 
African countries.  
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The current crisis in which it has played an ambigious role is a case in point. In 
order to ensure its position of dominanace, France created some so-called “interlocuteurs 
credibles” on behalf of his ex-colonies, yet the people concerned were never consulted on 
anything. Finally, France’s survival depends on the threat of coup d’etat in the former 
colonies. Thus, a clear declaration of independence is needed, one that will lead to former 
metrople and former colonies becoming equal partners (Koulibaly 2005: 4). The 
frustrations displayed by the Gbagbo regime may be justified, but one should not 
overlook the fact that there were unforeseable factors, which both France and Côte 
d’Ivoire did not have control over. This also resonated in the official discourse on either 
side today. But, what was the aid trend like during the subsequent regions, and especially 
the Gbagbo regime? 
1. Ivoirian Economic Crisis And French Aid  
In his doctoral thesis (Chapter 4) dedicated to French development aid and 
reforms of 1998-2002 to Africa, Richard Moncrieff discusses the changes made to the aid 
relationship between France and Côte d’Ivoire, and the effects of instability in Côte 
d’Ivoire on French policy. According to this author, Côte d’Ivoire enjoyed multi-faceted 
relations with France after independence (Moncrieff 2004: 144). 
From the mid-1980s this country suffered a thoroughgoing economic and 
financial crisis, which made it one of the world highest aid recipients at the end of the 
decade. Under President Houphouët-Boigny (1960-1993) and to some extent the Bédié 
regime (1993-1999) this country was by far the Francophone African country with most 
with the most links to France. These two countries nurtured a host of institutional and 
affective ties and similarities. French aid spending in this small West African nation 
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aimed to support this relationship by maintaining French influence at all levels-from 
French language teaching to Seniors Advisors in the presidency (144).  
President Houphouët-Boigny knew that his country could not develop by itself. It 
needed foreign manpower and capital. He never stopped mentioning the importance and 
role of foreigners (neighbors and the French) in the development of his country. Speaking 
in 1957, the President announced the following: 
La Côte d’Ivoire ne pourrait pas par elle-même avoir les capitaux necessaries a 
une expansion à la fois rapide et soutenue. Pendant de nombreuses années elle aura 
besoin d’une aide en capital suffisamment importante pour permettre à ses habitants de 
franchir les obstacles sérieux que la nature impose aux pays tropicaux. (Quoted by Bach 
in Fauré et Médard, Etat et Bourgeoisie…p.90, also Monicrieff 2004: 147) 
In general, French aid covered infrastructure projects, the presence of coopérants 
in ministries, the presence of the military base (not a development aid), and plenty of 
French language teaching (from 1981-1995, 80% of 31,000 French were teachers) 
(World Bank 2001). From 1960 to 1980 France provided more than half net development 
aid receipts, while Côte d’Ivoire was consistently the highest recipient of French aid. The 
French filled the capital gap in terms of financial and human resources, necessary for this 
country’s development. The extensive public funds and political stability provided by the 
French state, as well as Côte d’Ivoire’s attractive foreign investment laws, attracted 
private foreign investment, which dominated the infrastructure, large-scale retail and 
important sectors (147). 
While this French presence must be understood as part of Côte d’Ivoire’s 
development strategy, it was also French policy of deriving commercial and political 
benefit from close relationships with African leaders. Côte d’Ivoire accepted and indeed 
encouraged French development aid not only for the technical reasons of development 
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financing, but also because Houphouët-Boigny wanted to encourage political alliance 
between French West Africa and France, an alliance he rightly saw as a guarantee to the 
stability of his regime (147). 
The key to French influence has been the presence of coopérants at very senior 
levels of government. The French position may be described as “semi-insider”. Many of 
these coopertants have regarded themselves as working both for France and Côte 
d’Ivoire’s government. Relations with France have therefore played a role in the creation 
of a large technocratic civil service and political class in French education system, civil 
and military (148). 
One major aspect of this relationship was that many French became personally 
attached to what they saw as the warmth of the Ivoirian society, while many Ivoirians 
remained drawn to the symbols of “civilization’ in Paris. For many Ivoirians the presence 
of the French was seen as an integral part of the power structures of the Ivoirian society.  
But, French political culture was not fully implemented. Instead a fragment of French 
political culture was transplanted in Côte d’Ivoire (149). 
Côte d’Ivoire became indebted in the 1980s to both public and private borrowers, 
incapable of repaying its loans because of a huge fall in the prices of its main 
commodities (Cocoa and Cofee). In 1987, it announced it could not pay its debts. “The 
financial crisis changed Côte d’Ivoire relations with donors. Maintaining relations with 
IFIs became the most urgent issue for the Ivoirian government, leading to the creation of 
an inter-ministerial committee dedicated to this issue. In 1990s when the IFIs decline aid 
due to unpaid arrears and blockage in the structural adajustment programs (SAPs), France 
poured money into Côte d’Ivoire. Around half of the bilateral funds have come from 
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France” (Moncrieff 2004: 150). Table 6 below shows bilateral disbursements to Côte 
d’Ivoire for selective years (in million U.S. Dollar). 
Table 6: Amount of Bilateral Disbursements to Côte d’Ivoire By France 
YEAR BILATERAL DISBURSEMENT 
1970                                  53 
1975 102 
1980 210 
1982 183 
1986 164 
1988 138 
1990 554 
1991 439 
1992 462 
1993 768 
1994 982 
1995 829 
 
Source: Adapted from (Moncrieff 2004: 152) 
 This table shows a steady increase in French aid to Côte d’Ivoire from the early 
years of independence until 1995. It also shows that France has always been on the side 
of the Ivoirian government continuously. Note also that the period covered in this table 
were the previods under Houphouët-Boigny and partly Bédié, both of whom were PDCI 
leaders. Finally, table 6 suggests that although Houphouët-Boigny was died, France 
wanted to not only keep it interests and influence over Côte d’Ivoire, but also its alliance 
with the old party and the Ivoirian political class. 
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In 1994, the devaluation of the CFA Franc was followed by massive development 
aid transfers, both from IFIs and France to alleviate the country’s immediate balance of 
payment and debt problem. The massive rise in disbursements by the IFIs was regarded 
as a reward for the devaluation. The year 1994 and 1995 saw a series of new loan 
agreements, including a three-year Enhanced Adjustment Facility (ESAF) loan agreed by 
the IMF in 1994. The growth of the Ivoirian economy was impressive in 1995-1998, 
although the debt burden remained massive (153). 
The French were of course aware in the early 1990s not that the scale of the 
financial crisis of Côte d’Ivoire was beyond their means, but also that the political and 
social model they had helped set up was fracturing. Although increasingly worried by the 
emergence of a xenophobic political discourse after Houphouët-Boigny’s death in 
December 1993, and especially surrounding the elections of 1995, the French in fact had 
little option but support to Bédié, and try to use behind the scenes influence to moderate 
political dialogue (Moncrieff 2004: 153). 
During that time, The Ivoirians habitually came to the French for financial help 
and, through the Elysée, and the Cooperation Ministry, tried to use historical and personal 
influence to persuade the French to bail them out before going to the Inteernational 
Monetary Find and World Bank. The practice was stopped or seriously curtailed by the 
Abidjan Doctrine of 1993. In terms, the IFIs-led reform agenda, France played an 
ambivalent role. With pressure mounting and crisis growing, the French tried to cajole 
the Ivoirian officials in implementing reform, so Côte d’Ivoire can avoid adopting all the 
conditionalities (Monicrieff 2004: 154). 
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The first concrete reform between France and Côte d’Ivoire was the “Commité 
Mixte” of December 1998 (to discuss aid relations). The Commité Mixte involved 
meeting with the non-governmental sector, and the Ivoirian officials, the results were 
then fed into the main conclusions. The second aspect was the demise of the rapport de 
Commité Mixte, which lays out French intensions, and signed both parties (protocol 
d’accord on aid). The Rapport was replaced by the Document Cadre au Parténariat au 
Dévélopment (details mutual obligations, French cooperation to Ivoirian policies and 
initiatives) (Moncrieff 2004: 155) 
1998-99 was a period of increase emphasis given to cooperation with NGOs and 
local government. In the agriculture sector, for example, French support aimed at 
creating, financing and supporting professional organizations (unions and cooperatives) 
to replace the state marketing system. In the health sector, the making of a non-profit 
medical cooperative away from government control and near the people it is intended to. 
French also created some pilot projects throughout the country (for instance, Man in the 
west). The Fond Social Au Dévéloppement (FDS) was created to work closely with local 
populations in small-scale projects. The French insisted foreign aid must support Ivoirian 
citizens, and local government policies, but not government initiatives. This happened 
during much of the 1990s aid from must donors. But, some of these projects have not yet 
been implemented since 1998, probably because the French want to excercise oversight 
on all the aid given (158). 
There are indications that the development of aid relationship between France and 
Côte d’Ivoire was facing some serious problems in 1998 and 1999. The Ivoirian 
government failed to implement these policies, either for lack of political will, or its 
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inability to carry out such policies alone, signaling it over-dependence on French 
assistance. In 1998, frustration started to grow on the French side, for the Ivoirian 
government unwilling to implement administrative reforms, and massive fraud within the 
Ivoirian administration (160).  
Frustration became greater in 1999 as Côte d’Ivoire’s economy was going under 
and it was unable repay its arrears to donors. These problems were exacerbated by the 
difficulty relationships that existed by between the Bédié regime and French Socialist 
adminitration. Note also that the visits to Côte d’Ivoire of Josselin in July 1997, and 
Vedrine in October 1997 were dominated by public and media discussion of France’s 
“abandoning” Africa, and scale down support for African regimes, starting with the PDCI 
(160). 1999 was clearly a period of tension in Franco-Ivoirian relations, culminating in 
Josselin’s public rebuke to Bédié over the jailing of opposition RDR members, which 
Josselin stated, would inevitable damage Franco-Ivoirian relationship, (AFP 17 
November 1999, and Moncrieff 2004: 161). 
2. Ivoirian Political Crisis And French Aid 
In December 1999, Bédié was overthrown. The French decided not to intervene, 
nor they had demanded that Bédié and the PDCI be restored to power. The French 
believed that Guéï would keep his promise to hold democratic elections and give power 
to the civilians (Moncrieff 2004: 161). In 2000, law and order, state finances, and public 
administration disintegrated. Ouattara and Bédié had been excluded from running, 
leaving Guéï and Gbagbo as the sole vital candidates. The French and EU supported the 
referendum, but suspended aid when ouattara was excluded. Gbagbo won the elections 
after Guéï tried unsuccessfully to hijack the process by force (Moncrieff 2004: 162). 
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Also, in 2000, the French stated their intention to suspend the aide souveraine or 
(sovereign aid) that directly supported the Ivoirian state, as well as military cooperation 
except aviation security and plan for a regional peacekeeping training school for the 
Ivoirian military. Most of French coopérants working in central ministries were 
withdrawn. The French instead continued aide de proximité that benefited the people 
directly. The Coopérants in these areas were maintained in place (Moncrieff 2004: 162). 
According to Moncrieff (2004), some projects were suspended during much of 
2000 because of suspension of cooperation with the Ivoirian state (for instance, military 
training, fire training). Some projects were not suspended but their operations were 
impacted/showed by the security conditions on the ground or government was broke. 
Evaluation visits and training sessions were cancelled. In some instances the French 
would impose conditions to either re-start or assured the personal security of French 
personnel. Several projects were divided into sovereign and proximity components, while 
some sectors were either unaffected or positively encouraged (for instance, funding of 
small-scaled projects) 
The election of Gbagbo delighted many in the socialist camp in Paris, with which 
the FPI clearly identified. Note that the French Socialist Party supported Gbagbo during 
his tenure in position. The French quickly approved Gbagbo despite Koffi Annan’s 
statement that the elections were not legitimate. By-mid November 2000, Paris was 
swinging to support the new regime in Abidjan. Unfortunately, Franco-Ivoirian relations 
were gradually improving when the controversial 2000 legislative elections of December 
took center stage, creating frustration in Paris.  
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These legislative elections led to the repression of Ouattara’s supporters who took 
the streets to demand justice. From 2000-2001 the French looked at restarting their aid 
spending. Meanhile, the coup December 1999 coup accumulated more arrears. In 2002, 
Côte d’Ivoire stopped making any payments on its arrears. As Moncrieff writes: “On the 
bilateral front, what stands out in the eighteen months following the election of Gbagbo is 
a combination of support and misgivings… In a sense France has done the impression as 
if whoever comes to power in Abidjan would be welcome” (152).  
 The French adminitrations of Chirac and now Sarkozy have tried to hide their 
resentment for the socialist regime in Abidjan. One element of this new relationship is 
that both sides have been vocal on numerous issues, carried out by their respective media 
outlets. France has been frustrated by two things: First, the Gbagbo regime his expected 
role of “good student” of France as did the first regime. Second, despite all the problems, 
gbagbo remain popular, and any attempt by France to undermine his regime will cause 
chaos on both sides. Though, it did receive some important aid package, the gbagbo 
regime has looked elwhere for help, which threatens French influence and authority in 
Côte d’Ivoire. In sum, France did provide limited aid to the Gbagbo regime, and it 
assisted it in negotiations with the IFIs. At the same time, France has shown some 
hostility towards the Gbagbo regime over elections matters, and especially Ouattara.  
Since France has shown its support for Ouattara, it could be argued that also encouraged 
the rebels to go ahead with their initial plan. What were the relations of Côte d’Ivoire 
with its neighbors like? 
 
 
157 
 
 
 
C. Côte d’Ivoire’s Relations With Its Neighbors 
Côte d’Ivoire borders Liberia and Guinea-Conakry in the west, Mali in the 
northwest, Burkina Faso in the north, and Ghana in the east. These countries belong to a 
series of important regional and continental organizations since the indepdence era 
including: the Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO), and 
Organization Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM), and the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU), now African Union (AU) which was not a high priority for on 
President Houphouët-Boigny’s diplomatic agenda. In fact, his record was marred by poor 
attendance or threats to boycott summit meetings, as well as disregard for its decisions 
when they differed from his own, for example, his recognition of the Biafra, which 
wanted to secede from the Nigerian State, and his position on dialogue with South Africa 
(Toungara 1990: 47).  
Nevertheless, Houphouët-Boigny was frequently consulted as the elder statesman 
by his neighbors on development issues, as Côte d’Ivoire was a very important economic 
engine in the region. Even the most revolutionary leaders (for example, Thomas Sankara 
of Burkina Faso, and Jerry Rawlings of Ghana) that emerged as a result of a coup d’etat 
have traveled to Yamoussoukro to consult with the ‘Old Man” (Toungara 1990: 48)  
The president had generously offered Ivoirian hospitality to more than one 
deposed African leaders in Côte d’Ivoire, notably Odumegwu Ojuku and Jean-Bedel 
Bokassa, as well as the Maurice Yameogo of Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) (Jeune 
Afrique 1 July1987: 28-32). Under Houphouët-Boigny, Côte d’Ivoire was frequently 
cited as an example of what Africans are capable of achieving through a stable political 
environment with a liberal investment policy. His ascendance to global importance, as an 
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official spokesman for African affairs, was largely the result of his triumph of political 
tactics consisting of persuasion, negotiation, and reconciliation (Toungara 1990: 52). 
 He had maintained a policy of openness and brotherhood that made it difficult for 
his foreign enemies to intervene negatively in his country. In particular, the open door 
policy to immigrants during the first decades of independence was important to this 
regional solidarity with the neighbors, and the rest of the continent. It could also argued 
that the strong French presence and interests in the country constituted a strong deterrent 
for would-be-trouble makers a home and across the borders. As leadership changes, with 
mounting problems, the relationships between Côte d’Ivoire and its neighbors gradually 
started to deteroriate. Generally speaking, Côte d’Ivoire and its neighbors have lived in a 
relative peace, and almost perfect harmony with each other. Though, they have 
sporadically been involved in each other trouble either directly or indirectly. As a result 
of this, tensions have rising between some of them. For instance, Côte d’Ivoire and 
Burkina Faso were involved in the Liberian war of the 1990s. The latter was also accused 
to have participated in the war in Sierra Leone alongside their Liberian counterparts and 
Foday Sankoh. Another example was the violence between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire 
following a soccer game in Ghana in which Ivoirian supports were attacked in Ghana. 
When the story broke Ivoirian took the street and attack many Ghanaians living in 
Abidjan and elsewhere in the country. Several Ghanaians lost their lives in this incident. 
But, relations between these neighboring countries have varied over time. 
Côte d’Ivoire-Ghana relations had varied since independence. For instance, when 
he assumed power, Côte d'Ivoire regarded the government of Flight Lieutenant Jerry 
Rawlings, who overthrew a civilian regime in 1983, with a mixture of disdain, contempt, 
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and wariness. Relations with Ghana declined in the mid-1980s after Rawlings and 
Burkina Faso's leader Thomas Sankara appeared to ally themselves with Libyan leader 
Muammar Qadhaafi. In November 1987, Ghana condemned Côte d'Ivoire for granting 
landing rights to South African military and commercial aircraft, undermining 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) resolutions, isolating Burkina Faso in West 
African Councils, and permitting Abidjan to become a haven for hostile South African, 
Israeli, and Western intelligence services. At the same time, the two states worked 
together harmoniously to end smuggling in both directions across their common border. 
In general, the two countries have remained close to one another. In fact, most people 
saw President Kuoffor a friend and ally of President Gbagbo during the crisis. As for the 
Ghana state, it was seen as a peaceful neighbor that commanded much respect. 
Relations between Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso has been fascinating and 
special one. Note that the two countries used to be united as one. The northern part was 
called Upper Volta, while the south was named Côte d’Ivoire. Therefore the two 
countries share a lot in common, including culture, history, and territory. Because of 
these facts and other matters, president Houphouët-Boigny had accorded this country a 
high level of consideration. His open door economic polivy benefited this country very 
much. So that he was willing to make political sacrifice and concession on its behalf. As 
Moncrieff (2004: 145) writes: 
In 1964, Houphouët-Boigny proposed a law that would have given nationals of 
Haute Volta the same right to public employment as Ivoirian nationals. “The PDCI 
successfully resisted to this. However, Houphouët-Boigny did give the foreigners the 
vote in the one-party system, although it was taken away under pressure from some 
factions of his own party and the opposition FPI who, aware that many foreigners felt s 
strong allegiance to Houphouët-Boigny, accused him of using them as “electoral 
fodders.” 
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Burkina Faso has served as a reservoir for agricultural labor. The first tensions 
rose when Thomas Sankara took power by force in August 1983. The young leader 
joined with another yound military leader on the other side of Côte d’Ivoire, thus, 
creating fear in Abidjan. Tensions between Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso increased 
sharply in early 1985 following the alleged mistreatment of Burkinabé immigrants in 
Côte d'Ivoire and the assassination of a prominent Burkinabé businessman in Abidjan. In 
September 1985, hours before Sankara was to arrive in Côte d'Ivoire for a Council of the 
Entente summit meeting, a bomb exploded in a hotel room he was to occupy. Sankara 
blamed forces in Côte d'Ivoire, although no one claimed responsibility and no one was 
arrested.  
In October 1987, Sankara was killed during a coup led by his second in command, 
Captain Blaise Compaoré. Compaoré immediately reassured Côte d'Ivoire that he wanted 
warmer relations and later pledged to strengthen ties with the Council of the Entente 
countries. For its part, Côte d'Ivoire reaffirmed its "readiness to engage in trustworthy, 
brotherly, and lasting cooperation with this neighboring and brotherly country. But, 
tensions emerged again in between 1993-2002. Many Burkinabès were expelled from 
their plantations by local Ivoirian planters in the western coffee and cocoa belts. Worse, 
because of the installation of identity cards, and their alleged support for Outtara, these 
people were brutalized and constantly harrassed by the security forces. Many who feared 
for their lives left the country. Finally, it was alleged that the current rebellion had trained 
in that country before the attack of 19 September 2002. Fortunately, the intervention of 
President Compaoré as a major power broker between the rebels and the Gbagbo regime 
has help calmed both sides. 
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Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea-Conakry have had their time of discord, especially 
during the civil war, which saw many people from the west and north crossing the 
borders to safety. Guinea-Conakry feared the spillover effects of the war in Côte d’Ivoire. 
But, it has not been accused to be involved in the current crisis. In the past however, these 
two countries have had their own dislike in 1958 translated by the opposition between 
President Sekou Toure and President Houphouët-Boigny over local matters, and French 
influence in the region. When Toure died Ivoirian relations with Guinea improved 
considerably. And it has remained that way for a long time. 
Relations with both Mali and Liberia, although far from warm, were decidedly 
less confrontational than those with Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Ghana. Bamako has 
remained a good friend and neighbors of Côte d’Ivoire (at least officially) until the war 
impacted his citizens living in Abidjan and elsewhere in the country. Liberia has been a 
good neighbor until it started to experience its own civil war in the 1990s. As mentioned 
above, because personal ties with the leadership, President Houphouët-Boigny decided to 
get involve. When the civil war broke in Cote d’Ivoire, the Liberian fighters joined the 
MPIGO and MJP against the Gbagbo regime. Since, the countries have looked at each 
other with some reservation. 
It should be noted that so far, only Mali, Burkina Faso, and Liberia were cited as 
participants in the war. Mali was accused of providing the MPCI Dozo fighters (cast of 
traditional hunters). Burkina Faso was also accused for allowing the rebels to train in the 
Po region. But, such allegations have been diminished since President Compaoré started 
his role of “bons offices” to help resolve the crisis. As for Liberia, it remains a good 
neighbor despite the intrusion of mercenaries from there. If any of these countries 
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decided to get involved, it is because they felt insecured, as Côte d’Ivoire represented 
absorbs a huge portion of their population, and contribute to their own economic survival. 
Under the first regime they were kept politically satisfied. But, the crisis could have 
started under Bédié or Guéï as well. 
From the above discussion, one can argue that Côte d’Ivoire’s foreign policy 
towards its neighbors has varied over time because of the simple fact that the changes in 
the leadership, and the new global context. The Bédié, Guéï, and Gbagbo regimes seemed 
to have been overwhelmed by the internal demands of the Ivoirian polity, so that they did 
not really have enough time to develop and expand a clear foreign policy agenda. For 
instance, since it came to power, the Gbagbo regime’s main concerns have been about 
mainly regime security and little anything else. Bédié’s reign was rather short and marred 
with legitimacy problems. Guéï’s nine months occupation was a complete disaster, both 
internally and externally. To this end, we can say the regional political context was an 
empty one after Houphouët-Boigny. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
My dissertation was interested in understanding the root and proximate causes of 
the civil war that broke out in Côte d’Ivoire on 19 September 2002. In other words, it 
sought to understand how one of Africa’s most stable and prosperous states had fallen 
victim to war. The central question of this study was: Why did Côte d’Ivoire, which was 
relatively stable under President Houphouêt-Boigny, suddenly begin to experience 
political violence in the 1990s and an explosion in 2002?  
Chapter one outlined the entire dissertation project, and contextualized the 
analysis that followed in the subsequent chapters. The first section described the long 
period of relative political stability and economic success under President Houphouët-
Boigny. The second section gave a thorough account of the events that led up to the civil 
war on 19 September 2002 then it discussed why the war began.  
Chapter two reviewed the literature on civil wars in general, identified the 
different types of civil wars, then it discussed the nature of the Ivoirian civil war in light 
of these typologies. The chapter also included a discussion of the cultural pluralism 
versus political economy approaches; domestic (social depravation and resources 
opportunity) versus international political economy approaches (structural adjustment 
programs); international pressures approaches (including Western pressure for 
democratization, patron-client relations with France, and French pressures), and regional 
pressures from neighboring states such as Liberia, Mali, and Burkina Faso. 
Chapter three examined the domestic and international political economy as a 
source of civil violence in Côte d’Ivoire. First, it sought to know whether the civil war 
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began because the population got poorer during the 1990s, and “angry young men” 
become available and willing to fight. In other words, did the socio-economic grievances 
stimulate the fighting? The study found that poverty was already spreading across Côte 
d’Ivoire even before the 1990s, as a result of declining commodity prices that resulted in 
a huge economic contraction, high unemployment rate, company closures, massive 
layoffs, huge internal and foreign debts, rising costs of education and living, shrinking 
middle class, food insecurity, and falling life expectancy, among other things. In other 
words, the socio-indicators were very low across the board. The crisis became even more 
pronounced with the imposition of IMF and World Bank austerity measures (also known 
as SAPs) that led to the devaluation of the CFA Franc in 1994. The study suggested that 
had the general misery been a major contributing factor, the war would have been started 
long before 2002, perhaps, under the Bédié regime.  
The study also explored whether the rebel recognized an opportunity to take 
control of the country’s economic resources for their own benefit. It found that the 
control of resources was not a part of the initial plan set forth by the rebels. Their main 
goal was to overthrow the Gbagbo regime in Abidjan (south). When they failed to do so, 
they retrenched themselves in Bouaké (center), Korhogo (north), and parts of the West, 
where they established their headquarters. The rebels occupied more than a half of the 
country, and started using the resources under their control to sustain their movement. 
Note that an international peacekeeping force made up of the French Licorne, ONUCI, 
and ECOWAS forces served as a buffer zone to prevent the rebels from advancing 
toward the capital, Abidjan.   
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Meanwhile, there were reports that the rebels had broken or vandalized BCEAO 
banks in Bouaké (center) and Korhogo (north) during the first weeks of the uprising, and 
steal an undisclosed amount of cash. The rebels also exploited the natural resources 
(diamond and gold) and agricultural commodities (coffee and cocoa) under their control. 
Koné Zakaria, a MPCI leader in the northwest region (Séguéla and Mankono) was 
accused of illegally exploiting the diamond and gold for his own benefit. It could be 
argued that the economy did not play a significant role in starting the war, but it proved 
important thereafter to sustain the rebellion. 
Chapter four discussed the role of ethnicity and region as identities of the civil 
war in Côte d’Ivoire. In other words, it sought to understand whether the civil war was 
essentially a war between different ethno-regional groups in the country, and not about 
economics. A review of the internal composition of both the national and rebel forces 
indicated that the three rebels groups (MPCI, MPIGO, and MJP) were dominated by one 
or two major ethnic groups. In fact, their declarations during the first days of the crisis 
confirm this.  
The MPCI led by Guillaume Soro (a Senufo from Korhogo) claimed to be from 
the north. Many of Soro’s lieutenants and followers included many northern Dyula or 
Malinké. But, there were significant numbers of non-northerners also. This was the case 
of Dakouri Tabley and Alain Lobognon, both Bete from the center-west, and Michel 
Gueu, a Guere from the west. The MPJ and MPIGO were predominantly ethnic based 
also. These rebel groups were led by Guere and Yacuba leaders who wanted to avenge 
General Guéï, assassinated on the night of the uprising in Abidjan. The majority of their 
members were also from the same ethnic groups, who fought alongside several 
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mercenaries from neighboring Liberia. The chapter concluded that the three rebel forces 
were highly ethnic-based.  
A similar argument was made about the National Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire 
(FANCI) also. Though, the FANCI have suffered serious internal divisions because of 
political manipulations. The Bédié, Guéï, and Gabgbo regimes all manipulated the 
FANCI in order to accommodate or consolidate their power. For example, Bédié had 
replaced General Guéï with General Doué, while Gbagbo replaced General Doué with 
General Mangou. Other security organizations such as the Garde Républicaine, 
Gendarmérie, and Police also experienced a change of leadership. The chapter concluded 
that the civil war in that country is one that involved different ethno-regional groups over 
power matters, and not primarily about economics.  
Chapter five analyzed the role of the foreign relations in the civil war, as well as 
the regional political context. It was interested in finding out whether the war broke out 
because France was hostile to the Gbagbo regime in a way that it was not hostile to the 
regimes of Houphouët-Boigny, Bédié, and Guéï? If yes, did French aid fall after 
Gbagbo’s election in 2000?  
The study argued that Houphouët-Boigny was a very charismatic leader with 
tremendous credentials and respect, and more importantly a historic servant and key ally 
of France since the colonial era. Thus, he fully benefited from the French, including 
protecting his power. Such relationships were altered during the subsequent regimes, thus 
a change in France’s attitude towards the subsequent regimes, including the Gbagbo 
regime.  
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When he came to power in 1993, Bédié tried to alter the existing relationships that 
Côte d’Ivoire had with France, which, according to some, cost him his presidency. To be 
sure, France did not activate the security and defense treaties the two countries had 
signed since independence, after he was ousted from power by the military in December 
1999. Instead, France contented herself with smuggling him out of the country, and 
offering him and his family asylum to Paris. Bédié was also accused of being arrogant, 
and neglecting Houphouët-Boigny’s heritage.  
Once he assumed power in December 1999, Guéï attempted to defy the authority 
of French government, he demanded that France stayed out of the crisis, that any 
interventions by the France forces would be risky and unwise. He also tried to suspend 
the servicing of all the foreign debts incurred before him, especially by the Bédié regime. 
But, under huge pressures from France, the European Union, and other aid agencies, he 
was forced to change his mind. Guéï was also perceived as arrogant and uncooperative.  
Finally, Gbagbo came to power determined to implement his new socialist 
political agenda, “La Refondation,” a system of governance that favored national interests 
over foreign ones. In other words, he insisted that the resources of Côte d’Ivoire must 
benefit its people (not foreign companies or some imperialistic powers). Furthermore, he 
vowed to open the Ivoirian market to all foreign competitors that wanted to do business 
with his country. Thus, his administration tried to revise some of the special or sweet 
deals Côte d’Ivoire has had with France for decades, mostly through its companies which 
dominated vital sectors of the country’s economy. Obviously, France did not like these 
changes, this was a threat to its vital national interests, not to mention an insult to 
French’s self-perceived role in that country.  
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When the war broke out, a number of things occurred that helped explain France’s 
attitude against the Gbagbo regime. For example, France was quick to declare that the 
war was an internal affair in which it could not get militarily involved into. Also, during 
the Linas-Marcousis summit, and after former FPI Prime Minister Affi Nguessan lost his 
post to Seydou Diarra, the French government tried to take away key ministries (for 
example, Defense and Interior) from the Gbagbo regime and have them accorded to the 
rebels in an Ivorian unity government. 
France’s attitude toward the subsequent regimes (1993-present) in Côte d’Ivoire 
has been to pull back and observe, ignore, or step in when the situation has become 
chaotic, to use its influence and obtain what it wanted, demonstrated by the initiation of 
all the UN resolutions on the crisis in that country. When the situation started to improve, 
the first action from France was the historic visit of Le Patronat Français (business class) 
to Côte d’Ivoire, allegedly to negotiate or re-negotiate new and old deals with the Gbagbo 
regime.  The chapter found, however, that the relations between France and her ex-colony 
remained poor because of all these policies set forth by the new Ivorian leaders against 
French interests in the country.  
Chapter six presents below all the arguments developed throughout this 
dissertation, distinguished between superficial and deep causes of the Ivoirian civil war, 
and made judgments about the relative weight of the various causes, including the extent 
to which the weight of the causes can be measured. That is, is it possible to give an 
empirical answer to the question of why the war began? Can one explain the war, and 
demonstrate with scientific precision which causes were primary? Or can one only 
understand the outbreak of the war in the manner an anthropologist understands a 
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culture? Finally, what does the comparative evidence from other wars that began under 
similar circumstances, as well as peaceful political reform efforts that did not lead to war, 
have to tell us about the Ivoirian war? 
A. Distinction Between the Root and Proximate Causes of the War 
 
The Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC 2006) 
provides a comprehensive list of causal factors that fall under six broad categories 
including: Inequality (political, economic, social, and “grievances”); identity 
(mobilisation of groups with shared ethnic or religious identities); political factors (crises 
of state legitimacy, and weak state institutions); economic factors (economic motivations 
for engagement in conflict, and “greed”); political economy (where access to resources is 
determined by violence); and international factors (trade, regional instability, and 
development assistance). According to this institution, “it is generally agreed that none of 
these factors caused the war, but it is the dynamics, or interplay, among the factors that 
leads to violence.”  
Roubeaud (2003: 57) has done a good job grouping the different causes scholars 
have attributed to the war in Côte d’Ivoire into two analytical categories. He calls them 
the economic and political explanations. As he beautifully puts it in his native French:  
La plupart des analyses de la crise Ivoirienne se déclinent suivant deux lignes 
d’interpretations, qui, selon les auteurs, peuvent être plus ou moins combinés ou 
exclusives: D’un coté, une explication met en avant des facteurs de type économique. 
Près de deux décénnies de crise et d’adjustement structurel ont conduit à l’effondrement 
des équilibres antérieurs, sans faire émergence de solution alternative viable: 
appauvrissement généralisé, déstabilisation, des réseaux de solidarité familiaux et 
communautaires, épuisement de la rente foncière, libéralisation sans remise en question 
des logiques rentières, démentèlement de l’état et tarissement de la rédistribution. Une 
autre explication privilégiée, la piste politique tourne autour des réalités pour la 
succession de Houphouët-Boigny à la tête de l’état depuis les années 1990. Les 
conditions d’éligibilité, le code de la nationalité, les cartes de séjour, ou le code foncier, 
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questions autour desquelles le conflit s’est cristalisé, ne sont que des armes forgées et 
instrumentalisées par las quatres prétendants présidentiels (Bédié, Ouattara, Guéï, 
Gbagbo) et leurs clans respectifs dans leur lutte acharnée pour le pouvoir (Coulibaly 
2003). Dans tous les cas, la boite de pandore ouverte et theorisée avec le concept 
d’ivoirité joue un rôle pivot dans la montée des tensions. 
 
Roubeaud’s work is a goos start to understanding the origins of the Ivoirian crisis. 
But, in order to fully determine the actual root and proximate causes, it is important to 
provide a brief definition of each type of causes. 
Root causes of conflict are social realities that have developed over a considerable 
period of time and that remain unresolved. These causes can be dormant for a short time 
or long time depending on their effects. Once they increase in numbers or magnitude, 
they can often lead to the outbreak of serious conflict situations in a dramatic fashion. An 
example of this is the long humiliation and discrimination against the indigenous 
Liberians by so-called Americo-Liberians, which resulted in fierce battles between the 
Khran, Gio, Mano, and Mandingo tribes in the 1990s. 
      Proximate causes are typically the triggers of socio-political conflict. This may be a 
single, or combination of factors, that cause different groups to go war with one another. 
These causes are also the limit, intolerable level, or break point that a victim can take or 
endure. Therefore, something must be done about it. For example, the genocide in 
Rwanda of the 1990s was triggered by a single event, the downing of President 
Habyariman’s aircraft in April 1994.  That event was the pretext used to start the mass 
murder that took the lives nearly 800,000 people, though the cause of the plane crash 
itself remains a matter of controversy. The above definitions suggest that all conflicts 
have root causes, but these causes are often overshadowed by more visible ones that are 
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used as the pretext of the belligerents to go to war. In that sense, the war in Côte d’Ivoire 
is no exception.  
In the Ivoirian case, the root causes include: (1) The economic crisis of the early 
1980s due to the fall of Côte d’Ivoire’s main commodity prices on the world market, (2) 
the end to the one-party system and the death of President Houphouët-Boigny in 
December 1993, (3) the change in the Franco-Ivoirian relations following the same event, 
(4) the weakening state institutions and state legitimacy, (5) and the absence of sound 
immigration policies.  
As for the proximate causes of the Ivoirian war they include: (1) The Ivoirité 
concept used by leaders to manipulate the political process, (2) the controversial 
presidential elections of 1995 and 2000, (3) and the harassments and abuses perpetrated 
against northerners and certain immigrant communities. The relative weight of these root 
and proximate causes is assessed below. 
B. Judgment About the Relative Weight of the Various Causes 
1. Relative Weight of the Root Causes  
 
The economic crisis that Côte d’Ivoire had experienced since the late 1980s was 
due in part to falling prices on the market of its main commodities (coffee and cocoa). In 
order to rescue it from plunging further, the international financial institutions imposed 
several adjustment programs during the 1980s and 1990s. Unfortunately, these 
adjustment programs did not yield the expected results. This resulted in rising poverty 
and unemployment. The social indicators during that time revealed a significant drop in 
the living standards across all the social layers. The 1994 devaluation made matters 
worse, and consumer goods became more expensive or even unaffordable for many 
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Ivoirians, resulting in a huge dissatisfaction among the people, and the government was 
unable to provide any help. The situation deteriorated even further under the nine months 
of military rule, and it did not improve before President Gbagbo took power in 2000.  
The economic crisis did impoverish a huge segment of the Ivoirian population, 
resulting in the loss of confidence in the government. When things were better, the 
government was able to keep the people generally satisfied for a long time. But it has 
been demonstrated in this dissertation that the rebels’original plan was not to acquire 
wealth or control resources; therefore it could be argued that the economic crisis did not 
play a significant role in the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire. 
   Second, there was the death of President Houphouët-Boigny and the 
consequences of his demise. For better or worse, Houphouët-Boigny was considered a 
charismatic leader and great politician by many standards. He was considered the main 
architect of the initial impressive economic success and relative stability. Le Vieux (old 
man) was also a unifying force. Throughout the three decades of his personal rule, he was 
able to maintain all the communities together by creating a discussion forum, which he 
had often used to address the nation during times of crisis (Le Dialogue). Houphouët-
Boigny was very inclusive in all his speeches, and he often adopted a paternalistic tone 
including this one: 
You are all my brothers, my sons, and my grandchildren; good or bad, you are all 
my brothers, my sons, and my grandchildren. And for my part, I consider you all to be 
good brothers, good sons, and good grandchildren. Therefore, have confidence in me 
(Africa Report, Jan-Feb 1983: 5) 
 
He also created “La Démocratie à L’Ivoirienne” (Ivoirian Democracy) whereby 
all the major ethnic groups and communities were represented, not only in the various 
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governments, but also in the army, gendarmerie, navy, and police. Similar appointments 
were done for the district administrators known as prefets and sous-prefets around the 
country. Furthermore, the president included all the Customary Chiefs in the affairs of the 
state. All these political maneuvers and other qualities kept the majority of the people 
politically satisfied, thus less prone to rebel against the system. After Houphouët-Boigny 
died, this precious heritage was neglected. His passing disrupted the social fabric of 
authoritarian unity, which had been a significant contribution to the social peace. This 
idea is further developed below. But, Houphouët-Boigny was also a key ally of France 
since the colonial era. As a result of this alliance, he had the full backing of the French 
should any turmoil occur internally or from outside the country. In fact, the impressive 
French military presence in Abidjan was an obvious sign of this, that is, a good deterrent 
for potential troublemakers.  
These Franco-Ivoirian relationships suffered a big blow, first under Bédié, then 
Guéï, and Gbagbo. These individuals had different personalities and relationships with 
the French “Empire.”  Although Bédié had been groomed to carry them along, he 
obviously missed the opportunity to do so. Their political visions and agendas were 
different than those of Houphouët-Boigny. Note also that the new globalization imposed 
new dynamics in Sub-Saharan Africa, seriously undermining the old patron-client 
relationships from which Houphouët-Boigny and the PDCI had benefited so much for 
nearly four decades.  
Under Houphouët-Boigny’s regime, France’s interests were almost fully 
guaranteed, whereas this was not the case under the subsequent regimes. France then 
adopted a different attitude toward these leaders, their associates, and the country as a 
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whole. In fact, France could have foiled both the coup of December 1999 as well as the 
September 2002 attack by providing at least some important intelligence, and other forms 
of support. But it did not, signaling the rebels their action would suffer no interference 
from France. In sum, the Franco-Ivoirian relations did play a significant conditioning, or 
enabling, role in the crisis.  
The fourth root cause of the Ivoirian war was the weakening of the state 
institutions, and thus the legitimacy of its leaders. Democratization brought many 
institutional changes with it. The political culture, however, did not change to 
accommodate the new context. Upon Houphouët-Boigny’s death in December 1993, 
Article 11 of the state Constitution automatically allowed Bédié (then President of the 
National Assembly) to take over the president’s mandate. Despite these arrangements, 
Ouattara decided to interfere. After losing to Bédié, Ouattara made several incendiary 
comments and declarations that continue to define his political standing to this day.  
Because of these comments, many people considered him the “father”, “sponsor”, or 
again “mastermind” of the December 1999 coup, as well as the September 2002 attack 
against the Gbagbo regime. These animosities also led to sharp divisions between the 
Bédié regime and Ouattara supporters.  
In 1995, Ouattara was banned from running in the elections. Bédié easily won 
95% of the votes. In 2000, Guéï also excluded both Ouattara and Bédié from running, and 
then he tried to steal the elections from Gbagbo. After the passing of President 
Houphouët-Boigny, the new leaders manipulated the political process for their own 
advantage, disregarding the laws of the nation. In sum, the flawed institutional 
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arrangements, repressive and corrupt security forces, and the inability of the leaders to 
address the countries problems contributed greatly to the crisis.   
  The fifth root cause of the Ivoirian war relates to the absence of sound and clear 
immigration policies. Since the early years of independence, President Houphouët-
Boigny had opened the doors to many foreign nationals to participate in the booming 
economy, and thus, Côte d’Ivoire gained a reputation as a highly hospitable country, and 
the economic engine of West Africa. This also led to the recruitment of many foreign 
educators from Benin, Togo, Senegal, and France into the public service (for instance, in 
education, health, and administration). The agriculture sector saw a boom in the 1970s 
and part of 1980s thanks to thousands of foreign workers from neighboring Mali, Burkina 
Faso, Guinea-Conakry, and Niger.  
Unfortunately, this open-door policy flooded the country with immigrants whose 
number remained unchecked over the years. A huge number of people fleeing from 
natural disasters zones (droughts, famines, or floods), and wars in other African regions 
migrated to the country. By 1990, Côte d’Ivoire realized it had an immigration problem, 
which it had longtime denied. When the economic crisis reached its pick (also rampant 
insecurity) immigration became central in the national discussion. The majority of 
arrested criminals were alleged immigrants from the countries mentioned above. Thus, 
began the harassment of the various immigrant populations, justified by the adoption of 
the carte de séjour invented under Ouattara’s adjustment plan. 
Meanwhile, in the western cocoa and coffee belts, Malians and Burkinabès saw 
their plantations taken away, destroyed, or burned down, and had to flee for their 
security. They were thoroughly vilified by indigenous Ivorian populations. Like Ouattara 
176 
 
 
 
in 1993, they also were told they did not belong in the country. In retrospect, it is clear 
that these poor immigrants have consciously or unconsciously supported Ouattara for this 
reason. These immigration, land tenure, and citizenship problems were created under the 
first post-Houphouët regime, but they were not properly addressed by the subsequent 
regimes either.  Nonetheless, though this may have generated tacit support for the rebels 
from certain members of these immigration communities, immigration was not a 
significant factor in the war that broke in September 2002. 
2-Relative Weight of the Proximate Causes  
 
   The democratization process of 1990s brought significant changes to Côte 
d’Ivoire. Not only it did allow competitive elections, but also renewed interest in the 
political game after nearly four decades of one-party system. It also created a new 
political culture, thus new attitudes, behaviors, and aspirations among the people. While 
the new context created new opportunities for the opposition parties, it seriously 
disrupted the old regime, which has yet to recover from this. The PDCI has been 
weakened significantly because of internal dissidence. Some of its former members have 
created new parties, and made alliance with the Gbagbo regime.  As in many countries in 
the developing world, multipartyism in Côte d’Ivoire has brought more tensions and 
divisions in the population. Party leaders have often made alliances that they could not 
keep because of greed or power struggle. For example, Ouattara and Gbagbo had formed 
the Front Républicain (republican front) against Bédié. The same Bédié is now allied 
with Ouattara against Gbagbo under the banner of the infamous (Rassemblement des 
Houphouetists, or RHDP), which by the way, is on the brink of explosion as each 
candidate seeks to position himself for the next persidential elections. It should be 
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emphasized that this odd pattern (alliance then betrayal) has dominated Ivoirian politics 
since the death of President Houphouët-Boigny in 1993. It is in part the new political 
context, which these leaders have manipulated for their own individual gain that triggered 
the war. The next two proximate causes are directly linked to this one. 
After he became aware of Ouattara’s ambitions for the presidency, Bédié did all 
he possibly could to stop him. First, he used legal means by refusing to recognize 
Ouattara’s alleged “forged” Identification certificate he had obtained in Dimbokro 
(center) that stated that he was born there in 1942. Bédié also invented (though others 
exploited it as well) the powerful and infamous “Ivoirité,” in which he viciously attacked 
Ouattara and his alleged Burkinabè origins. As time progressed, the “Ivoirité” concept 
that was designed to counter a political enemy (Ouattara) in the first place, became a 
slogan, and also political weapon against both immigrant communities and northerners. 
These communities saw in Ouattara an icon, representative, leader, and spokesman. The 
civil war of September 2002 is the direct consequence of the Ivoirité movement created 
by Bédié and also exploited by all the subsequent regimes. In other words, these 
communities were tired of being relegated to second-class citizens by the Bédié, Guéï, 
and Gabgbo regimes. The Ivoirité was by far the single most important factor that 
triggered the civil war in that country. 
 The 1995 and 2000 controversial elections have much more in common than they 
have differences. To be sure, in 1995, Bédié won 95% of the votes against very weak 
opposition candidates. The 2000 elections that put Gbagbo in power had a very low 
turnout of voters, though they did put an end to a ruthless nine months military rule. In 
2000, Guéï excluded both Ouattara and Bédié to run alone against Gbagbo. Another 
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important similarity was that each time Ouattara’ supporters demonstrated against these 
injustices they were heavily repressed by the security forces. Tensions then escalated 
throughout the country, pushing some angry and frustrated Ouattara supporters to make 
overt declarations of war, which the leaders did not take seriously at the time. It was only 
when the situation exploded that the leaders started to put the pieces together. These 1995 
and 2000 debacles were strictly linked to the “Ivoirité” movement. Put together, they 
triggered the fighting in September 2002. The three proximate causes above were the 
main contributing factors that triggered the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire in the first place. As 
for the root causes, they only permeated and created the conditions for the outbreak of the 
war. 
D. Measuring the Relative Weight of the Various Causes 
My dissertation serves as a test of the idea that one cannot explain the civil war, 
that is, demonstrate with scientific measurement which causes were primary.  In other 
words, the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire cannot be explained; that is, revealed to have one 
over-riding cause, or a network of intersecting causes whose influence can be quantified.  
It can, however, be understood; that is, one can identify the main contributing causes, and 
make some judgments about which are most influential; one can distinguish between 
necessary conditions, contributing conditions, and efficient (or proximate) causes.  
A discussion of the root and proximate causes above showed that this was indeed 
true. The situation in Côte d’Ivoire was extremely complex, and the causes so 
intertwined, that it was very difficult to give a definitive or empirical answer as to what 
actually started the war in that country in September 2002.  The study found that all the 
proximate causes discussed were linked and all relevant to the case. On the other hand, 
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the root causes provided a social context and created the conditions for the outbreak of 
the war.  
Cogneau and Mesple-Somps (2003: 102-103) have put this crisis in the context of 
a missed opportunity. For these authors, then the Ivoirian crisis could have been avoided 
had the leaders played a responsible role for which they were elected. Attackers or 
victims, they all played a significant role in it. Therefore the failures and blames were 
both collective and personal, but agency played a key role. As they put it in French: 
La crise que connait actuellement la Côte d’Ivoire est d’abord une crise politique, 
au sens où elle aurait pu être attenuée sinon evitée par l’exercice de la responsabilité 
politique dans les différents camps en présence…Cependant, en perdant tout contrôle, la 
compétition politique a exploité et élargi les failles d’un système économique et social 
particuliérement fragilisé….Sur la période 1999-2002, les arrivées à la présidence du 
Général Guéï et de Laurent Gbagbo n’ont pas donné de signes d’une modification 
substantielle de comportement sur les sujets les plus critiques…En tant qu’opposant, 
Ouattara n’a pas manifesté une forte éthique de responsabilité face au risque d’explosion 
nationale..Depuis 1993, les principaux dirigeants politiques ont compté sur des 
manipulations politiciennes et ethnicistes pour se maintenir au pourvoir en dépit d’une 
légitimite entamée. Les frustrations sociales se sont alors cristalisées dans les reflexes 
ethniques ou xénophobes.  
 
GRIP (2003: 40) begins with the same internal actors, but then also implicated 
several external actors such as France, the European Union, and International Financial 
Institutions (the IMF/World Bank), authors of the SAPs, as being providing a context for 
war through their actions.  As this institute writes: 
The crisis in Côte d’Ivoire is first and foremost a series of deep failures by the 
Ivoirian political class consumed by increasing power and material wealth, the political 
class was never able to resolve the problems faced by the society without using 
clientelism.–The inter-personal problems among elites, their individual interests, in-
fighting within parties who had been sharing power, were put above the problems faced 
by the entire country. Gbagbo, Ouattara, Bédié, and Guéï, all bared a responsibility in the 
current crisis…They all participated (off and on) to some important political alliances, 
which they ruined themselves later on...It is also the failure of France and the EU. The 
first, France, too implicated on the ground to preserve its enormous economic interests 
and strategic alliances, often backed the people who are responsible for the deteriorating 
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situation. France waited until the situation reached a state of no return to intervene 
diplomatically and impose its influence. The second, EU, very respectful of France’s role 
and influence in the region, contented itself with the indications it received by applying in 
Côte d’Ivoire a politics of aid and development, often without any serious critique. 
Finally, the International Financial Institutions whose adjustment programs contributed to 
the degradation of the socio-economic conditions of Côte d’Ivoire. The unequal 
distribution of the resources of the country, the social tensions deriving from the huge 
impoverishment of the people also created slowly and unavoidably the fertile ground for 
all the violence.  
 
The war in Côte d’Ivoire is a political war that started with the struggle for power 
by the main contenders after Houphouët-Boigny died in December 1993. Their initial 
contest was one for power through manipulated elections, but their actions created 
problems that spread beyond electoral issues.  Many other post-Cold War African 
countries faced similar problems beginning around the same time as Houphouët-Boigny’s 
death.  Thus, we might gain some further insight into the Ivorian case by examining some 
of these parallel cases.  What, then, does the comparative evidence from other wars that 
began under similar circumstances (for example, Congo Brazzaville, Central African 
Republic, Sierra Leone, and Liberia) have to tell us?  Similarly, what can we learn from 
the other francophone African states (for instance, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, and Gabon) 
that avoided both real political reforms, but also civil war? 
E. Ivoirian Civil War in Comparative Perspective 
 
I discuss the comparative evidence from the wars in Congo-Brazzaville (1997-
1999), Sierra Leone and Liberia during the 1990s. In this section, I discuss three non-
reforming francophone African states (Burkina-Faso, Gabon, and Cameroon), and one 
political reforming state (Senegal) to make its case.  
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1.  Congo-Brazzaville 
In October 1997, the troops loyal to former president Denis Sassou Nguesso 
(1979-1992) seized the capital Brazzaville, and overthrew the democratically-elected 
president Pascal Lissouba. When he came to power, Lissouba gave a concession to the 
U.S. oil company Occidental Petroleum (OXY), which paid him important arrears of 
government employees. Expectedly, this threatened the interests of the French oil 
company, Elf-Aquitaine. Sassou also benefited from the backing of Angola, as the 
UNITA fighters and Cabinda Nationalist Guerrillas were believed to operate in parts of 
Congo, where they attack the Angolan government.  As for Lissouba, he had the support 
of President Laurent Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
The war of 1997 started in June when President Lissouba sent a detachment of 
forces to arrest ex-President Sassou ahead of the elections that were scheduled for July.  
Sassou was Lissouba’s chief rival in the elections that were forthcoming, and he 
threatened to return to power by electoral means.  The war lasted from June to October 
1997, after a fierce battle between the supporters of Lissouba and Sassou, who finally 
assumed power after Lissouba fled the country in defeat.  In January 1998, the Sassou 
regime held a national forum for reconciliation to ease the tensions and formed a 
transitional government. Nonetheless, fighting resumed in December 1998 when the 
former rebel forces loyal to Lissouba took up arms again.  After Sassou’s forces gained 
the upper hand, a couple agreements were signed between the two groups in November 
and December 1999. The war in Congo-Brazzaville war was a political one, as in Côte 
d’Ivoire, in the sense that it was triggered by the struggle for power in a context of 
political reform. It was a war where an elected president had been ousted (like Bédié). It 
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was also a war between ethno-regional groups (like the Forces Nouvelles and Gbagbo’s 
supporters). The differences are that in Congo-Brazzaville, oil was considered a crucial 
factor in the war, and French backing of Sassou-Nguesso against Lissouba was evident. 
Finally, there was a clear evidence of foreign involvement on both sides, which has yet to 
be proven in the Ivoirian case.  As in Côte d’Ivoire, however, the structural pressures for 
war cannot be said to have caused the war.  Rather, they only created a political context 
in which the leading political figures were encouraged to behave irresponsibly (Clark 
2008 and Knight 2007). 
2.  Sierra Leone 
It is widely accepted that the civil war in Sierra Leone was in part fueled by the 
civil war in neighboring Liberia. Former Liberian President Charles Taylor, who had led 
a faction in Liberia's civil war, reportedly sponsored the RUF as a means to destabilize 
Sierra Leone. The RUF fighters led by Foday Sankoh operated from neighboring Liberia. 
There were also members of Liberian NPFL, as well as Burkinabès. The RUF and some 
members of the Sierra Leone army controlled the diamond-rich areas in the south and 
east. In this case, natural resource was a big contributing factor in the conflict, though the 
struggle for power seemed to be the primary cause of the fighting. A power-sharing peace 
agreement signed in Lomé awarded Sankoh the post of chairman of the Commission for 
Strategic Mineral Resources and Development (see Campbell 2004, Gberie 2005, 
Richards 1996). The Sierra Leone case is a clear evidence of wars of control of the 
resources, and power struggle. It also demonstrates the key role of sub-regional alliances, 
as states like Liberia, Burkina Faso, Libya, and Nigeria got involved. 
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3.  Liberia 
 
The civil war in Liberia started in 1989 after a failed coup attempt against 
President Samuel Doe by Gio and Mano elements. Doe’s internal supporters included the 
Krahn and Mandigo ethnic groups. On December 24, 1989, a few Libyan-trained rebels 
led by Charles Taylor invaded Liberia from within Côte d’Ivoire borders. With explicit 
support from neighboring African nations and a large section of Liberia's opposition, 
Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) took over the capital.  
It was in this context that ECOMOG troops (the military branch of ECOWAS), 
predominantly from Nigeria and Ghana, entered Monrovia and joined the Doe camp. 
Many non-Krahn or anti-Doe people were killed, as a result. The political context of the 
war was the attempt by Americo-Liberians to re-establish themselve as the dominant 
political force in Liberia. In this case, tribal affiliations played a key role in the split 
between the Krahn, Gio, and Mano people.  Burkina Faso's president Blaise Compaoré 
provided foreign mercenaries and training bases for Taylor. Military supplies and 
manpower from Libya and Burkina Faso were also transported by road through the Côte 
d’Ivoire to Liberia. The revenues generated for the war came from diamonds, timber, 
rubber, gold, and iron ore. The war spilled over into Sierra Leone in 1991, when Foday 
Sankoh led a mixed group of Liberians and Sierra Leoneans into Kailahun in eastern 
Sierra Leone. Finally, a cease-fire was signed in 1996 between the warring factions, 
surprisingly, Taylor won the 1997 presidential elections (see Huband 1998). 
The war in Liberia was also a complex one in the sense that it was a mixture of 
power struggle, control for the country’s resources, and ancient hatred between the 
Americo-Liberians and local indigenous ethnic groups, as well as sub-regional sub-
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alliances.  As in the other cases, the war in Liberia appears to have had multiple and 
overlapping “causes.”  None can be easily identifiable as “the” key cause. Rather, a 
number of different contexts must be recognized to understand how the war came about. 
F. Non-Wars Under Political Reform 
 
Despite the wave of democratization and enthusiasm that swept the African 
continent in the early 1990s, not all countries were forced to make significant changes to 
their political system. This was the case in Burkina Faso, Gabon, and Cameroon, for 
example. While the first country had experienced a military coup, the latter have been 
ruled for decades by authoritarian regimes that did not faced military intervention. In 
each case, the formerly de jure one-party states act now as de facto one-party states, with 
the same ruling parties still in charge. 
Indeed, Paul Biya, Omar Bongo, and Blaise Compaoré all have had a tight grip 
over their respective political system. In Gabon, the former President’s son now carries 
on his father’s legacy, following Bongo’s death in 2009.  Except for Cameroon, the other 
two had been involved in others’ wars, either as facilitators or accomplices. Gabon for 
instance, was implicated in the wars of Congo-Brazzaville for two reasons: its Elf 
connection, and presumably because of the Sassou-Bongo families’ personal relations. As 
for Compaoré, he has been involved in many wars in the sub-region by supplying arms 
and soldiers, or training facilities, and probably profiting from this arms trafficking. Only 
in Côte d’Ivoire did he play a constructive role as a peace broker. Though, he was 
accused by Ivoirian authorities of allowing the use of his country as a training ground 
before the September 2002 attack. This study suggests that, in general, despite the 
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pressure for political change, these three leaders have shown the kind of political skills 
necessary to avoid civil war, as Houphouët-Boigny once did in Côte d’Ivoire. 
As for Senegal, the only reforming state, it has been able to successfully manage 
the peaceful transition since President Abdou Diouf left power. Unlike Côte d’Ivoire, the 
political process has not been manipulated for personal gain. Abdoulaye Wade has 
displayed much more deft and statesmanlike behavior than did Houphouët’s Ivorian 
successors.  Today, this country is among the few countries cited as good students of 
democracy in Africa, alongside South Africa, Botswana, Ghana, and Zambia. Although 
the situation with Casamance remains unresolved, this has not threatened the essential 
stability of the Senegalese state.  
This study has made significant a contribution to various areas of inquiry. First, 
my dissertation has sought to contribute to the debate on the causes of civil wars in 
general, and the causes of the Ivoirian civil war in particular. A closely related issue is 
how divided polities like Côte d’Ivoire can return to the path of peaceful political 
development. Second, the comparative studies I used have shown that collectively all 
these cases faced structural pressures that might have led to violent conflicts. These 
structural pressures emanated from all of the same environments that conditioned the 
Ivorian case:  the global, the regional, and the internal.  In some of the cases, the leaders 
behaved selfishly and irresponsibility, leading their countries into the same kinds of wars 
that Côte d’Ivoire has faced.  In others, savy rulers were able to manipulate difficult 
circumstances to their advantage, and remain in power without significant political 
reforms.  Among the cases I compared here, only in Senegal did President Diouf allow 
reforms to proceed in a way that did not upset the country’s fragile social peace and civil 
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institutions. In all cases, the (unpredictable) agency of the key political actors had a 
significant bearing on the political trajectory that their countries followed. 
Third, my dissertation has also contributed to three other important areas: (a)  
The study was an empricial case that other researchers could use as a reference for future 
wars. (b) The study also made a contribution to the theoretical literature by proposing 
generic typologies of the causes of civil wars in general, and in the African context. 
Specifically, my dissertation has also shown that civil war in Côte d’Ivoire has evolved as 
a type-two (war agasint the state) to a type-four war (control over the local resources). (c) 
It has contributed to the policy area, especially conflict prevention. The policy message 
was that focus has to be on prevention, and thus on the proximate causes. 
Despite all the difficulties much has being done to try to put Côte d’Ivoire back 
on its feet. As Daddieh (2001: 18-19) has well stated: Although the political crisis is far 
from over, the situation can be considered to have been defused. The re-instatement of 
Ouattara’s nationality coupled with the conciliatory response of President Gbagbo, have 
pulled the country back from the brink of full-scale ethno-religious conflict.  
New elections are set for early 2010 in which fourteen candidates will compete. 
This juncture marks another opportunity for Côte d’Ivoire’s leading political figures to 
display their statemenship, and perhaps to put the country again on the road to peaceful 
development. 
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